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 ABSTRACT 
BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING: 
THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF AUSTRALIA’S CHINA POLICY 
by 
YEUNG Man Kwong 
Master of Philosophy 
Recent research on power shift, or the change in relative power of states in an 
international structure, has focused on how states adapt to strategic difficulties. As a 
key change in international politics, scholars have long discussed how states react 
strategically to power shift. One school in international studies, neorealism, 
emphasizes the prime importance of security affairs over other strategic concerns in 
an anarchic international structure. It explores states’ dilemma in choosing between 
balancing a more powerful state or bandwagoning with it. While this approach sheds 
important insights on the study of international politics, the parsimony of neorealism 
suffers from a lot of criticisms and challenges. Among these, argument on the 
multi-faced nature of a state’s strategic interests has gained the strongest traction. 
Power shift profoundly impacts the Asia-Pacific region. The rise of China, for 
example, draws concerns for changing distribution of power in the region and around 
the globe. Others regional states, especially secondary powers, have to redefine their 
strategies to adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape. However, strategic choices 
of these states are barely studied. Australia’s reaction to the power shift, for instance, 
challenges the neorealists’ “balancing versus bandwagoning” model. Australia’s 
search for her own regional position is filtered through its threat perception. Seeing 
ideological differences with a rising China, Australian politicians have continuously 
tried to engage China to gain profit while remaining skeptical about a more assertive 
China. This thesis challenges the balancing literature and investigates why hedging 
has been the strategic response used by Australia to deal with the power shift. 
This research analyzes and interprets Australia’s strategic dilemma with evidence 
collected from the Australian government, academics, and media. This thesis affirms 
the neorealists’ position on the predominance of self-help principle in international 
politics. However, it also tries to move further to argue that security is the principle 
that cannot be over-emphasized. Australia simultaneously maximizes her strategic 
 interests, which include security interests and economic interests. Principally, 
Australia aims at maintaining her status quo position while concurrently balancing 
against a rising China and bandwagoning with China economically for 
profit-maximization. By managing the strategic risk posed by China and not turning 
the China problem into China threat, Australia cautiously decides on her strategic 
response to prevent a riskier situation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGIC DILEMMA ON ITS 
CHINA’S POLICY 
 
1.1 Background of research 
Australia has long held strategic interests in China. China’s rise since its 
implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening Up” in 1978 has forced 
Australia to consider the implications of such on its strategic interests. The strategies 
employed by a state in the pursuit of its national interests were highlighted by 
Dueck’s (2011: 31) in his definition of “grand strategy”: 
 
“a calculated relationship on the part of national leaders of ends and means in 
the face of one or more potential external opponents… when there is no 
possibility whatsoever of the use of force, we usually do not speak of the 
need for a grand strategy… a kind of conceptual road map, describing how to 
identify, prioritize, and match national resources to national interests against 
perceived threats… may not be entirely coherent, pre-planned, or well 
considered...” (Dueck 2011: 31, emphasis added). 
 
In particular, a school in the study of international politics known as structural 
realism, or neorealism, sees the existence of an international system that is anarchic, 
that is, there is no central authority to exercise hierarchical order, so states have to 
self-help, leading to them prioritizing their strategic moves to secure their mere 
survival (Waltz 1979). Walt (1987) and Waltz (1979) proposed two strategies that 
states can choose for better security, namely, balancing and bandwagoning. 
Balancing suggests that states can either arm themselves or form alliances with other 
powers to balance against great powers, while the latter refers to states 
bandwagoning with the great powers to seek for security assurances (Waltz 1979: 
116-127).  
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The neorealists’ understanding described above is rather linear. In reality, external 
security behaviours of contemporary states differ from neorealists’ prediction, as 
loose strategic partnerships have become more popular than alliances (Wilkins 2012). 
In addition, there are issues other than security that states consider, especially during 
a period in which threats are not certain and imminent. States are concurrently 
sensitive to other’s actions and are willing to cooperate for economic gains (Keohane 
and Nye 2001). In short, the neorealists failed to predict the mixed strategies used by 
states in present times. 
Recently, attention has turned to the study of how states react to the power shift 
from Europe and the United States (US) to East and South Asia, in particular, that 
from the US to China. Power shift, in its ordinary use, denotes the changing 
distribution of power among states in the international system, with a rising power in 
the system that has the potential for supremacy (White 2010). Earlier, historians and 
realists believed that power transition on the global and regional levels may bring 
states into great power wars. Power shift today, however, is characterized by high 
levels of enmeshment between states and the international system (and the regional 
and international order), thus lowering the possibility of war-prone power transitions 
(Buzan and Cox 2013). Consequentially, Asia-Pacific regional powers are now 
facing a “strategic dilemma” - a dilemma in choosing between the reigning global 
power, the United States, and the rising great power, China.  
Among these regional powers, a peripheral middle power, Australia, has drawn 
scholarly attention, to the scale that a special issue of the Asian Survey have included 
several articles with differing views on the central theme of Australia’s ‘strategic 
dilemma’. For example, Dittmer and He (2014) described Australia’s strategic 
dilemma as a question of security and political (ideational) choice. Other articles 
resonated with the famous statement assessing his country’s position between the US 
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and China by Former Australian Prime Minister (PM), John Howard, when he left 
office: “We, Australia, do not need to choose between our history and our geography” 
(Howard 1995; 2003a; 2006). Howard’s position is widely held by both Australian 
politicians and academics. For instance, Hugh White, a professor at the Australian 
National University and the chief author of the 2000 Defence White Paper, argued 
that the choice between the US and China is a false dilemma that can be resolved by 
accommodating China (White 2005; 2010; 2013). Similarly, Nick Bisley, a professor 
of international relations at La Trobe University, proposed a hedging strategy. That is, 
while seeking economic cooperation with China, Australia should maintain a close 
strategic relationship with the US (Bisley 2014). Regardless of the view, it is clear 
from the literature that the question of how Australia decides its strategic response to 
the power shift is an important one. 
 
1.2 Scope of study and research questions 
 
This thesis explores Australia’s hedging strategy based on its China policy. 
Australia makes an interesting case for study, because, first, geographically distant 
from China, Australia’s strategic responses can be more accommodative like South 
Korea’s (Kang 2009). Yet, it inclines to put its effort in balancing against China. 
Second, it is important to understand Australia’s motive to hedge against China as an 
ally of the US. Third, Australia is economically reliant on China, which drives it to 
hedge simultaneously to maximize both the country’s security and economic interests. 
Finally, with reference to Former PM Tony Abbott’s “fear and greed” framework of 
Australia-China relations in a secret conversation with Angela Merkel, Chancellor of 
Germany, Australia’s China policy represents a typical case of hedging strategy in 
international politics worthy of further investigation. 
4 
 
The period covered by the current study is from 1996 to 2015. When John 
Howard was elected as the Prime Minister (PM) in 1996, the “China problem” and 
the future direction of Australia’s China policy started to occupy the country’s grand 
strategy discussion. Howard was the longest-serving Australian PM in recent history, 
and thus, his government’s China policy is essential for analysis. After Howard, 
Australia-China relations have seen consistent changes stemming from China’s 
continuous rise in capability and Australia’s fear over the impacts of China’s rise on 
its strategic interests. The end of the study period, September 2015, coincides with 
the ouster of Tony Abbott by his colleague, Malcolm Turnbull. 
This thesis attempts to answer the key research question: Is Australia’s China 
policy made according to neorealists’ prediction? The focus is on whether the 
security issue drives Australia to sacrifice economic interests in favour of adopting a 
purely balancing behaviour. If the neorealists’ prediction were unable to explain 
Australia’s China policy, it could then be argued that such prediction is inadequate or 
too parsimonious, and the following questions can be asked: What has been 
Australia’s alternative strategic response to the power shift? Does hedging against 
strategic risks best explain Australia’s strategy? If this were the case, not balancing, 
but bandwagoning, would be the answer to Australia’s strategic dilemma. This thesis 
argues that maximizing both security and prosperity is Australia’s fundamental 
motive to hedge against China’s rise. Therefore, the final question would be: How 
does Australia’s China policy shed light on states’ behaviour in the context of the 
general understanding of the power shift? 
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1.3 Research significance 
 
This research contributes to the ongoing debate on Australia’s China policy by 
providing a detailed analysis of the former’s hedging strategy against the latter. In the 
power shift, states have to react strategically to manage their relations with different 
regional and international powers. For example, both “fear and greed” are drivers for 
Australia’s strategic response towards the changing regional distribution of power 
(Uren 2012). While earlier scholars saw hedging as a risk management strategy, this 
research explores how states try to maximize strategic interests through such an 
action. Thus, without deviating from conventional understandings on hedging, this 
thesis provides a theoretical understanding of states’ actual behaviours in maximizing 
gains whenever possible. In this sense, this thesis concurs with the long-standing 
criticisms on neorealists’ understanding of strategic responses in power shift, which 
emphasizes states’ concerns for security only. Despite this, the current study 
maintains that the anarchic international system can still be useful for analysing 
international relations. This thesis also contributes to Australia’s domestic debate on 
managing her relationship with China. As contemporary economic linkages are 
enormous, this thesis addresses how economic interactions drive hedgers to adopt 
certain strategic responses to a rising power. In summary, this thesis sees hedging as 
a pragmatic strategy by which hedgers, while attempting to manage strategic risks, 
pursue and maximize strategic interests. 
 
1.4 Data collection 
 
The current research is a case study that investigates Australia’s strategic 
response to China’s rise and how it uses a hedging strategy to maximize gains. A case 
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is defined by Eckstein (1975, cited in George and Bennett 2004: 20) as “a 
phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any 
pertinent variable”. Data on Australia’s China policy from the Australian 
Government, academic studies on China policy, and news reports on Australia’s 
response to China’s rise form the basis for analysing how Australia is hedging against 
China’s rise and how Canberra is managing its relationship with China. The findings 
are further analysed for how states fundamentally seek to maximize strategic 
interests when they hedge, resulting in the hypothesis that hedgers try to maximize 
gains when they hedge. Finally, this hypothesis is tested against the chosen case, that 
is, Australia’s China policy from 1996 to 2015, to determine its ability in explaining 
the motives driving the hedgers to respond to power shift (George and Bennett 2005, 
cited in Leuffen 2007: 149). 
Data from the Australian Government are essential for understanding the 
country’s China policy by framing them systemically under a hedging framework. 
Such data include official documents, such as media releases, policy papers, and 
transcripts of speeches on how Australian government perceives China’s rise and 
makes her foreign policies (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Vromen 2010). Other 
government-related documents, including news briefings, materials available from 
government websites, and parliamentary documents, are also collected to broaden the 
database for the analysis (Burnham, Grant, Layton-Henry and Lutz 2008; 
Krippendorff 2003; Thies 2002). 
Other than official documents, scholarly studies, news reports and commentaries, 
and internet sources are also used in this study. Scholarly studies contribute largely to 
the conceptualization of Australia’s strategic responses to China’s rise (Burnham, 
Grant, Layton-Henry and Lutz 2008), and provide knowledge on how her policy has 
changed over the past ten to fifteen years. Critical interpretation of these works, 
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especially studies arguing for Australia’s hedging approach, is important for 
understanding the context and content of Australia’s China policy. In particular, 
studies by prominent Australian scholars, like Hugh White and Michael Wesley, and 
commentators of newspaper, like Greg Sheridan and Mark Kenny, are included in 
this research. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis sees maximizing gains as the fundamental motive for Australia’s 
hedging strategy against China’s rise. The analysis is based on the neorealists’ view 
of international politics, which has undergone a nearly four-decade-long debate with 
neoliberalism since Kenneth Waltz first proposed the theory. The debate forms the 
basis for examining the validity of criticisms on neorealism. Other middle-ground 
strategies that are normally associated with the study of hedging strategy in 
international politics, like engagement and accommodation, are also reviewed. 
Chapter 3 is a discussion of the hedging strategy, in which a literature review of the 
conventional understanding of hedging as a risks minimization strategy is followed 
by the development of a theoretical framework that emphasizes maximization of 
strategic gains in international politics, that is, states choose to both balance and 
bandwagon.  
The four ensuing chapters are detailed empirical examination of Australia’s 
China strategy. Chapter 4 is an overview of variations in Australia’s China strategy 
over the past two decades, with focus on the political history and ideational aspects, 
and how the international order shaped Australia’s threat perception. Chapter 5 
explores Australia’s internal balancing efforts, with a stress on how the ideas of 
“strong and secure” soothe the country’s fear from the uncertainty caused by power 
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shift. Chapter 6 deals with external balancing by revisiting Australia’s attempt in 
building external security partnerships, including the Asia-Pacific security 
partnership, to create a more certain environment in the context of power shift. 
Chapter 7 studies the economic aspects of Australia’s China policy. It examines what 
Australia has done in recent years to reap the benefits of China’s rise. Effects of 
Australia’s economic dependence on China and its relations to Canberra’s strategy 
towards the power shift are also investigated in this chapter. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by briefly summarizing the key findings of this 
research and introducing the implications from this research on enhancing the study 
of international politics and the development of a better theoretical understanding of 
hedging strategy, specifically, how hedging can be viewed as a strategy to maximize 
gains. Finally, opportunities for further studies by the international relations 
community in hedging strategy and the current Turnbull government’s China policy 
are proposed. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW: “BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING” 
AND THEIR VARIATIONS 
 
How states make their strategies have long been a popular topic for study in the 
field of international relations. Among these, literature on balancing strategy has the 
longest tradition, dating back to the writings of British historian E. H. Carr (1946). 
Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism/structural realism, carried out scientific 
analyses of states’ balancing strategy under an anarchic international structure and 
simultaneously explored the “balancing versus bandwagoning” thesis. As a structural 
theory, neorealism has faced a number of criticisms directed at both its assumptions 
and its applicability to a state’s strategic response to the changing distribution of 
power among states. In the case of the current power shift, neorealism is under fire 
for its applicability in explaining a state’s strategic behaviour. However, given its 
popularity and persuasive power, it is worthwhile to review the debates over the 
neorealists’ idea of “balancing versus bandwagoning”. 
The aim of this chapter is to present the theoretical perspective of neorealism and 
the criticisms it is facing. To begin with, literature on “balancing versus 
bandwagoning” is reviewed, with a focus on how neorealists explain the 
international structure. Second, criticisms on Waltzian balancing theory are 
highlighted. This brings the thesis to the discussion on bandwagoning behaviour in 
the literature. Third, two other strategic responses discussed repeatedly in the 
literature, namely, engagement and accommodation, are introduced.  
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2.1 Balancing and bandwagoning – the dichotomous pair in international 
politics 
 
One of the earliest writings on realism is Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian War (Morgenthau 1973). Based on the works of historian E. H. Carr 
and political theorist Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz developed the neorealist/ 
structural realist school, which has influenced many who followed (Parent and 
Rosato 2015). This section serves three purposes. First, a neorealist structured 
approach and the theory of balancing is introduced. This is followed by a review of 
the criticisms of the neorealist school, and finally, a discussion on the refinements 
made by later scholars to the neorealist approach. 
 
2.1.1 Structural realism and the balance of power theory 
Neorealism is “neo-” in the sense that it introduced a new approach to the realist 
school. The neorealist approach is a structural approach that studies how the 
international system shapes states’ behaviours (Waltz 1979). Under an anarchic 
structure, neorealists believe that states’ goal is to make themselves secure, defined 
primitively as survival
1
 (Waltz 1979: 107-116). While Waltz argued that balancing 
against great powers make a state secure, offensive-minded scholars led by John 
Mearsheimer proposed that it is seeking hegemony that makes states more secure 
(Mearsheimer 2014: 30-36; Waltz 1979: 117-127). Regardless, the major concern of 
the neorealists’ theory is how states respond to changing international politics to gain 
security (Mearsheimer 2014; Parent and Rosato 2015; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). 
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 Waltz (1979: 118) wrote “states… at a minimum seek their own preservation and, 
at a maximum, drive for universal domination”. He declared the international system 
as a system of “self-help”. 
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On security, neorealists focus on how power is distributed among states within 
the system. Power has been defined in many ways. For example, Waltz (1979: 131) 
defined it as the ‘size of population, resources endowment, economic capability, 
military strength, political stability, and competence’, ranking the powers roughly 
according to their power, while Mearsheimer (2014: 55) saw it as “the 
socio-economic ingredients that go into building military” power that are “largely 
based on a state’s wealth and the overall size of its population”. Neorealists see two 
categories of states: Great powers, which are polar powers that can impact the 
patterning of the international system, and small or secondary powers, which react to 
great powers’ capabilities and behaviours (Mearsheimer 2014; Waltz, 1979). To 
Waltz, great powers have large military and economic power capabilities, and they 
usually have nuclear capabilities (Waltz 1993). Therefore, an economic great power, 
in Waltz’s conception, needs to be a military great power too. In the case of Japan in 
the early 1990s, Waltz argued that “[A] country to choose not to become a great 
power is a structural anomaly”, implying that Japan in that era was required by the 
international structure to be a great power possessing sizable military forces after 
becoming powerful economically (Waltz 1993: 61-70; 2000: 33). After all, in an 
anarchy, states need to arm themselves to safeguard themselves from vulnerability 
and conflicts.  
Later on, some scholars proposed that great powers will try to gain, or even 
maximize, power to meet security needs through hegemony-seeking behaviours 
(Mearsheimer 2014; Schweller 1998). However, maximization of power is a 
controversial view in the neorealist school. Waltz argued that possession of nuclear 
weapons by smaller powers gives them second strike capabilities, thus eroding the 
offensive advantages of a great power seeking hegemony (Waltz 1993). To explain 
this situation, Waltz introduced his theory of the balance of power, which states that 
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secondary states will align with the weaker side to deter great power. The opposite 
behaviour is termed bandwagoning, meaning weaker powers choose to align with the 
great powers for security if there are no other options (Schweller 1994). 
According to the balance of power, the state’s security can be guaranteed by 
internal and external balancing (Waltz 1979). Internally, states arm themselves and 
imitate the most advanced military technologies (Parent and Rosato 2015; Waltz 
1979: 118). Waltz also argued for mutual autarky and self-sufficiency, which leads to 
his prediction of the low level of economic cooperation between powers (Waltz 
1979). Neorealists view interdependency as mutual dependence. Great powers 
possess sizable economic power for building their military capability to maintain 
their status (Mearsheimer 2014: 67-75). However, increasing economic mutual 
dependence has led to neorealists refining their theory, such that interdependence is a 
dependent variable of security in states’ strategic considerations, rather than an 
independent variable shaping a state’s strategic response2 (Waltz 2000: 15). In other 
words, if interdependence potentially causes harm to security, states may choose to 
sacrifice economic benefits already gained to ensure security. 
States also balance externally by forming alliances. Secondary powers side with 
the weak side because “they are both more appreciated and safer” by shielding from 
the threat of great powers (Waltz 1979: 127, emphasis added). However, neorealists 
believe that military self-reliance is superior to forming and relying on alliances in 
gaining security (Parent and Rosato 2015). 
Flocking to the weak side prevents smaller powers from having to subordinate 
themselves to the stronger side (Waltz 1979: 127; 2000). For the great powers, 
however, external balancing is not a particularly yielding strategy, as the increase in 
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 Readers have to notice Waltz’s intention of writing this is warn the undesirability 
of unipolarity in international politics. 
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the above-mentioned advantages is just marginal (Parent and Rosato 2015). In 
addition, external balancing strategy can be unreliable, especially on occasions of 
war, when security alliances among great powers can easily be scrapped. This stems 
from the fact that, encountering an existential threat in a war, alliance commitment is 
at best ambivalent (Parent and Rosato 2015). When states change alliances, the 
implications could be changes in the equilibrium of the distribution of power in the 
international system
3
 (Waltz 1993). As a result, external balancing is still useful to 
all states engaging in balancing behaviour. 
 
2.1.2 Balance of power: Preliminary problems and criticisms 
Although the neorealists’ theory of the balance of power is a powerful tool for 
analysing the behaviour of state, it has triggered debates regarding the theory’s 
assumption and applicability. The revival of analytical focus on domestic politics in 
the 1990s has led a group of scholars to focus on its role in a state’s strategic 
response (Kang 2009; Kuik 2008; Rose 1998). Although structural anarchy is a 
useful concept accepted by many, some argued against neorealists’ belief that 
anarchy offers the best explanation for important outcomes. For example, a wide 
range of literature on the origin of the World War Two suggested that, on the one 
hand, the cartelization of ruling class at the top-tier of the hierarchy in expansionist 
states like Germany and Japan best explains their unrestrained expansion and 
aggression during the war (Snyder 1991). On the other hand, important beliefs 
regarding domestic political discourses in the mind of some top politicians in 
democratic France and Britain can be perceived as a cause for delayed efforts to arm 
themselves against Hitlerite Germany (Schweller 2008). Even in the study of the 
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 Interestingly, Waltz in the Theory told the most desirable structure is bipolarity 
while changed his mind and says multipolarity is better. See Waltz (1993: 45-50). 
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First World War, the neorealists’ theory of the balance of power has difficulty in 
explaining Italy’s betrayal of the triple alliance, in which all sides were roughly on 
par in power capabilities at the time (Schweller 1994: 95). 
Another weakness in the balance of power theory is in explaining whether 
weaker states join forces to balance against great powers militarily. For instance, 
European powers did not balance the US in the early 2000s (Wivel 2008). There is 
also no determinative evidence of balancing behaviour in the Asia-Pacific region, 
that is, small powers forming alliances to balance against China. Heavy economic 
interdependence in the region is a reason for the neorealists’ failure in explaining the 
situation (Ross 2006, cited in Goh 2007: 116-117). 
 
2.1.3 Balancing and bandwagoning: Waltz’s variants 
Balancing and containment 
While Waltz considered power maximization undesirable, as it may trigger other 
states’ counter-balancing, offensive-minded neorealists argued that power 
maximization by great powers is unavoidable. This view is best represented in 
Mearsheimer’s (2014) book The tragedy of Great Power Politics, which explores the 
great powers’ ambition to seek regional and international hegemony, their balancing 
behaviours against rising great powers, namely, by trying to translate latent (in the 
original use, economic power and population size) power to military power, and how 
that may lead to conflicts. It is obvious that great powers pursuing military 
domination will inevitably clash with each other in the race to the top (Mearsheimer 
2014; Tellis 2014). This view is rooted in the bipolar Cold War setting, in which the 
superpowers actively engaged in proxy wars in the periphery, prioritizing armament 
at the expense of economic development and blocking economic exchanges through 
applying sanctions on the others (Kennan 1987[1947]). Containment policy is, 
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however, not applicable in the age of low marginal gain in translating latent power 
into military power and an increase in production efficiency of weaponry 
(Mearsheimer 2014: 76-81). Also, it is difficult to contain a rising economic power 
that has substantive economic linkages. Thus, rather than dismissing Mearsheimer’s 
thesis, states are trying to prevent Mearsheimer’s nightmare scenario from being 
realized. 
 
Threat perception and balancing/bandwagoning debate 
Power, whether military or economic, is not always the factor that determines 
balancing behaviour. Walt (1987) argued in the balance of threat theory that threat 
perception determines balancing behaviour. This theory draws on the relationship 
between aggregate power endowment, offensive capabilities, geographical proximity, 
and threat perception as determinants of a state’s strategic behaviour, with the latter 
being the key determinant
4
 (Walt 1987; 1996). Threat perception is related to 
intention, where intention is defined as “actions he will take under given 
circumstances (or, if the circumstances are hypothetical, the actions he would take if 
the circumstances were to materialize)” (Jervis 1976: 48). Researching on 
psychological explanations of the causes of war, Jervis (1976) suggested that 
perceptions among elites in a state on both themselves and others, especially the 
perception on the ability to defend oneself and possibility of an attack by aggressive 
actors, can explain how fear contributes to conflicts. Moreover, Cohen (1978: 106) 
proposed that misperception of others’ intention can be prevented “by conforming to 
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 Normative scholars in international relations like Lebow (2008) tend to regard this 
offensive balance as fear-instilling behaviour which explains the causes of war in 
clashes honor-seeking behaviours, or influence in previous understanding. 
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rules mutually understood”, such that “they obviate the risk of collision and 
unnecessary conflict”.  
Following from the above, it is clear that cooperative and friendly perceptions 
contribute to building generous relations, while perceiving threats leads to balancing 
behaviours. However, championing the realists’ tradition that balancing behaviour 
prevails, Walt emphasized that threat perception should still be considered in the 
“balancing versus bandwagoning” debate. Thus, Walt’s balance of threat theory is 
capable of explaining why states bandwagon with power. Specifically, states 
bandwagon with great powers to balance against threat (Walt 1987: 175-176). Simply 
put, balancing is for managing threats externally (Walt 1987).  
The neorealists’ theory of balancing is still facing a number of unresolved 
questions. For example, Schweller (1994: 85-87) had criticized Walt’s theory as 
being biased to the world’s status quo and overlooking revisionist states’ 
expansionism. Other challenges include bandwagoning with a threatening power for 
gains is far more common in reality than Walt’s assertion (Grigorescu 2008; 
Schweller 1994; Sweeney and Fritz 2004), and alliances can be formed not 
necessarily by threats, but also interests (Schweller 1994; Sweeney and Fritz 2004). 
 
Hard and soft balancing 
During the American unipolar moment, scholars noticed a new pattern in weaker 
states’ balancing behaviours5. Pape (2005: 10, emphases added) termed this concept 
soft balancing, as opposed to the conventional hard balancing, and defined it as 
“actions… to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military 
policies” in the ear of the American unipolar moment. Given the high cost to 
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 The new balancing is a pattern opposing to balancing pattern in the Cold War. 
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reallocate resources for hard balancing, states choose to balance at an intensity low 
enough not to trigger any party, thus increasing costs for the unipolar great power 
acting unilaterally. Through denying American legitimacy, states aim at preventing 
any threat induced to their existence and sovereignty (Pape 2005: 15-16; Paul 2005: 
53-54, 59). Soft balancers form ad hoc, issue-based coalition (Pape 2005: 36). For 
instance, collaborative efforts by Russia, Germany, and France in the United Nations 
Security Council and NATO to veto US’s pre-emptive strike in Iraq partly reflected 
the effect of soft balancing (Pape 2005: 39-40; Paul 2005: 64-70). Simultaneously, 
states strengthen their power capability relative to the unipolar power. Low-key and 
low-intensity balancing methods are employed by other great powers (Pape 2005: 
36-37; Roy 2005: 310). 
Soft balancing, like conventional hard balancing, faces a number of challenges, 
one of which is its inclusion of a broad range of tactics and policies to define 
balancing (Kang 2009: 6-7; Pape 2005: 37). Furthermore, even if soft balancing is 
able to shed some conceptual insights, Paul (2005: 70, emphasis added) admitted that 
his analysis “does not make soft balancing a futile strategy, as the success of hard 
balancing is also uncertain, given the difficulty in determining when balancing has or 
has not occurred”. This view is a question to the realist theory that sees balancing 
behaviour as dominant and easily determined (Parent and Rosato 2015; Walt 1987; 
Waltz 1979). 
 
Proper balancing and Underbalancing 
There are also scholars who study how balancing behaviours are properly carried 
out. Researching on the existence of domestic political consensus and strength of 
cohesion in society and among elites about threat perception, Schweller (2008) 
concluded that competing domestic political discourses may lead to delayed efforts 
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in balancing threat. The inability to deter an imminent threat is dreadful to states’ 
security, usually risking the state’s survival (Schweller 2008). The problem facing the 
concept of underbalancing is similar to that facing soft-balancing, as it is difficult to 
clearly outline what is underbalancing. Specifically, although the concept of 
underbalancing attempts to support neorealists’ assumption that balancing is far more 
common than bandwagoning, the notion of underbalancing extends too far to explain 
balancing behaviours (Kang 2009: 7).  
 
Behavioural pattern in alliance politics: Chain ganging and buck-passing 
Another topic well-discussed by scholars is how allies behave. In a multipolar 
world, unlike bi- and unipolarity, states have a strategic option to pass the burden of 
balancing to others. Known as “passing the buck”, this action is against the self-help 
principle held by neorealists (Christensen and Snyder 1990). Another behaviour 
observed is “chain-ganging”, which means being in an alliance prevents states from 
acting independently (Christensen and Snyder 1990: 142). Whether states chain-gang 
with allies or pass the buck to others in a multipolar system primarily depends on 
threat perception. Perceiving offensive intention from a rising power, states tend to 
chain-gang with its allies. However, whether this is the case for secondary powers in 
the Asia-Pacific is still under investigation. 
 
Summary 
In short, the above-mentioned correctives are attempts to expand the applicability 
of “the balance of power” theory without challenging its structural assumptions. 
These efforts, however, are unable to eliminate criticisms of the assertion that 
“balancing is far more common than bandwagoning”. The case is worsened by a 
time-series study that surprisingly revealed that balancing behaviours are on par with 
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bandwagoning behaviours over a two-century period. This suggested that interests, 
not security and threats, determine whether states choose to balance or bandwagon 
(Sweeney and Fritz 2004). Regardless, balancing behaviours are still observable in 
many cases. In the following section, the other end of the “balancing versus 
bandwagoning” paradigm, bandwagoning behaviour, will be discussed. 
 
2.2 Bandwagoning: The understudied strategic phenomenon 
 
Bandwagoning behaviour was first established as the behaviour opposite to 
balancing (Waltz 1979: 126). The concept has been developed substantively in the 
literature, with the most notable one being the “bandwagoning for profit” theory 
(Schweller 1994). This section reviews the literature on bandwagoning and examines 
how the bandwagoning strategy was defined and developed. 
 
2.2.1 Conceptualization of bandwagoning in literature 
Waltz (1979: 126) first defined the bandwagoning strategy as a surrender of 
self-autonomy to powerful states for better security. Later, Walt (1987: 17) revised 
Waltz’s definition of bandwagoning to “the alignment with the source of danger” in 
his study of the development of Middle East politics between 1957 and 1979, and 
further divided bandwagoning into two categories of behaviours: “A form of 
appeasement” and “to share the spoils of the victory” (Walt 1987: 21). The following 
is a review of several dimensions of the bandwagoning strategy. 
 
Bandwagoning for security and bandwagoning for profit 
Scholars identified two motives in pursuing the bandwagoning strategy: For 
security and for profit. A problem in Walt’s definition of bandwagoning is whether 
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states bandwagon voluntarily. In a later publication, Walt declared bandwagoning 
strategy as “one side’s victories convince other states to shift their alignment to the 
winning side voluntarily” with unequal exchanges (Walt 1991: 55, 75, emphasis in 
original). Thus, Schweller (1994: 81) correctly pointed out that Walt’s somehow 
equates bandwagoning to surrendering or submission, as states bandwagon 
voluntarily (Schweller 1994)
6
. He then argued that “bandwagoning should not 
assume involuntary support gained through coercion, which is instead capitulation” 
(Schweller 1994: 83). Another research refuting the validity of bandwagoning 
behaviour of European states defined bandwagoning strategy as follows: (1) If states 
bandwagon for profit, they bandwagon willingly; (2) if states bandwagon for security 
(survival), they bandwagon before contingency; and, (3) states choosing to stand 
with the victory side after defeat cannot be regarded as bandwagoning. Only neutral 
states during a war bandwagon with the perceived victorious side can be regarded as 
bandwagoning (Whiteneck 2001). This reaffirms that, no matter what motives states 
have when they bandwagon, willingness is a key factor in measuring whether states 
bandwagon or not. 
Following from this, Schweller (1994) argued that profits, not security, drive 
states to bandwagon voluntarily, and critiqued neorealists’ comprehension of 
“balancing versus bandwagoning” for focusing too heavily on security as survival 
(Schweller 1994). He thus proposed the idea of “bandwagoning for profit” that 
targets profit-making behaviours. In this case, rather than being coerced into it, states 
bandwagon voluntarily, induced mainly by the compatibility in political goals, for 
instance, seeking expansion of power and matching of each other’s strategic goals. 
Schweller further defined several types of bandwagoning behaviours. Jackal 
                                                     
6
 In essence, Walt’s definition of bandwagoning as appeasement introduced the 
problem of bandwagoning as surrendering or submission. 
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bandwagoning describes efforts done by aggressive powers to block 
counterbalancing coalition by encouraging smaller powers to flock to its side. 
Piling-on bandwagoning exemplifies a state’s decision to join the victorious power 
willingly near the end of a war to claim the victory status
7
. Bandwagoning for the 
wave of the future analyses a state’s incentives to join emerging power for future 
gains. Finally, contagion bandwagoning explains the spread of domino effects on 
states (Schweller 1994: 88-99).   
Schweller’s conceptualization of bandwagoning behaviour has two distinctive 
features. First, the concept of “bandwagoning for profit” points out that states are 
profit-seeking parties. Second, the inclusion of a state’s preferences better explains 
how states pursue strategic goals. States can choose according to the cost they can 
pay when they act, and can prefer to be revisionists or be self-preserved. These differ 
in that revisionists can have unlimited aims and look for self-extension. They 
challenge the existing values, and believe in aggression, that is, conquering of other 
countries. On the contrary, status quo-power looks for self-preservation and protects 
existing values (Schweller 1994: 99-104). Further studies reaffirmed interests, both 
security and non-security, as drivers of alliance formation (Sweeney & Fritz 2004). 
For states to bandwagon in a limited manner, they need not pick a clear side. Rather, 
they only need to form partnerships with the bandwagon by sectoral coordination and 
some degrees of security commitment (Kuik 2008: 168-169). Meanwhile, states can 
also bandwagon for profit. Therefore, strictly and theoretically speaking, balancing 
and bandwagoning lie in two or more non-overlapping dimensions of defining 
national interests, and are not mutually exclusive. In such case, therefore, states may 
sincerely and voluntarily bandwagon with a power solely for rewards restricted to the 
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profitable dimension. However, caution should be taken that balancing against 
existential threats and bandwagoning with these threats for security may be 
contradictory. 
The concept of bandwagoning for profit provides insights for the analyses of 
small and middle powers. For instance, Litsas (2014) found that Turkey’s 
rapprochement with the US in the 2000s aimed at seeking profit, all while hiding her 
revisionist goals, which include gaining recognition of regional primacy, gaining 
American trust, and marginalizing Israel from Washington’s focus. Such strategy 
eventually paid off, and resulted in Turkey’s regional hegemony (Latsis 2014: 133-6). 
Thus, the Turkish’s bandwagoning with the US was more concerned with attaining 
strategic goals than survival. Another example is the six (out of 11) Pacific Islands 
states that participated in the Iraq War to attract American economic assistance 
(Wivel and Oest 2010). However, Schweller’s thesis is problematic for its difficulty 
in judging states’ revisionist intent. In sum, neorealists argue that states bandwagon 
for security, whereas Schweller and others, without contradicting to neorealists’ 
understandings, proposed profit-seeking as the motive for bandwagoning behaviour. 
 
Soft balancing and Soft bandwagoning 
Another heated debate topic is whether European powers bandwagoned with the 
US during the Iraq War, with some (Ohtomo 2003; Wivel 2008) believing that this 
has happened for both profit and security of the Continental Powers. Similar to the 
idea of soft balancing proposed by balancing theorist, bandwagoning scholars also 
raised the concept of soft bandwagoning to describe the varying degree states show 
in their symbolic behaviour to a powerful state (Grigorescu 2008). Specifically, soft 
bandwagoning captures the milder degree of unequal exchanges between the 
bandwagon and bandwagoners. An example of soft bandwagoning is the responses of 
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East and Central European (ECE) states to the Iraq War. Most of them bandwagoned 
with the US by participating in post-war rebuilding operations, but few joined the 
fighting against Iraqi forces (Grigorescu 2008). The motives for the ECE states to 
jump on the bandwagon included the hope to gain financial assistance from the US, 
American security presence to counterweight Russian influences, and to a lesser 
extent, taking advantage of the oil reserves in Iraq, which would lower their energy 
reliance on Russian natural gas (Grigorescu 2008: 286-9). This bandwagoning 
behaviour is soft, because these ECE states were not directly threatened by Iraq. 
They joined the operation because they believed that this is the best way for them to 
gain rewards. This concurs with Schweller’s definition of balancing and aggression, 
that is, small and medium powers bandwagon with the balancer to gain interest. So, 
most ECE states participated only in light intensity operations to show their support 
for American security. Figure 2.1 on the following page explains why states balance 
or bandwagon and various policy implications of their choices. 
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2.2.2 Constraints and costs of bandwagoning 
Bandwagoners have to pay considerable costs, such as the loss of autonomy in 
making security policy. The alliance of Japan and Canada with the US, for example, 
has constrained them from making security policies independently, as they are often 
asked by the Americans to devote efforts in committing to requirements of the 
alliance. Japan’s voluntary bandwagoning with the US for security is a good example 
of how a smaller power’s autonomy in making security policies can be affected. 
Japanese military forces are highly dependent on American technologies, which 
raises vulnerability to Tokyo to discard the treaty at a formidable cost (Beeson 2007: 
630; Ohtomo 2003: 46-50). Essentially, this is the security umbrella in the United 
States-Japan alliance that reduces suspicion on Japan’s re-militarization (Ohtomo 
2003). Furthermore, domestic anti-militarist forces also compel Japan to refrain from 
actively participating in American-led operations. However, there are also cases that 
small bandwagoners, like Canada, may not have sufficient resources to fulfil the 
requirements of the bandwagoning alliance (Boucher 2012). Regardless, 
bandwagoning for security through alliances with asymmetric powers puts 
considerable cost on the smaller power. As seen from the cases of Canada and Japan, 
both countries have to invest in security to fulfil their commitment to the US. When 
the US fights against her security threats under the name of NATO, European 
participants have to sacrifice their strategic interests, including partial security 
interest, to fight together with the Americans security threats, as in the case of 
Germany, which has to pay the cost of committing to fight under NATO operations 
(Wivel 2008: 32). In short, the worst-case scenario of bandwagoning at the cost of 
sacrificing foreign policy autonomy can be entrapment into wars without significant 
gain (Haine 2015: 998-999) or the accidental abandonment of the bandwagoning 
alignment. 
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More importantly, bandwagoning sometimes brings more risks than gains. 
Drawing from game theory, bandwagoning behaviour may a send wrong signal that 
the bandwagon can take whatever advantages from bandwagoners (Jervis 1976: 
58-59). Although historically, states bandwagon to gain strategic interests, 
requirements set forth by the bandwagon may cost bandwagoners much more than 
the benefits they could enjoy. For example, the terrorist attacks in London in 2005 
brought unexpected security cost to Britain for their participation in the Iraq War. 
Australia’s alliance with the US also draws scepticisms from her Asian counterparts 
for being the “deputy sheriff” of the US in the Asia-Pacific (Beeson 2007: 625-628). 
In short, states pay when they bandwagon. Bandwagoners may be entrapped by 
commitments stemming from the bandwagoning behaviour, resulting in them having 
to share the burden of the bandwagon’s pursuit of interest at the expense of the 
bandwagoner’s own interest.  
 
2.3 Two muddling-through strategies: Engagement and accommodation 
 
Although “balancing versus bandwagoning” captures states’ strategic responses 
to the power shift, states in the Asia-Pacific are often described as engaging in, and 
accommodating to, China’s rise. Walt (1991: 55), in a book chapter, admitted that 
“balancing and bandwagoning are ideal types, and actual behaviour will only 
approximate either model”. This implies the existence of non-ideal, possibly 
muddle-through strategic responses, which will be reviewed in this section. 
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2.3.1 Engagement 
Engagement is an ambiguous term that describes interactions between states per 
se. For the purpose of this study, the definition of engagement is as suggested by 
Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (1999: 10, cited in Drifte 2002: 5): 
 
“[T]he use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo 
elements of a rising power’s behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing 
power is used in ways that are constituent with a peaceful change in regional 
and global order”. 
 
This definition outlines two essential elements: Prevention of major military 
conflicts and removal of revisionist elements from the rising power. Thus, 
engagement is a status quo-oriented strategy moderating the revisionists’ ambitions 
of increasing their powers through their gradual socialization of the existing order. 
An example of engagement policy is Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder”, 
a term he introduced in 2005 in his capacity as Deputy Secretary of State of the US 
to mandate Chinese responsibility in providing international public goods. In 
Zoellick’s (2005) words, a responsible stakeholder defends the status quo, which 
“recognize[s] that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they 
work to sustain that system”. Engaging China to become a responsible stakeholder, 
thus, enhances the status quo global order and lowers the possibility of a rising power 
revising the status quo militarily. Concurrently, the engagement strategy requests a 
rising power to share the burden of providing international public goods for peace, 
stability, and prosperity. In this sense, the engagement strategy is closely related to 
regional multilateralism, which can enmesh rising powers by binding them with rules 
and values (Wesley 2015). This is also why engagement, as a norms-loaded strategy, 
has failed to convert China into a responsible stakeholder. 
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The engagement strategy is difficult to be carried out successfully, as a powerful 
state will try to promote its own agenda and spread her values and norms to compete 
with others (Wesley 2015). As the international order is defined as “distribution of 
power and prevailing understandings of legitimacy within society, and for some time 
their ability to shape behaviour can keep power and legitimacy within their 
prescribed limits”, China will continuously challenge the status quo by introducing 
her norms and values (Wesley 2015: 484). China will not accept western values and 
norms, like human rights, democracy, and market liberalization, and will seek to 
shape the politics of small powers (Reeves 2013). In this case, the effectiveness of 
engagement remains doubtful. 
 
2.3.2 Accommodation 
The literature also discusses how status quo powers can accommodate Chinese 
strategic goals to de-escalate strategic competition. Accommodation is a strategic 
choice that partially or totally, and unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally 
appeases some of the rising power’s revisionist agendas. The aim of accommodation 
is to manage strategic risks and legitimize the status quo order by revising it 
gradually, with the aim of “satisfying the rising power and adapting it to the new 
environment” (Glaser 2015; Lee 2012: 6; Manicom 2014; White 2013). States 
accommodate a rising power by negotiating for peace and security, and no written 
agreement is needed. 
The study of accommodation peaked in the aftermath of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC). Amidst the economic downturn, there were suggestions for a 
negotiated peace that allows China to play a more significant role in international 
politics while continuing American provision of security through maintaining her 
alliance commitment, as well as developing new strategic partnerships with other 
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regional states (Glaser 2015: 54). American commitments to the Asia-Pacific include 
protecting the freedom of navigation, arms sales, and the commitment to defend to 
Taiwan (Glaser 2015; Manicom 2014: 352; White 2013: 95-97). The question then is 
whether the US is willing to accommodate China. Australian strategist Hugh White 
argued for the establishment of a concert of power by  
 
“an agreement among a group of great powers not to try to dominate each 
other, but to accept one another as great powers and work to resolve 
difficulties by negotiation” (White 2013: 134-136). 
 
 The feasibility of accommodation relies on whether the US is willing to truly 
treat China equally, which is rather difficult to be realized (Glaser 2015: 86-87; 
White 2013: 141). A grand bargain between the US and China on the critical strategic 
issue, Taiwan, is another case of accommodation (Glaser 2015). Negotiation for the 
US to concede its commitment to protect Taiwan in exchange for Beijing’s 
recognition of America’s involvement in Asia’s security affairs can be pursued by 
managing allies’ expectation and domestic opposition (Glaser 2015: 78-84). Private 
negotiations on Asia-Pacific security, in addition, can be the third way to 
accommodate a rising China (Manicom 2014: 360-362). In brief, status quo great 
powers can better negotiate with rising powers to “agree to disagree” with each 
other’s strategic interests to form an accommodative solution (Manicom 2014). 
Regional powers have also accommodated China. South Korea, for example, has 
accommodated China’s rise since the mid-2000s by strengthening her economic 
relations with China, developing sound strategic relationships with China, and 
showing limited determination to balance China militarily (Kang 2009). Taiwan 
under Ma Ying-jeou government has also accommodated China by accepting the 
“One China principle” and signing the ECFA in 2010 (Ross 2010: 383-387). Vietnam, 
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lacking a potential ally, has also accommodated China while denying China’s 
hegemonic ambition (Goh 2005: 23).  
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HEDGING AS NATIONAL INTERESTS 
MAXIMIZATION 
 
After briefly introducing the two key types of strategic responses to power shift 
as suggested by structural realism, namely, balancing and bandwagoning, and the 
two muddling-through strategies, namely, engagement and accommodation, this 
chapter will explore additional state strategies to respond to a rising power. Many 
scholars since the mid-2000s have analysed the use of hedging strategies by regional 
powers, and to some extent, international great powers, in a unipolar international 
system with the United States acting unilaterally in international affairs. In contrast 
to balancing behaviours adopted by states facing existential threats from 
unlimited-aims revisionist great powers, hedging strategists generally argue that 
states normally do not need to allocate extensive resources to self-help efforts, such 
as building military capabilities (preferably nuclear capabilities), advancing 
comparative security advantages, and championing economic self-reliance. Daily 
hedging strategies thus differ from those used when facing existential threats that 
require balancing alliances. In the current power shift, states, especially middle and 
small powers, opt for an interest maximizing approach in deciding strategies for 
structural uncertainty. Such behaviours have resulted in the rising popularity of 
hedging strategy. 
In the past, scholars studying hedging strategy focused primarily on the 
risk-minimization motives. This follows from the dictionary definition of the word 
“hedge”, which means “a way of protecting yourself against the loss of something, 
especially money” (The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2005: 724). Indeed, 
the definition of hedging in most literature follows an assumption of not “putting all 
eggs into one basket” (Lee 2012: 8). The prevalence of defining hedging as a 
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risk-aversion strategy analogical to hedge funds in the stock market is useful for the 
international community to understand what states hedge against. However, as will 
be shown in this chapter, such conventional understanding of hedging does not 
capture what states look for when they diversify their strategic investments. 
Essentially, hedging strategy helps states to maximize different strategic interests, 
defined to be national interests that include security, economic, and political interests. 
Based the neorealists’ definition of power in Section 2.1, this chapter will propose an 
alternate view of hedging strategy by considering its real motives as gaining both 
security and profit.  
To facilitate the understanding of this alternate theoretical explanation and why 
states hedge to maximize strategic interests, a review of the conventional 
understanding of hedging strategy practices of states is first carried out, with a 
special focus on regional powers in Southeast Asia, on which a large sum of 
literature has been produced. Secondly, the alternate theoretical formulation on 
hedging as maximization of strategic interests is elaborated. With states intending to 
maximize both security and economic interests, evidence will be provided to affirm 
that maximizing gains represent a better understanding of how states manage 
strategic risks. 
 
3.1 Hedging strategy in the literature: Conventional understanding as risk 
minimization 
 
The hedging strategy is conventionally understood as a strategy for preventing 
loss of strategic interests in an uncertain international system. The hedging strategy is, 
hence, a risk-aversion strategy, similar to states putting eggs into different baskets. 
The study of hedging became popular in the aftermath of the American invasion of 
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Iraq, responding to the question of how states minimize strategic risks (Goh 2005). In 
the mid-2000s, scholars started to apply the study of hedging strategy to analyse 
regional response to China’s rise (Foot 2006; Kuik 2008; Medeiros 2005; Roy 2005). 
Facing an increasingly uncertain geopolitical setting triggered by the power shift, the 
study of hedging strategy concerns how hedgers simultaneously gain economic 
benefits from China while engaging China into a binding, rules-based, and 
procedure-guided American-led international economic order (Foot 2006; Goh 2005; 
Kuik 2015; Medeiros 2005). In explaining why regional powers hedge against a 
rising China, many (e.g., Lee 2012: 8; Matsuda 2012) considered hedging strategy a 
risk-aversion policy to prevent contingencies, with some (e.g., Kuik 2015; 2016) 
even hailing it as a way to prevent the worst contingencies. Others analysed hedging 
strategy by focusing on Asia-Pacific powers and their strategic indeterminacy in 
response to an uncertain international system during the power shift (Jackson 2014; 
Matsuda 2012; Mederios 2005: 146; Roy 2005). Therefore, it can be seen that a 
common theme shared by the literature is their focus on managing strategic risks to 
explain how states hedge to prevent losses. However, while such studies see 
low-intensity or soft balancing, it does not entail that hedgers sacrifice economic 
interests to balance an imminent, existential or intolerable threat. States, while 
preventing losses, still acquire adequate military power, which is a form of 
low-intensity balancing to ensure their security. 
 
3.1.1 Security risk-minimization – the limited balancing rhetoric 
The conventional understanding of hedging strategy explains how hedgers 
manage a rising power, de-escalate strategic competition, and prevent the nightmare 
scenario of turning the rising power into real and imminently adversarial threat. 
Misperceiving a threat or failing to perceive a threat can result in costly 
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consequences, risking a state’s survival (Jervis 1976; Mearsheimer 2014). Despite 
hedgers trying to prevent such scenarios from coming true, they are still afraid of 
great powers with sizable military forces harming their security. Military power, as 
the source of fear, is thus a necessary condition for hedging strategy, and the hedgers’ 
strategy, then, is to prevent major power conflicts (Kuik 2015). As Kang (2009: 7, 
emphasis added) argued, “countries that do not fear a larger state do not hedge, even 
if they do not bandwagon”. Indeed, literature on hedging strategy follows the 
neorealists’ assumption that a state can never perceive the true intention of others 
(Mearsheimer 2014: 31). In Asia-Pacific, most regional powers, irrespective of their 
size, hedge against China (Foot 2006; Kuik 2008; Medeiros 2005; Roy 2005; Tow 
2008b: 9, 20-21). While great powers like the US can compete to maintain regional 
primacy, smaller powers can, at best, minimize strategic risks (Wesley 2015; White 
2013). As such, hedgers in conventional understanding should adopt “both 
competitive and cooperative policies” that aim at preventing the worst contingencies 
(Medeiros 2005: 147). 
States also hedge against revisionist ambitions. Given the possibility of China 
revising the world order, status quo minded hedgers feel uncertain about the effect of 
China’s rise on their security. Thus, they use low-intensity security competition, 
which is similar to soft-balancing, to assure their position in the region (Kuik 2008: 
165-171; Roy 2005: 310). There are also studies that discuss the change in the 
strategy to a more balancing-oriented approach if the rising power gradually 
transforms into a real security threat (Babbage 2011: 61; Kuik 2015; Matsuda 2012: 
114-115). However, hedgers still aim to limit the possibility of a strategic 
competition escalating to an armed conflict to the lowest level. Otherwise, their 
economic well-being may be sacrificed as resources have to be devoted to balancing 
against threats. 
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Previous research had suggested two approaches in managing strategic risks. The 
first one is socialization-based engagement (Kuik 2008: 167-168; Roy 2005: 310), in 
which hedgers engage the targeted state by socializing them into the status quo world 
order while refraining from triggering harsh responses from it. A possible way is to 
engage the targeted state into multilateral institutions through a binding engagement, 
and then set up procedural rules to shape its behaviours. This raises the cost for the 
targeted state to disobey those rules to threaten hedger’s strategic interests (Roy 1996) 
while lowering the possibility of its pursuit of revisionist ambitions (Goh 2007: 
146-147; Jackson 2014: 342-345). In addition, hedgers refrain from giving any firm 
commitment to other countries, leaving room for investing alternatively in different 
strategic dimensions by engaging different powers (Lee 2012). By staying 
strategically indeterminate, hedgers are able to maintain more strategic autonomy to 
respond to strategic contingencies. In short, conventional understanding of hedging 
supports the idea of tacit balancing against a rising power. 
 
3.1.2 Profit-seeking and pragmatic cooperation 
Literature on hedging strategy assumes a high level of economic interdependence 
and mutual sensitivity to policy changes of other states to their national economic 
welfare. Given this, economic interdependence serves as a foundation for states to 
pragmatically pursue economic profits from doing business with the targeted state. In 
the literature, hedgers advocate for some degree of expansion through economic 
cooperation with the rising great power, in this case, China (Medeiros 2005; Tellis 
2014: 43-45). For example, they develop economic linkages with China to profit, 
even when they hedge against uncertainty. As mentioned previously, hedgers can use 
regional multilateral institutions to maximize economic gains. For instance, hedgers 
engage China in the regional trading network with well-established rules and 
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regulations to liberalize trade relations with China, with a hope of influencing the 
policy outcomes of China (Foot 2006: 83-84; Goh 2007; Lee 2012: 13). However, 
while increasing trade volumes benefit hedgers’ domestic economic welfare, the 
dependence on trading with the great power would weaken their bargaining position 
and increase the costs for balancing (Lee 2012: 20-21). In Asia-Pacific, concerns for 
regional power’s economic dependence on China were raised after the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997, when China started to become these states’ important 
trading partners (Foot 2006: 85). The concern over the economic over-dependence on 
China only worsened after the 2008 Financial Crisis. As a result, regional powers 
strive to secure a better negotiation position vis-à-vis China by investing in different 
parties and reducing reliance on a single partner, which may harm hedger’s pursuit of 
profits. 
Summing up, regional powers in Asia-Pacific selectively cooperate with China to 
maximize profit while keeping a safe distance from this rising power. 
 
3.1.3 The rise of less-committed strategic partnerships 
Studies also revealed that hedgers form strategic partnerships, not alliances per se, 
with each other. An alliance is defined by Walt (1997: 157) as “a formal or informal 
commitment for security cooperation between two or more states”, including “both 
formal alliances, where the commitment is enshrined in a written treaty, and informal, 
ad hoc agreements based either on tacit understandings or some tangible form of 
commitment, such as verbal assurances or joint military exercises”. Alliance 
behaviours can be differentiated from forming an alliance per se, meaning that 
alliance behaviours are not necessarily linked with signing binding, formal treaties. 
Wilkins (2012: 59-61) emphasized that, for any security cooperation to be qualified 
as an alliance, it should be formal, well-documented, binding, permanent and aimed 
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at deterring threats or expanding power. Informal, ad-hoc agreements for deterring 
threats are coalition instead of an alliance.  
Contemporary security cooperation tends to be different from security coalition 
aimed at defeating existential threats in wartime, when some states surrender their 
commander to the leading power (Rice 1997). The ideology-driven Cold-War style 
alliance systems, most notably the American “hub-and-spokes” system, have now 
transformed into mere regional security architectures (Foot 2006; Goh 2007; Tow 
2008b, 2008c). Regional powers fight to gain assurance from the US to preserve the 
power balance and deny China’s quest for primacy (Kuik 2008: 169-170; Medeiros 
2005: 146; Roy 2005: 319-320). Present day alliances are, at best, defence-oriented 
mechanisms that assure secondary powers (Dupont 2015; Wilkins 2014: 154-157). 
States no longer seek security enhancement through newly-written alliances. Instead, 
hedgers seek strategic partnerships, which are “all-dimensional, wide-ranging and 
multi-layered” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004, cited in Feng and Huang 
2014: 7). Such strategic partnerships are formed after some level of economic 
relation is developed with partners to deepen bilateral relationship (Wilkins 2012: 67) 
and to achieve security and other strategic goals (Feng and Huang 2014: 12-14; 
Wilkins 2012: 68). By forming strategic partnerships, hedgers can securitize 
commonly-perceived important issues (Dosch 2012: 158-159; Scott 2014) and build 
confidence among partners (Jackson 2014: 348-350), while decreasing the need to 
commit to relocating domestic resources to fulfil written commitments to other states, 
as in an alliance. 
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3.2 An alternative theoretical understanding of hedging – maximization of 
strategic interests 
 
The alternate theory on why states hedge, namely, to maximize gains, is 
introduced in this section. In the following, the term “maximizing gains” is first 
defined, followed by an explanation on how hedgers maximize gains. 
 
3.2.1 Defining the “maximization of strategic interests” 
Hedgers aim to maximize strategic interests whenever they can. Specifically, 
states attempt to maximize both security and economic interests. This understanding 
of hedging strategy differs from the conventional version, in which scholars explain 
how states strive for strategic manoeuvrability by minimizing strategic risks. Kuik 
(2015: 23) argued that direct balancing sacrifices balancer’s economic interests, 
while the current thesis proposes that states can simultaneously exercise balancing 
and bandwagoning behaviours to maximize both security and economic interests. A 
state finds that maximizing her strategic interests would better posit her in an 
anarchic international system. To some extent, the current thesis postulates that states, 
concerned with their pursuit of national and strategic interests, are not fundamentally 
focused on minimizing strategic risks. Rather, these states are concerned with how 
they can best achieve both goals. This postulation is not to discount Kuik’s view on 
what hedgers do. Kuik proposed that hedgers will choose from strategies ranging 
from limited-bandwagoning, indirect balancing, binding engagement, economic 
pragmatism and dominance denial. The first means that hedgers try to gain political 
benefits by partnering selectively and giving defence to the bandwagon. The Second 
means that hedgers try to secure regional middle or small power’s security by 
gaining some degree of military power. The third means that hedgers try to project 
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and spread norms to engage the hedged power. The forth strategy means that hedgers 
try to maximize (economic) gains. And the last one means that hedgers try to prevent 
any regional great power from seeking hegemony (Kuik 2008; 2015; 2016). It should 
be noted that Kuik’s “indirect balancing” argument does not qualify as a balancing 
strategy. Balancing behaviours that hedgers exercise include arming themselves, 
which is not the same as containment. Providing one’s own security through arming 
is the most efficient way to prevent bandwagoning for security when a rising power 
has the ability to harm a hedger’s security (Waltz 1979: 112-113). Maximizing 
security by balancing behaviours, thus, fits the conventional understanding of 
hedging to improve hedger’s strategic independence (Wilkins 2014). After all, the 
critical difference between a balancing strategy and hedging behaviour lies in the 
nature of the source of threat. For this purpose, Roy’s (2005: 306) differentiation 
between balancing and hedging is adopted, in which balancing was defined as a 
security-cantered strategy to deal with “a certain and compelling threat” that is 
imminent and existential. The hedging strategy is then a mixed strategy by which 
hedgers deal with an uncertain and non-compelling threat. 
As mentioned previously, hedgers aim to maximize strategic interests. As a 
unitary party in anarchic politics, I argue that the state’s strategic interests can be 
assumed to represent the common denominator of consensus among its citizens on 
what are considered national interests. This would include “physical security and 
material well-being” (Frankel 1990: xi) and “spreading intangible values and norms 
worldwide” (Nye 1999). In other words, gains in a state’s strategic interests are 
multidimensional, involving such dimensions as economic, security, and 
socio-political. However, for the purpose of this thesis, socio-political interests are 
taken to be a form of security interest, as the goal of seeking socio-political interests 
is to ensure that the operating environment of hedgers be safer and more certain, 
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making such action a form of security-seeking behaviour. In other words, it is a 
search for political security, or, the security of a state working in an ideologically and 
psychologically comfortable environment (Mitzen 2006). To achieve this 
multidimensional goal which fundamentally maximizes strategic interests and gains, 
states will need to employ a mixture of strategic tools. 
As hedgers try to maximize economics and security gains, they have to take care 
not to lose independence or risk security. Putting this alternatively, viewing hedging 
as gains maximization differs from understanding it in the traditional sense of 
minimizing risks, as the former better captures states’ pursuit of strategic interests. 
While the core theme of the traditional understanding of hedging is “risk”, the 
argument of the current thesis, namely, “hedging as gains maximization”, follows 
Schweller’s “balancing of interests” theory, which is an interests-based approach. It 
should be noted that interests are not contradictory to risk, and “increasing risk” 
should not be understood as the opposite of “gaining interests”. Kuik (2015: 13, 
emphases as original) argued that it is the “mixed perception of threats and 
opportunities” that leads to hedging for gaining benefits and preventing risks. 
However, a detailed analysis of the arguments that defined hedging as risk 
minimization reveals that hedgers try to maximize their strategic manoeuvre (which 
manoeuvre is also a kind of interests) for pursuing their strategic goals
8
. This 
approach is, primarily, looking at how hedgers prevent the deterioration in their 
position of carrying out foreign policies. Conversely, this thesis views hedging 
strategy as an interests-based, “gains maximization” approach, in which states pursue 
                                                     
8
 For this common theme, minimizing strategic risks to facilitate hedgers’ pursuit of 
strategic interests, works from Foot (2006), Kuik (2008, 2015, 2016), Medeiros 
(2005), and Roy (2005) are worth to visit 
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improvement in their position. In this sense, the argument of this thesis is not 
contradictory to conventional understandings. 
It has been observed that great powers since the 16th century had all first risen 
economically, before converting their sheer economic power gradually into military 
power (Gilpin 1981: 65; Kennedy 1989[1987]; Mearsheimer 2014). This provides 
support for the realists’ explanation on the motives for states to cooperate with others 
economically. In an increasingly uncertain geopolitical setting, hedgers have to plan 
for long-term security. A way of accomplishing this would be to maximize profits 
and domestic welfare, and gain the economic power needed for developing more 
advanced military power to ensure maximum security and the state’s survival. In fact, 
the lack of investment in strengthening her economic power as a long-term basis for 
security was quoted as a partial reason by Waltz (1993: 50-51) for the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. To prevent history from repeating itself, states have to arm themselves 
continuously, and this requires heavy investment in building up the military. To 
sustain her investment in arming, hedgers need a strong foundation in their economic 
power. Through limited bandwagoning with the targeted power, hedgers seek to 
maximize economic power as latent power for future security. The maximization and 
accumulation of economic profits from bandwagoning for profit would also enable 
hedgers to better secure both domestic welfare and long-term improvement of 
military power. Thus, bandwagoning economically with the targeted power is the 
best way for hedgers to maximize their security. 
Figure 3.1 represents how hedgers try to gain strategic interests. On the economic 
side, states maximize economic well-being and national economic welfare. On the 
security side, hedgers maximize both military capabilities and the subjective feeling 
of being secure. 
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3.2.2 Diplomacy to secure strategic interest – what do hedgers do? 
Hedgers may “bandwagon for profit” if they perceive that the losses in security 
are compensated for, or outweighed by, economic gains (Kuik 2008: 168-169). When 
hedgers bandwagon for profit, they coordinate their diplomacy to prevent triggering 
the targeted power’s harsh responses. This is a mild form of unequal exchange, in 
that, to hedgers, such a form of profit maximization involves the concession in 
promoting political values. When describing states bandwagoning for profit, 
Schweller’s proposed the idea of “wave of the future”, which means that status quo 
minded hedgers seek to gain by joining the side with higher profitability in the future, 
which attracts the hedgers in a way not dissimilar to a religious dogma (Schweller 
1994: 96-97).  
However, such a light degree of bandwagoning for profit behaviour is highly 
conditional. For instance, hedger’s core political values cannot be sacrificed 
unconditionally. Hedgers will tolerate assertiveness of the hedged to the extent that 
such assertiveness in international affairs does not harm hedger’s pursuit of strategic 
interests. Thus, hedgers simultaneously act to maximize economic profits and 
bargaining power while taking care not to become too reliant on the target. 
Overreliance on the targeted state may lead to price drop in the long run, particularly 
when businesses from the targeted state invest heavily in key areas of hedger’s 
domestic economy, such as key exported goods. The drop in price of those goods can 
sharply lower the profit hedgers earn from exporting those goods. To prevent this 
kind of economic reliance, hedgers would protect domestic industries by rejecting 
efforts from the targeted state to acquire ownership of local businesses, so as to  
gain better bargaining position in future economic cooperation (He and Sappideen 
2013: 60). Therefore, when state hedges, they may hedge in different ways to 
maximize gains, and carry different measures within a realm, say economic, to 
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maximize gains with a presumption of the minimization of losses, achieved by 
binding economic engagement similar to economic norms socialization. 
In case the threat of a rising power is not imminent, Roy (2005: 307) argued that 
hedgers would balance against the targeted state at low intensity to maximize 
physical security by, for example, selectively arming themselves to maintain the 
offensive-defence balance. It means that hedgers try to better secure themselves by 
obtaining defensive advantage against potential attack by the targeted state. However, 
believing that the targeted state will not start a war in near future, hedgers only invest 
moderately in arming herself, with the aim of maximizing security using minimum 
resources (Kuik 2015).  
When choosing how to arm themselves, neorealists believe that states base their 
decision on their geography, which Parent and Rosato (2015: 58) stated would shape 
states’ balancing behaviours. Although a prominent offensive realist, John 
Mearsheimer, argued for the primacy of land power, which helps great powers to 
seek regional hegemony by conquering adversaries’ territories in war, this is not the 
case for hedgers, which are mostly regional powers (Mearsheimer 2014). Hedgers 
usually lack the resources needed to build a formidable power, and thus, they 
generally invest heavily in their navy and air force (Kuik 2008; 2015). Apart from the 
fact that “land powers invest more on land forces” and “sea powers invest heavier on 
the navy”, hedgers with a maritime advantage usually plan for air-sea battles. The 
aim of planning air-sea battles is to minimize human and infrastructure losses in their 
territories and to exercise the A2/AD tactic on their target (Carr 2014; Dupont 2015). 
In the medium- to long-run, hedgers also outline plans for advancing their 
technological development for better security, in addition to how to arm, how to fight 
against the targeted states in a war, and what kind of weapons to acquire (Parent and 
Rosato 2015; van Evera 1999; Walt 1996).  
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Externally, hedgers refrain from relying on any single partnership. Instead, they 
seek less-binding, less-committed security partnerships. For example, they seek 
security partnerships with the US and other regional powers, and they join together 
for war games, transfer of military technologies, and participation in nonfighting 
operations (Kuik 2008; Wilkins 2014). However, hedgers try not to act together as 
allies, as this would work against their own strategic interest. For example, hedgers 
would not join fighting operations against their economic partners. Building more 
regional strategic partnerships contributes to maximizing security by minimizing 
regional geopolitical risks and uncertainty. 
As discussed previously, hedgers bandwagoning for profit would work to 
negotiate with the targeted state to enmesh it into the existing regional order through 
socialization, so as to maximize predictability of the targeted state’s behaviours. 
Hedgers are mostly satisfied with the status quo regional order and prefer gradual 
reforms. They try to gain security by joining regional multilateral institutions (Carr 
2014; Wilkins 2014) to prevent domination by the targeted state (Kuik 2008: 
169-170; Schweller 1999: 7-16, cited in Roy 2005: 306). An example is the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), initiated by China to fill the gap in financing 
infrastructure projects in Asia-Pacific (The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
2016). In this example, hedgers join the AIIB on the basis of good governance by 
written rules in an attempt to socialize China with norms and values they champion, 
so as to prevent Chinese domination in the policy-making process within the bank. 
Sometimes, hedgers even initiate proposals of setting up new multilateral 
institutions, with hope that both the US and China would take part to deny Chinese 
domination in the region. Such multilateral institutions range from economic 
institutions, APEC for instance, to security institutions, like the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, and more comprehensive, integration-oriented institutions, like the East 
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Asian Summit. Hedgers simultaneously enjoy dominance-denial and gaining 
influence in policy-making processes within these institutions, while trying to nurture 
China to accept their stipulated norms and values (Giddens 1991 cited in Mitzen 
2006: 344-351; Green et. al. 2015: 21-23). In sum, states hedge for maximizing gains 
in strategic interests. 
 
3.3 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presents the motive for pursuing hedging strategy as maximizing 
gains, and explained why such understanding does not violate the conventional 
understanding of the motive for hedging strategy as minimizing risks. Hedgers 
simultaneously maximize strategic interests, including both economic welfare and 
security, through a mixture of policies, including balancing against, and 
bandwagoning, with the targeted state to maximize economic and security interests. 
At the same time, they invest in arming of their military and innovating or imitating 
the most advanced technologies, form new security partnerships and strengthen 
existing alliances, expand economic cooperation, and engage the targeted state into 
multilateral organizations, all while refraining from sacrificing one dimension of 
strategic interests for another one.  
The following four chapters will be an exploration of Australia’s China strategy 
from 1996 to September 2015, with a focus on how Australia balances against 
China’s rise while bandwagoning with economically strong China for profit. 
  
47 
 
4. THE “CHINA PROBLEM” IN AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGY: POLITICAL 
DIMENSION 
 
The “China problem” has long been playing a part in Australia’s strategy. As far 
back as the outbreak of the Korean War, Australia unhesitatingly chose to answer the 
“China problem” by firmly joining the American-led Capitalist camp to fight against 
Communist China (Edwards 2015: 8-9). China’s rapid economic rise only sharpened 
the “China problem” and the question of how Australia should respond. Back in the 
mid-1990s, then Labour government and the John Howard-led opposition party 
outlined Australia’s mission to engage Asia economically and enmesh Asia in the 
liberal, rules-based order politically during the 1996 election campaign (Evans and 
Grant 1995; Howard 1995). Before taking up office, Howard asked, “do we, 
Australians, choose strategically between our history and geography?” (Howard 
1995; 2003a; 2006). The former PM in fact pointed out a possible strategic dilemma 
for Australia: Should Australia choose to align with China and abandon or sacrifice 
its own political security and economic interests? By nature, the strategic dilemma 
facing Australia is one of security. Australia has to arm herself with considerable 
military power by devoting a handsome amount of money if she were to provide her 
security independently. Also, bandwagoning with China means Canberra has to 
sacrifice the Australian values of promoting democracy, protecting human rights, and 
launching of low-politics policy agendas. In a speech delivered at the National Press 
Club, Howard (2006) posed the “China problem” as a way to “balance between 
history and geography in our global strategy” and responded by “we, Australians, do 
not need to choose between our history and our geography”.  
Putting the US and China together would lead to a strategic dilemma that requires 
making a painful choice. This chapter explains what the “China problem” is in 
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reference to Australia’s China policy, and how Australia goes about answering it. It 
was found that the Australians perceive China as a low-intensity threat to their 
country’s security, both politically and militarily, in the past two decades. Second, 
this chapter introduces the strategic tools used by Australia to manage the “China 
problem”, that is, to bind China with liberal and procedural rules to constrain her 
ambition in dominance. 
 
4.1 Australia’s “China problem”, 1996-2015: A brief historical review 
 
The “China problem” has been transforming over the course of Australian history. 
Howard did highlight Australia’s choice in his answer: Maintaining a close political 
relationship with the US while developing closer political ties with regional 
economic partners who share similar political values and cultures, in particular, 
liberal democratic values. Howard’s government also tried to develop a firm and 
long-lasting partnership with emerging economic partners, China included, while 
respecting differences in political beliefs and realities (Howard 2002; 2003a, 2003b; 
2006). In the “China problem” debate, the first Australian ambassador to China, 
Stephen FitzGerald, published a book in 1997 entitled Is Australia an Asian Country? 
that discussed rigorously how Australia should engage herself and her people in Asia 
to cultivate a commonly shared Asian identity, so as to achieve cultural convergence 
between Australia and other regional powers (FitzGerald 1997). However, 
FitzGerald’s thesis, namely, Asianization of the region by integrating regional states 
to form a consensual “Asian identity” favourable to Australia’s pursuit of strategic 
interests bound by liberal, democratic, and rules-based virtues, could not answer the 
“China problem” satisfactorily (Funabashi 1993; FitzGerald 1997). Australia’s way 
of engaging Asian powers received a cold response, as did FitzGerald’s thesis. 
49 
 
Nonetheless, FitzGerald was successful in explaining Australia’s fear stemming from 
a rising China:  
 
“Because peace and security and prosperity are not assured; because the 
benevolence of greater powers towards smaller is never assured… their 
treatment of smaller powers is seldom equitable, and their own behavior may 
not be predictable; because the behavior of Great Powers is not the only 
threat to a stable future; and because the legacies of history and culture 
present political and other problems which can only be managed on a shared 
basis” (FitzGerald 1997: 156). 
 
Australia’s attempt to maximize her economic and political gains vis-à-vis China 
diplomatically only made the “China problem” more complicated. The core of the 
problem, politically, was the differences in political beliefs between Australians and 
Chinese, which had muddled Australia’s management of the “China problem”. 
Specifically, while rationally and pragmatically trying to maximize economic gains, 
how should Australia manage the differences in values? Whether Australia 
reprioritizes her political goals in exchange for pleasing China, thus, becomes a 
question worthy of further research. If there were clues that Australia pursued a 
lesser degree of political socialization, it could be deduced that, at a time, the 
government prioritized some other goals over the goals of binding engagement. In 
that case, it could be concluded that Australia had exhibited a greater degree of 
tolerance towards different political values in exchange for profit, in other words, 
they pursued limited bandwagoning. 
The following sections are dedicated to presenting how different administrations, 
from the Howard government to the Abbott government, have responded to the 
“China problem”.  
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4.1.1 John Howard’s government and the development of the “China problem” 
1996-2007 
Although Howard introduced his response to the “China problem” during his 
election campaign, it was not until the Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper entitled 
“In the National Interests” in 1997 that his government first systemically presented 
the problem. According to the White Paper, Australia’s national interests included 
pragmatically grasping economic benefits, strengthening relations with the US, 
obtaining technological advantages and military forces in the next 15 years, and 
contributing to regional peace and stability for Australia’s prosperity 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1997a). The White Paper also discussed in detail 
Australia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. It mentioned security interests as 
being defending Australia, as well as acting independently in international politics in 
a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific. It also defined economic interests as engagement 
with Asian states to guarantee the economic well-being of the Australian state and 
every Australian, partially achieved by regional trade liberalization agendas. Lastly, 
the White Paper explained national values, or domestic political interest, as ensuring 
domestic political and ideological consensus on liberal democracy, which inherently 
implies favourable rules-based decision-making processes of “the rule of law”. The 
White Paper hopes that these values can spread throughout the Asia-Pacific region, 
for example, by ensuring the protection of human rights in the Asia-Pacific 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1997a: 1-14). Politically, the White Paper argued for 
binding engagement, as Australia attempted to promote the principle of the rule of 
law in the region. Indirectly, the Howard government projected soft power, 
favourably intangible power of binding norms, to engage Asian powers, including 
China, in hope of shaping their policy preference without coercion (Nye 2004: 5-6). 
“Public diplomacy” was also discussed in the Paper as a way to project Australia’s 
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attractive image for the 2000 Sydney Olympics (Commonwealth of Australia 1997a: 
78). In addition, the Paper presented clues showing Australia’s determination to stay 
politically close to the US and economically close to China in search for the 
formation of ad hoc issue-based coalitions. All are evidence for Australia’s eagerness 
to become actively involved (Commonwealth of Australia 1997a: 50-51).  
The White Paper also briefly laid down Howard government’s grand strategy, 
with two particular focuses on the strategic implications of the rise of Asia. It argued 
against the need to choose only one between the American-led Western camp and, 
potentially in the future, Chinese-led Asian camp. On the other hand, several months 
before the release of the Paper, then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer delivered a 
speech in Canberra to present some of its general principles, emphasizing heavily on 
how Australia sought national interests politically. In his speech, Downer (1997) 
highlighted Australia’s efforts in building liberal democracies in small regional 
powers, including supporting Aung San Suu Kyi and East Timor. In summary, the 
White Paper outlined Howard’s political principles in engaging China during his 
11-year tenure, namely, “with shared interests and mutual respect” (Commonwealth 
of Australia 1997a: 63), which would help Australia overcome the political 
differences (Commonwealth of Australia 1997a: 64).  
This was followed by the publication of a Defence White Paper in 2000 that 
outlined the Australian government’s conception of the country’s strategic interests in 
terms of defence priorities – a policy largely followed by later official documents 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2000; Australian Government Department of Defence 
[DOD] 2009; 2013; 2016). Figure 4.1 summarizes Australia’s strategic interests at 
four levels, from the inner domestic level to the near regional level (for instance, 
Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, and South Pacific Island states), then the border 
Asia-Pacific level, and lastly, the international level:  
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Figure 4.1 Concentric circles of Australia’s strategic interests from domestic level 
to international level advocated in the post-Cold War age 
 
Two things are noteworthy from the figure. First, there is a strong sentiment of 
dominance denial, both regionally and internationally, and both bilaterally and 
multilaterally. The reason is that dominance achieved by a power harms the goal of 
maximizing Australia’s gain in strategic interests. After all, Howard government’s 
China policy, as manifested through the two Papers, is for Australia to possess the 
capabilities to strategically look outward to maximize strategic interests through 
active political and diplomatic engagement with international politics, with a 
particular focus on the Asia-Pacific. 
It should be emphasized that, Howard was not trying to make Australia the 51st 
state or deputy sheriff of the US, as those arguing that he was trending too close to 
the US diplomatically to strengthen bilateral ties had blamed him for. In fact, Howard 
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government did presume American presence in the region as her political bottom-line, 
as the retreat of the friendlier Americans will result in power imbalance, which 
Australians were trying to prevent from happening. Australia also shares political 
values on binding engagement and militarily with the US through Canberra’s strong 
commitment to participating in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars (Altman 2006). In his 
autobiography, Howard (2010: 498) revealed that it was essentially through his 
friendship with American presidents and the possession of similar strategic agendas 
like environmental protection and appreciation of democratic values that Australia 
was able to maintain a close relationship with the US. Furthermore, even though 
Howard weighed Australia’s relations with China at the same level as that with 
Washington, the US has been “the more important partner, and more intimate friend, 
for Australia” (Howard 2010).  
Facing China, Howard tried to manage the differences in political beliefs to 
prevent worsening of bilateral relations. For instance, meeting with the Chairman of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Li Peng, in 2002, 
Howard announced Australia-China relations as: 
 
“sound because it is built upon the important principles of mutual respect for 
each other and a recognition that societies that have different cultures and 
have different histories can nonetheless work together very closely if they 
understand those differences and they focus on the things that bring their two 
societies together” (Howard 2002). 
 
In October 2003, the American President, George W. Bush, and the Chinese 
President, Hu Jintao, both visited Australia at the same time, and both were invited to 
deliver a speech in a joint sitting of the Parliament. In a radio interview several days 
ahead of the joint house meetings, Howard objected to an argument presented to him 
and reaffirmed the possibility of keeping good relations with both the US and China 
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by insisting that there was no strategic dilemma in siding with either one (Howard 
2003a). In another radio interview on the day after President Hu delivered his speech 
to the Parliamentary house (24 October), Howard again reaffirmed the government’s 
answer to the “China problem”, namely, no need to choose between America and 
China (Howard 2003b). Howard later revealed in his autobiography that, while he 
favoured the Americans and felt closer and friendlier towards the US because of the 
ideological proximity and his personal linkage with George W. Bush, he intended to 
give equal respect to both leaders at the joint house meetings (Howard 2010: 498). 
Interestingly, in the Parliamentary Hansard, Bush was honoured with the title “The 
Honourable”, while President Hu was just referred to as “His Excellency” 
(Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives 2003). The difference in the 
titles used was a reflection of the difference in Australia’s strategic weight afforded 
to each side. 
In the 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Advancing the National 
Interest, the Howard government emphasized the importance of managing 
international affairs effectively. These goals could be achieved by dialogues on 
promoting human rights and good quality of governance based on the rule of law, 
mainly targeting failed states in the South Pacific (Commonwealth of Australia 2003). 
The paper reaffirmed the position of the US as the most important political partner of 
Australia and hinted at Australia’s unwillingness to bandwagon with China for 
survival and cultivating Chinese politicians’ values due to the differences in political 
beliefs (Commonwealth of Australia 2003: 1-2). The Paper concluded Australia’s 
role in the trilateral relations as a ‘supportive middle-person’ to engage China in the 
American-led international order (Commonwealth of Australia 2003: 22). 
In 2004, Australia’s relations with China became frustrated over the Taiwan issue. 
The Taiwan issue and the solved Hong Kong issue highlight the differences in how 
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Australia perceive and define sovereignty. The Strait Crisis in 1995-96, during which 
China tested missiles as a result of the independence rhetoric promoted by then 
Taiwanese president Lee Tung-hui in his re-election campaign, triggered harsh 
responses from Australia (Wang 2012: 159-160). In 1997, Australia sent positive 
signals to Beijing by sending delegates to observe the full sovereignty handover 
ceremony of Hong Kong albeit a Western boycott on the retreat of democratization in 
the Legislative Council (Wang 2012: 164-165). In 2000 when independence-minded 
Democratic Progressive Party candidate Chen Shui-bian won the Taiwanese 
presidential election, Howard triggered China’s strong response in his interview with 
Australia’s Nine Network to the argument that Australia might assist the US by 
engaging in conflicts between China and Taiwan (Wang 2012: 166-167). However, 
on 17 August 2004, then Foreign Minister Downer questioned the applicability of the 
Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) on committing the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) to fight against China under a Taiwan contingency. 
Downer downplayed the importance of the ANZUS, appealing to it as a defensive 
alliance that Australia has to compulsorily commit to only if any party is attacked 
(Downer 2004b). While Downer questioned the applicability of Article 5 of the treaty 
on Taiwan contingency, Howard, on 20 August 2004, told journalists that “[T]he aim 
of the policy is to remove choice, the aim of the policy is to be friendly with both and 
we are and we will remain so” (Howard 2004), showing the government’s ambiguity 
in answering the “China problem”. In an interview in 2005, Howard agreed with 
Downer that Australians are not East Asians, as Australians have a different history 
and political values in comparison with East Asians (Howard 2005b). Such 
differences resulted in Howard’s insecurity when working with China, and his 
apparent attempt in enmeshing China in the status quo regional order to maximize 
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certainty over perceiving China’s behaviour, hence better securing Australia’s search 
for strategic interests. 
 
4.1.2 The “China problem” of the Rudd, Gillard and Abbott governments, 
2007-2015 
By 2007, the Labour had come to power in Australia. This section is a review of 
how Labour governments from 2007 to 2013, under the leadership of Rudd and 
Gillard, and the short-lived Abbott coalition government from 2013 to 2015, 
answered the “China problem”. Before Rudd entered office, he told the public his 
affirmation of the applicability of cultivating China with the rules-based 
decision-making processes in regional and international institutions bilaterally (Rudd 
2007). His visit to China in April 2008 triggered a heated debate on whether 
Australia should “teach” China how to conform to an international rules-based order 
by being a responsible stakeholder. The trigger, Rudd’s conversation with Chinese 
youths at Peking University on 9 April, in Mandarin, clearly showed his fear of 
politically illiberal China dominating geopolitics. Before the speech, Rudd made a 
joke that read “not afraid of the heaven, not afraid of the hell, only afraid of a 
foreigner speaking Chinese” (Wang 2012: 157). While Rudd told that joke about fear, 
he ended his speech with a possible solution to manage fear by drawing from the 
concept of “zhenyou/true friends”, which he claimed “broader and firm basis for 
continuing profound and sincere friendship” that “offers unflinching advice and 
counsels restraint”, specifically referring to Rudd’s concern on the human rights 
situation in Tibet (Rudd 2008a). The speech, as a Chinese scholar working at an 
Australian University analysed, presented Rudd’s unreflective image of China and 
revealed a lack of understanding in China per se (Pan 2015: 325).  
57 
 
Rudd’s proposal to manage the “China problem” through transforming China into 
true friends became more controversial when his secret conversation with then 
American Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was exposed by WikiLeaks, in which 
Rudd described himself as: 
 
“‘a brutal realist on China,” Rudd argued for “multilateral engagement with 
bilateral vigour” integrating China effectively into the international 
community and allowing it to demonstrate greater responsibility, all while 
also preparing to deploy force if everything goes wrong…indicated the 
forthcoming Australian Defence White Paper’s focus on naval capability is a 
response to China's growing ability to project force. Rudd would send the 
Secretary a copy of his April 2008 speech at Peking University in which he 
had argued that China’s idea of a harmonious world, based on the philosophy 
of Kang Youwei, and the West's concept of a responsible stakeholder were 
not incompatible.” (WikiLeaks 2009a, emphases added) 
 
Rudd, who understood hedging as minimizing risks and preparing for regional 
security-contingency, presented a plan to maximize security under the contingency 
that Australia would take down China. To a lesser extent, to Rudd himself, the rising 
of Chinese power is itself a self-proof of China emerging as a threat to Australia’s 
future security. As a response to this special and increasingly powerful threat with 
political difference, Rudd government’s published a Defence White Paper in 2009 
subtitled Force 2030 (hereafter, Force 2030). From these, it can be concluded that 
Rudd was a pragmatic politician who believed that the more liberal China is, the 
safer Australia would be in international politics (Uren 2012: 25-27). 
The Rio Tinto scenario further exemplified the nature of the “China problem” 
Rudd faced: A clash of political beliefs in the power shift. Stern Hu, a top official of 
Rio Tinto’s China branch and an Australian citizen, was sentenced to ten years of 
imprisonment for economic espionage and bribe-receiving. Three other Chinese 
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employees of Rio Tinto were also handed sentences. The sentencing came 
coincidently after Rio Tinto’s cancellation of a deal with Aluminium Corporation of 
China Limited (Chinalco), which led Australians to question the fairness of the 
Chinese legal system without the rule of law (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
2010), as some speculated that Hu was sent to jail as revenge for a failed deal 
between Rio Tinto and Chinalco (Uren 2012). While this incident frustrated bilateral 
relations, no harm was done, as the effect had not been long-lasting. Nonetheless, the 
case highlighted Australia’s concerns over fairness when managing China’s rise.  
Julia Gillard ousted Rudd in 2010 and led the Labour until 2013, when she was 
ousted by Rudd. The Gillard government continued the binding engagements 
introduced by the Rudd government, working to shape China’s regional political 
behaviour. However, different from the Rudd government, which focused on human 
rights promotion, the Gillard government emphasized transparent policy-making 
processes when making strategic goals and maximizing Australia’s strategic interests 
diplomatically (Commonwealth of Australia 2012a: 199). 
By this, the Gillard government attempted to answer the “China problem” by 
raising the importance for China to make foreign policies more transparent, so as to 
increase Canberra’s confidence in securely working with China (DOD 2013: 29). 
Gillard’s China policy was best represented by the 2012 Australian in the Asian 
Century White Paper, in which the PM deliberated lengthily over policies to engage 
Asia-Pacific states, particularly targeting China. Paying attention to China’s future 
position, the Paper called for assisting and enhancing the transparency of China’s 
domestic and foreign policy-making processes (DOD 2009: 34; Commonwealth of 
Australia 2012a: 228-229). In short, the Gillard government tried to liberalize 
Chinese economy, improve transparency of China’s economic governance, and 
enmesh its economy in institutionalized and procedurally legitimate groupings 
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governed by negotiating rules and regulations (Commonwealth of Australia 2012a). 
The Paper also called for preparation to strengthen the cultural and political 
knowledge of Asia (Commonwealth of Australia 2012a) by championing the training 
of future Asia-capable leaders who speak fluent Asian languages, piloted by Chinese 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2012a: 167-171). Fundamentally, Gillard sent a signal 
that “[I] want our nation to be a winner as our region changes and I want every 
Australian to be a winner too”. By winning, she meant maximizing Australia’s 
strategic goals, which include both security and economic goals (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2012a: iii). 
Despite steering away from a clear answer on the “China problem”, Howard’s 
idea that Australia needs not choose between China and the US was generally 
followed through by Rudd and Gillard, as evidenced in Chapter 8 of the Australian in 
the Asian Century White Paper. Australia had politically chosen to respect the 
differences in beliefs with China while trying by all means to engage China and 
maximize the feeling of security by developing mutual trust and alleviating the 
feeling of fear (Commonwealth of Australia 2012a: 228-230). 
The Liberal-National coalition won the 2013 general election and Tony Abbott 
became the Prime Minister. The short-lived Abbott government tackled the “China 
problem” by working diplomatically with China guided by “fear” and “greed” 
(Garnaut 2015). Successive top-level ministers and Abbott himself strived to develop 
linkage with China by frequently visiting the country. For instance, Abbott’s speech 
in the 2014 Boao Forum objected to criticisms of him perceiving China as a friend, 
as he highlighted the importance of building friendships with China (Abbott 2014b). 
Earlier in 2014, in a speech addressed to the Asia Society, Abbott said that “making 
new friends doesn’t mean losing old ones” (Abbott 2014a). Abbott held that the 
deepness of friendship depended on the extensiveness of overlapping interests as 
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well as beliefs. This was clear from the fact that the Abbott government came closer 
to Japan compared to China, and stated that Australia’s relationship with Japan was 
“one of the world’s firmest friendships and most practical of partnerships”. On the 
contrary, China did not receive an equivalent comment, and that there was a lot of 
room for improvement (Abbott 2014c, 2014e, 2014g, 2014h). Abbott’s successor, 
Malcolm Turnbull, viewed the “China problem” with the possibility of contingency. 
In a television interview, Turnbull argued that China’s assertiveness in reclaiming 
lands in the South China Sea could rightly achieve the opposite result that the 
Chinese wanted (Sales 2015). The Chinese are pushing the envelope on territorial 
disputes, escalating suspicion on their revisionist ambitions. 
 
4.2 Australia’s management of the “China problem” – developing political 
relationships as a basis to maximize security 
 
There are considerable differences in political values, cultures, and institutions 
between Australia and China. Fearing that China’s increasing comprehensive power 
and escalating revisionist ambitions would alter the status quo political order, 
Canberra opts to engage China to stick to the status quo, liberal democratic order to 
manage the long-term uncertainty led by the struggle for order by the US and China 
(Bisley 2014). Australia is, nonetheless, avoiding adversarial relations by making 
vague claims. Power shifts change Australia’s perception of the offence-defence 
balance, moving Canberra to build arms against a potential unilateral capture of 
Taiwan by China or conflicts in East and South China Seas, escalating fierce 
strategic competition (Lee 2015). In this section, the differences in political beliefs 
between Australia and China are first reviewed, followed by a study of Australia’s 
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binding engagement efforts to maximize her feeling of security in regard to the 
“China problem”. 
 
4.2.1 Australia-China political relations, the “China problem”, and issues of the 
“China problem” 
There are a number of differences between the political beliefs of Australia and 
China that help to sharpen the “China problem”. This section will review Australia’s 
attempts to maximize her political interests, which form the basis of Australia’s 
ontological security, by first investigating micro-level domestic political issues, 
followed by some broader bilateral issues, and finally, the broader regional and 
international level. 
 
Multicultural policies 
At the domestic level, Australia’s national identity is marred by a large number of 
Chinese immigrants and inbound Chinese students. This gave rise to the 
multicultural policy in the 1990s, in which the government tried to engage Chinese 
inbound students, socializing them with Australian political norms and values. 
However, those multicultural policies failed, as a survey conducted on Chinese 
students’ extent of assimilation after studying in Australia for years revealed that they 
still viewed Australia and Australians negatively (Fung and Mackerras 1998). Some 
researchers attributed the failure of the multicultural policies to the intensification of 
cultural differences due to the introduction of new policies that unintentionally 
strengthened Australia’s exclusiveness (Pan 2015; Kendall 2005: 200). The failure to 
engage inbound Chinese students foretold Australia’s failure to engage China 
normatively to alleviate political fear over domination by the powerful country at the 
regional level. Such fear gave birth to the “yellow peril” rhetoric - the discriminatory 
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thought against Asians that reached its peak when far-right politician Pauline Hanson 
was elected Member of Parliament (Wang 2012: 157). The influence of the “yellow 
peril” rhetoric is still powerful in narrating and exaggerating the fear of China. A 
recent anti-Chinese investment campaign, entitled Rally against the Chinese real 
estate invasion, initiated by a racist party, Party for Freedom, in May 2015 reflected 
the continuation of extremist forces spreading fear of Chinese domination in 
Australia (Folkes 2015). With the failure of the multicultural policies, Australia 
generally remained mentally fearful of China. 
 
Political transparency and Chinese espionage against Australia’s interests 
Australia places a high value on political transparency, and thus, considers 
Chinese’s suspicious and non-transparent activities, such as espionage and spying 
activities, threatening to Australia’s security. Transparency is an issue in Australia’s 
“China problem”, because the non-transparent policy-making procedures in China 
induce a high level of suspicion and fear in Canberra’s political elites of Chinese 
taking unilateral actions to harm Australia’s strategic interests. Political transparency 
is important in building confidence, as flowing information and exchanges in 
political beliefs help increase the predictability of international politics. Trust flows 
with increasing transparency in policy-making processes, especially in defence 
policy (Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2013: 
29; Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 109; 2000: 4; DOD 2009: 19). The promotion 
of transparency aims at building reciprocal relations, contributing to confidence 
building. Yet, China’s hesitation to work more transparently in defence affairs has 
done little to alleviate Australia’s fear of potential Chinese domination of the region. 
In a 2011 interview, Rudd, at that time the Foreign Minister, said that “[T]he central 
thrust of Australian policy is one of comprehensive engagement because we believe 
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that China is, in broad terms, heading in the right direction” (Rudd 2011). When 
Australia engages China, they pay attention to increasing security in the engagement 
processes. 
Without transparency, Australia’s security interests continue to be threatened by 
suspicious Chinese cyber-attacks, espionage, and spying and surveillance activities. 
Such activities have already drawn the attention of many Australians. For example, 
there were reports that China tried to gather information on the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter aircraft (JSF) through secret espionage activities (Dorling 2015). The 
Australian government has reacted sharply towards China’s cyber warfare, even 
mentioning the declining trust between both sides as malicious Chinese activities 
deprive Australia of realizing her strategic goals of encouraging “China to embrace 
openness and transparency” (Australian Government Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 2013: 29). Given the increasing capability of the Chinese to 
conduct cyber warfare, it is predicted that the issue of transparency and 
non-transparent warfare conducted by China will remain an issue on the table. 
 
Human rights 
The crackdown at Tiananmen Square in 1989 reminded Australians of the 
importance of promoting universal human rights, as well as democracy, in China. 
Immediately after the incident, Canberra joined other countries in condemning the 
crackdown, and sanctioned China with an export ban on military-affiliated 
technologies, cutting off high-level visits temporarily, and slowing down Chinese 
efforts to join APEC, in hope to revive the democratization movement in China 
(Harris 1996: 9). Compared to others, however, Canberra reproached Beijing quickly 
and her sanctions were not harsh, thanks to her trading status with China (Evans and 
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Grant 1995: 233-234; Harris: 1996: 10-11; Wang 2012: 110-111). However, Australia 
remains concerned about the human rights situation in Tibet and Xinjiang. 
In 1991, a group of Australian delegates, led by then Foreign Minister Evans, was 
invited by Beijing to investigate the human rights situation in various cities, 
including Lhasa, the administrative centre of Tibet (van Ness 1998). On the one hand, 
Australians were happy to take up the role of human rights observers in China. The 
published report of the visit affirmed Canberra’s role in assisting China to raise her 
human rights standard from the socio-economic dimension for governing to universal 
civil and political rights, which annoyed China (Mackerras 2014: 214; van Ness 1998: 
194-195). On the other hand, several visits to Australia by secessionist political 
figures from Tibet and Xinjiang, including the Dalai Lama (Tibet) and Rabia Kadir 
(Uyghur), since 1992 showed the country’s determination to warn China about the 
importance of human rights protection (Hanson 2012; Wang 2012: 141-142). For this 
goal, Australia was eager to, risk temporal cooling down of bilateral relations. While 
Wang (2012: 205-206) suspected that the leader’s personality contributed to 
Australia’s prioritization of promoting human rights, Australian has long been 
concerned about China’s human rights situation, so the various leaders were just 
following along when making policy choice. 
Therefore, Australia’s stance on promoting universal civil, political, and human 
rights principles stipulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and China’s continuous poor human rights records add to Australia’s fear over 
Chinese revisionist ambitions. Speeches made by politicians tie Australia’s 
improving strategic relationship with China (in terms of being true friends) with 
Chinese recognition of Australia’s accepted norms and values. Australia’s efforts to 
oblige China to protect human rights, in fact, also work to promote Australian values 
to China to better secure Australia’s position.  
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Sovereignty and the principle of non-interference 
The sharpest difference seen in the diverging political beliefs between Australia 
and China is the concept of sovereignty. This is because the issue of sovereignty has 
the highest possibility of leading to clashes and accidental armed conflicts. 
Australia’s bilateral relations with China have occasionally suffered from caveats 
when the Taiwan issue is raised. Australia’s relationship with the “Far Eastern 
Trading Company”, later the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, made Beijing 
displeased over Australia’s faith in supporting the “One China policy” when then 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited Australia in 1992 (Mackerras 2014: 239). Close 
interactions between Taiwan and Australia in the first few months after Tiananmen 
drew attention to an Australian “de facto ‘Two China Policy’”, even though Australia 
had already abandoned official relations with Taiwan
9
 (Klintworth 1993: 106, cited 
in Wang 2012: 150). The Taiwan Strait Crisis further sharpened the divergence when 
the newly elected Howard government supported American deployment of two 
aircraft carriers to the Strait. While Canberra sought Beijing’s restraint, Beijing 
criticized Canberra’s assistance to the US in “containing” China and to Taiwan to 
“separate” from China, and took action to cut partial economic cooperative initiatives 
(Atkinson 2013: 62-67).  
Fast forward to August 2004, when then Foreign Minister Downer delivered his 
speech that further reflected how the sovereignty of Taiwan and the “One China 
policy” frustrated Australia-China relations. A few days before Downer made his 
                                                     
9
 As of 1992, Australia-Taiwan relations were more than trade relations. Other than a 
restriction on Taiwanese top officials entering Australia, other functions of bilateral 
relations looked no different from Australia-China relations. See Atkinson (2013, 
53-56). 
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speech, on another occasion, he proposed building bilateral relations for a secure 
future and that the Taiwan question can best resolved by negotiation (Downer 2004a). 
Kevin Rudd shared similar thoughts. In an interview after the announcement of the 
2009 Defence White Paper on 2 May, Rudd defended Australia’s stance on the Strait 
Crisis as being non-speculative (Rudd 2009a). Later in 2009, it was written clearly in 
a joint statement released on 30 October by Australia and China that Australia 
“confirmed the position of successive Australian Governments since 1972 that 
Australia respects China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including in relation to 
Tibet and Xinjiang” (Rudd 2009b). In short, the sovereignty issue will continue to be 
raised from time to time, making it a difficult issue in the “China problem”. 
In summary, these issues have brought Australia some degree of fear of the 
Chinese taking action to harm Australia’s pursuit of her strategic interests. Australia 
tries to maximize political security through utilizing multilateral, norms-centred, and 
binding engagement on China politically, in hope of maximizing Australia’s feeling 
of intangible security and strengthening her position through diplomacy with China. 
 
4.2.2 Multilateral binding engagement for political interest maximization 
This part explains how and what Australia’s binding engagement did to maximize 
political security within multilateral institutions. It will explore why Australia intends 
to engage China multilaterally, usually with an American presence and explain the 
origin of Australia’s aim of engagement to enmesh China in the regional rules-based 
order, the APEC initiative. Finally, there will be a chronologically review of 
Australia’s efforts to maximize political security. 
Australia utilizes niche diplomacy, emphasizing spreading Australian beliefs 
externally, and actively engaging regional powers to maximize her regional influence 
(Carr 2014; Evans and Grant 1995: 323; Harris 1996). Then Labour Foreign Minister 
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Gareth Evans contributed largely to the use of regional multilateral institutions to 
securitize Australia in the region. The long-awaited proposal co-initiated by Australia 
and Japan, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative, held its first 
ministerial meeting in Canberra in November 1989 with 12 members. The main goal 
of the APEC is to promote regional trade liberalization by creating free trade 
agreements among members (Emmerson 2002: 3-8). Originated from building a 
Pacific version of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the 
APEC has attempted to build a strong, rule-binding community of states, and put 
“Australia in Asia” while simultaneously encouraging the United States to join 
(Dalrymple 2003: 82-87; Pitty 2003: 25). Former Prime Minister Hawke, in his 
welcoming speech to guests participating in the first APEC meeting, claimed that the 
APEC meeting is  
 
“certainly one of the most important international meetings Australia has ever 
hosted important in the range and seniority of our guests and important, 
indeed vital, in the issues to be discussed over the next two days” (Hawke 
1989). 
 
Although Australia wanted to include China from the beginning, the Tiananmen 
Incident delayed China’s involvement in the APEC for another two years. Excluding 
Beijing from the APEC at the beginning reflected Australia’s preference to follow 
others by condemning China. Other concerns for the APEC members include how to 
engage China and how to include the Taiwan and British Hong Kong - both questions 
remained unsolved until all three parties were included and the APEC renamed 
participating parties as “member economies” to prevent triggering Chinese anger. To 
repeat, the APEC gave hope to Australia for raising proposals to integrate regional 
economies, liberalizing regional trade, and binding member economies to 
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institutionalized and procedural rules, including Australia’s foreign policy agenda, 
multilaterally (Wesley 2007: 71; Pitty 2003: 25). 
In the early 1990s, Australia’s economic liberalization agenda became a talking 
point. Australia opted for active spreading of her liberalization agenda of binding 
engagement diplomatically (Carr 2014). Gareth Evans’ proposal of establishing an 
East Asian Economic Hemisphere, against former Malaysian PM Mahathir’s 
proposal for an East Asian Economic Caucus, showed Australia’s eagerness to entrap 
regional powers to institutionally constrain dominance-seeking behaviour 
(Dalrymple 2003: 89-90). However, Evans’ effort did not receive warm responses 
from Asian powers. Together with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, regional 
multilateral cooperation centred at the APEC meeting died out quickly.  
Apart from APEC, Australia also tried to engage China in other multilateral 
institutions. One example is the United Nations (UN). Australia is actively involved 
in innovative, non-traditional security agendas like nuclear non-proliferation 
processes, as well as being an active member in initiating global environmental 
protection (Carr 2014; Evans and Grant 1995: 324-325; Ungerer 2007: 547-548). 
Summing up, Australia’s inclusive, norms-binding engagement in the 1980s and 
1990s was moderately effective. However, as time went on and regional relative 
power balance changed, the effectiveness of Australia’s binding engagement 
declined. 
 
Australia’s binding engagement of China in the 21st century 
Entering the 21st century, Australia continues its binding engagement effort in 
newly established multilateral institutions. In the case of the East Asian Summit 
(EAS), Australia took a passive position because she originally paid little attention to 
it. Consequently, Howard did not receive a warm response from Chinese premier 
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Wen Jiabao when Australia sought to become a founding member of the EAS 
(Howard 2005a). The Chinese goal was to exclude Australia, New Zealand, and India 
from the EAS, so that they could dominate the EAS easier. Of course this was 
objected to by the Australians (Malik 2006).  
Outside of the EAS, Rudd promoted his proposal of establishing an Asia-Pacific 
Community that includes both the US and China. The idea was to tie China down in 
an inclusive regional institution with American presence, so as to contain Chinese 
ambitions to dominate policy-making processes in regional multilateral institutions 
and seek regional hegemony. While the aim of the proposal was to attempt to shape 
China’s political and economic preferences by building a community ruled by 
liberalized norms, both economically and politically, Australia was doing it at the 
expense of her own strategic interests (Davison 2011: 199; Uren 2012: 180-183; 
Wang 2012: 182). Despite so, Rudd argued for the building the Community, 
confirming its usefulness in constraining regional states by a liberal international 
order to prevent revisionists from dominating smaller powers (Rudd 2008c), as 
entrapping China into the proposed Community would increase its opportunity cost 
to seek regional hegemony by forming something like a power concert to govern 
regional affairs (Koh 2009). However, due to a lack of support and Rudd’s rush in 
pushing it forward, the Asia-Pacific Community proposal died out quickly. 
Australia’s participation in the AIIB is another piece of evidence that Australia is 
willing to concede its strong binding engagement in face of economic benefits. The 
AIIB was introduced by China to  
 
“focus on the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in 
Asia, including energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, 
rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, 
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environmental protection, urban development and logistics, etc.” (The Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank 2016).  
 
While the AIIB was initiated by China in 2013, Australia did not show any solid 
desire to join until 2015. One reason was American opposition to her allies and 
partners, like South Korea and Australia, signing the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) of the AIIB, which was set to expire on 31 March 2015 (Perlez 2014; Abbott 
2015a). The argument for Australia to refrain from joining the AIIB is that, given the 
uncertain institutional setting, Australia hoped to look for a well-established 
institutional setting before signing the MoU (Perlez 2014). Then Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop mentioned during her visit to Beijing for the APEC meeting in 2014 that 
Australia would join the AIIB if her strategic partners, including the US, Japan, and 
South Korea, joined (Bishop 2014c). However, when the Abbott government signed 
the MoU, there was no clue of a bilateral discussion on the institutional setting of the 
AIIB to make it fit Australia’s expectations. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
Australia had agreed to let go of its firm beliefs for economic benefits, which is a 
case of limited bandwagoning with China. 
 
4.3 Chapter summary – revisiting the “China problem” 
 
Australia assumes that China’s rise poses an increasing threat of uncertainty over 
Chinese intentions, especially dominance-seeking intentions. This is at the core of 
Australia’s “China problem”, which is fear-driven matter that needs to be managed 
politically by engaging China in rules-based institutional settings to constrain 
China’s behaviour, and making China’s actions more predictable by socializing 
China to follow the rules. This approach suits Australia’s search for strategic interest. 
Occasionally, in order not to anger the Chinese, Australia would attempt to better 
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secure economic profits by de-escalating political disputes, of which the risk 
management efforts of Downer’s controversial speech is an example. In the next 
chapter, the hard, tangible, and capability-based military balancing behaviour 
employed by Australia so far to maximize physical security will be presented. 
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5. INTERNAL BALANCING IN AUSTRALIA’S CHINA POLICY 
 
Along with the rise in China’s power is the strengthening of its military force, 
particularly its offensive capabilities and assertiveness, which is threatening to 
Australia’s security. The current thesis argues that, to maximize her own security, 
Australia uses the military to balance against China, a low-intensity security threat. 
Australia’s balancing behaviour, both internally and externally, aimed at maximizing 
its security interests has been a hot topic for study. For example, Bisley (2011; 2014) 
argued that Australia strengthened its alliance with the United States to champion its 
security goal of maintaining regional rules-based order. White (2008; 2010), who has 
advocated for a concert of powers in Asia-Pacific since the mid-2000s, even 
persuaded Canberra to prepare for future war in the region - a war by a great power 
war with a size and impact as great as the Pacific War during 1941-1945.  
Officially, the Department of Defence, in cooperation with other governmental 
bodies responsible for cultivating academic and public opinion, has an evolving view 
on security doctrines for Australia’s defence. At the government level, it is 
reasonable that officials perceive powerful and politically different powers as 
threatening. In this respect, whether Americans are present in Asia-Pacific militarily 
is not the prime concern (Please refer to Section 6.1 for further discussion on this). 
While views may differ, an essential element exists, namely, the need to prepare for 
Australia’s defence in the power shift, thereby managing the rise of unfamiliar 
powers that have the potential to alter the existing regional rules-based order. 
This chapter is a study of Australia’s internal effort in preparing for security in 
face of rising Chinese military power. Particular interest is dedicated to where the 
Australian Defence Forces should fight against China, what tactical tools the ADF 
should use to fight, and what kinds of capabilities Australia should acquire to best 
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suit her tactics. It has been observed that Australia has armed the ADF to maximize 
security under the slogan of “Forward Defence”, and deployed the ADF overseas to 
deter and defeat security adversaries. In addition, Australia has internally 
reprioritized tactics of fighting on the sea, under the sea, and in the air, most notably 
A2/AD tactics and tactics to fight air-sea battles on Australia’s northern approaches 
rather than over her homeland. The ADF’s acquisition of weapons with various 
capabilities, in particular, submarines, amphibious ships, and aircraft will also be 
analysed to demonstrate how Australia reallocate resources to prepare her military 
correspondingly to tackle the rise in Chinese military power. 
 
5.1 Forward-defending approach of Australia’s security policies 
 
As mentioned previously, Australia manages a regional security contingency to 
face security threats from the sea. This section explains why Australia opts to defend 
security threats on the sea by reviewing the debate over whether homeland defence 
or externally-oriented defence should be deployed, and why Australia currently 
choose to defend security threats overseas to better secure her homeland from being 
invaded. 
 
5.1.1 The origins of Australia’s two Defence approaches: “Forward Defence” and 
“Defending Australia” 
There has been ongoing internal debate on where the ADF should best be located 
to fight potential territorial adversaries. In general, opinion falls into one of the two 
different defence approaches regarding the pitch of warring scenario, “Forward 
Defence” and “Defending Australia”.  
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In the early years of the Cold War (1950s and 60s), Australia employed the 
“Forward Defence” strategy, in which forces were deployed to Southeast Asian states 
to deter perceived security threats from Communist forces in the region (Edwards 
2015: 7; Frühling 2014). Over the period, Australia became involved in the Malayan 
Crisis, defended Papua New Guinea, then an Australian colony, foiled potential 
invasion by Indonesia during Sukarno’s konfrontasi period, and supported the US 
during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars (Edwards 2015; Frühling 2014). The 
“Forward Defence” strategy is considered an ideologically-driven one, with an 
underlying spirit of containing communist expansion. As Peter Edwards (2015:7, 
emphasis added), a prominent Australian historian, put it, “we must fight them up 
there before we have to fight them down here”.  
However, faced with the high cost and changing geopolitical environment, the 
“Forward Defence” strategy was abandoned by the Whitlam government in the early 
1970s in favour of another defence approach, “Defending Australia”, in which 
Australia would give up most of her external security commitment and only fight 
against territorial adversaries threatening her survival (Kilcullen 2007: 54-55). This 
strategic theme was at its peak in the early 1980s given the repeated failures in 
pursuing strategic goals by operationalizing the “Forward Defence” approach 
(Frühling 2014). Throughout the 1980s, a relatively stable decade, the Hawke 
government overwhelmingly requested to defend Australia, including her exclusive 
economic zones and offshore territories (Commonwealth of Australia 1987: 1-2). 
Thus, in 1986, the Dibb report was published, which, along with the 1987 Defence 
White Paper, both suggested that Australia’s core security interests should be getting 
“forces capable of tracking and targeting the adversary” in the close region of 
Australia threatening Australia’s sea trade (Commonwealth of Australia 1987: 31) . 
In short, the “Defending Australia” strategy is a contractive approach focusing 
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narrowly on providing just enough military capabilities to defend Australia’s coast 
lines and homeland while paying little attention to dispatching the ADF overseas 
(Kilcullen 2007: 59). In fact, Australia only invested moderately in “Defending 
Australia” (Dibb 2009: 36). 
 
5.1.2 Australia’s Defence approach in the 1990s and the revival of “Forward 
Defence” in the 2000s 
As Australia contracted her external military commitment for better allocation of 
resources to physically secure Australia’s homeland, a renewed “Forward Defence” 
approach was introduced into Australia’s security strategy as the 1990s dawned. 
Along with the diplomatic activism pursued by then Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, 
Australia re-expanded her security commitment to the region, first by frequently 
deploying the ADF to participate in humanitarian assistance operations, and later, by 
taking part in international action, such as “Operation Desert Storm” in the 1991 Iraq 
War and leading the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET). These 
deployments reflected the paradoxical view in Australia’s verbal defence doctrine at 
the time, and were evidence of the fading explanatory power of the “Defending 
Australia” approach in defending Australia’s security. Indeed, Australia failed to 
carry out “Defending Australia” as a narrow-focus defence posture while acquiring 
capabilities to cope with such security doctrine (Kilcullen 2007: 60).  
In the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Keating government put the “Forward 
Defence” approach back into Australia’s defence debate. The White Paper argued in 
the introductory chapter that the ADF should acquire capabilities to contribute to 
international security, not through fighting with the great powers, but mainly through 
humanitarian assistance operations (Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 3-5). The 
White Paper also associated economic interests with defence interests, claiming that, 
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while Australia could continue to reap in economic benefits from rising Asian 
economic powers, it is essential to have better security in face of future uncertainty 
and the rise in security threat to Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 4; 
10-11). Clearly, the Keating government had started to redefine Australia’s defence 
commitment by putting his country’s external security commitment onto the agenda 
again and advocating for the defence of Australia’s strategic interests in key maritime 
trade routes. 
By 2000, the “Forward Defence” approach was back to its dominating position in 
Australia’s security interests. That “Defending Australia” was falling out of favour 
was evident in the 2000 Defence White Paper, which reported the possibility of 
invasion of the Australian motherland to be low in the near future and highly 
impossible in the wake of the 21st century (Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 
23-24). Committing to the alliance with the US also required Australia’s outward 
security involvement, which empirically rejected the main thesis of “Defending 
Australia” – low level of security involvements overseas. In addition to the 
concentric strategic interests (Figure 4.1), the revival of the “Forward Defence” 
approach was the result of Australia’s management of China’s rise. The 2000 
Defence White Paper hinted at the upgrading of military capability, especially the 
ADF’s ability to dispatch troops overseas to provide humanitarian assistance 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 5-6).  
Scholars who studied these two approaches concluded that the 2000 White Paper 
abandoned the narrow, exceptionalist approach of “Defending Australia”, and started 
to address why Australia needs a defence force and what kind of capabilities the ADF 
needs for them to commit to Australia’s military obligations in Asia-Pacific or 
internationally (Ayson 2006: 30-32; 2010: 188-189; Kilcullen 2007). Compared to 
the 1994 Defence White Paper, the 2000 version emphasized more heavily on the 
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essence of maintaining the American-led international security order 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 31-32). On the other hand, the 1994 Defence 
White Paper fundamentally shifted from its 1987 version and the 1997 Foreign and 
Trade Policy White Paper in that Australia weighed international relations in 
Northeast Asia equally important as those in the nearer and immediate region, and 
viewed it as an important measure of her championing of peace and security in the 
region (Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 17-23). Anyhow, the 2000 Defence White 
Paper opened the door for further debate on Australia’s internal security and 
(re-)emphasis of the “Forward Defence” doctrine while reviving Australia’s search 
for security interests outwards. The next section will provide an explanation for the 
Australian government’s decision of a contingency based tactic by acquiring 
advantageous air-sea capabilities to fight against any security threat (DOD 2007).  
 
5.2 Australia’s defence tactics: What an air-sea approach means to Australia’s 
internal balancing 
 
This section continues by discussing how Australia tries to internally decide on 
defence tactics. As Canberra perceives that future security contingency harming 
Australia’s security will happen on the sea and in the air, the “Forward Defence” 
approach would be suitable solution to tackle with the problem. Under the theme of 
potential adversary on the sea and in the air, the air-sea battle contingency is the 
central theme of Australia’s call for tactically managing threatening powers, 
especially those deployed to Australia’s near region. This is followed by an 
investigation of how Australia manages its security doctrines to tactically deter rising 
Chinese military threats. Internal balancing includes domestic efforts to allocate 
resources to maximize security and prioritize security doctrines to tactically manage 
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security policies, both of which are essential to securing a state’s defence. Finally, 
David Uren (2012: 128), an economics editor for the Australian, revealed the 
existence of an undisclosed, secret chapter in the 2009 Defence White Paper, in 
which the Rudd government called for a focus “on Australia’s ability to fight an 
air-sea battle alongside the United States against China” (Uren 2012: 128). It is 
possible, therefore, that an air-sea war plan would mean the possibility for Australia 
to coordinate with troops from allies and partners to deter and defeat existential 
threats. 
 
5.2.1 Australia’s air-sea defence approach: An introduction 
First and foremost in Australia’s security doctrine is that she should maximize her 
security by not allowing her homeland to be attacked. Force 2030, mentioned that, as 
a geographically constrained country,  Australia should plan to acquire military 
capabilities for the ADF to be capable of defending Australia against a military 
adversary and security threats coming from the sea (DOD 2009: 49). While the 
concept of air-sea battle is quite recent, the tactics to fight in a war by interoperating 
the air force and navy, or an air-sea approach of defence tactics, is not new. The need 
for preparation for air-sea battle can be traced back to China’s rising A2/AD and 
naval and aerial projection capabilities. In effect, rising Chinese A2/AD capabilities 
raises the costs for other Asian-Pacific powers to operate in the Pacific region if they 
have disputes with China. As a result, the rise of the concept “air-sea battle” is a 
preventive measure to minimize the effect of the Chinese’s assertive use of A2/AD 
tactics (Krepinevich 2010). Australia prepares for security by acquiring military 
capabilities to deter Chinese “Shashoujian” - the trump card, which is delaying 
American effort to project forces to Chinese territory and defeat American forces if 
they enter the “effective range of Chinese territory” (Krepinevich 2010: 15).  
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Originally, air-sea battles are a part of American tactics for fighting against China, 
and Australia is one of key allies in such cooperation with the US (Cavas and 
Muradian 2009, cited in Babbage 2011: 42; van Tol 2011: 51). In view of this, Robert 
M. Gates, the US Secretary of Defense, made a speech on 3 May, 2010 that affirmed 
the need for Australia to increase its offensive military capabilities, including 
weaponry, technologies, and personnel to prepare for air-sea battles (Gates 2010). In 
fact, Australia did plan to arm herself, as evident from the frequent publication of 
defence documents, the three White Papers in 2009, 2013, and 2016, and a Defence 
First Principle review in 2015. In reality, these plans pinpoints at equipping the ADF 
with adequate arms firstly to defeat and deter peer adversaries, and secondly, to 
cooperate with ally troops, in particular, the Americans, through American 
commandeering and ADF coordination, in case of a contingency.  
The air-sea battle is both defence- and offence-oriented. Defensively, such battles 
are a preventive measure, not preventive strike, against emerging security 
contingencies (van Tol 2010: 9-10) that aims at “preserving a stable military balance” 
(van Tol 2010: 9-10). This means that the states carrying out air-sea battle tactics will 
not pre-empt any non-adversarial, non-imminent threat when their power is not 
sufficiently threatening to survival. As such, this kind of defensive air-sea battle is 
for actively assuring regional peace and stability through military deterrence against 
the rise of aggressors from changing regional power balances. As an offensive tactic, 
despite troops in air-sea battles not making a pre-emptive strike, they will attack an 
imminent threat whenever necessary, before the threat invades their homeland, 
making a “war-fighting scenario” by deploying offensive capabilities to launch 
strategic strikes (van Tol 2010: 17, 50). As such, Rudd’s proposal for preparing the 
ADF for air-sea battle was, in fact, a proposal to maximize Australia’s security by 
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planning and equipping necessary military capabilities capable of destroying 
imminent adversarial capabilities.  
 
5.2.2 Rudd’s contribution to Australia’s air-sea defence tactics 
The strategic context laid out in Force 2030 is closely linked with the changing 
regional distribution of capabilities (or, precisely, material powers). For instance, the 
GFC in 2008 and the subsequent shift in the global distribution of economic power 
from the West (Western Europe and the US) to Asia-Pacific, led by two great powers, 
China and India, have impacted Australia’s regional geostrategic environment (DOD 
2009: 16, 31-32). Australia was determined to check Chinese assertive military 
actions on the sea by cooperating with the US, Japan, and other regional powers 
(Davies and Schreer 2015: 7; Tow 2014: 277). She would defend against any direct 
threat to the freedom of navigation in key sea routes, and deter direct threats to the 
rules-based order by regional hegemonic seeking behaviours challenging the security 
environment of the Asia-Pacific (DOD 2009: 34, 43-44; 2013: 25-27; 2016: 69-70). 
Any Chinese unilateral actions in altering the regional security environment had to 
be balanced by Australia’s efforts (DOD 2009: 30).  
Both the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers advocated for the equipping of 
interoperable capabilities to facilitates coordination and commandeering by 
American troops (DOD 2009: 68; 2013: 41). For instance, the ADF will be equipped 
with aircrafts and amphibious ships to assist potential American operations, both 
electronic and physical warfare, against China. After all, both White Papers urged for 
preparing Australia for regional uncertainty through acquiring corresponding defence 
capabilities to manage two issues. The first issue is China’s military rise and her 
uncertain intentions, and the second is the hardly predictable effect of the power shift 
(DOD 2009: 15-16; 2013: 1-3). These efforts underline the different approaches 
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championed by Australia to tactically prepare for a fight against the increasingly 
fearsome Chinese military forces if she pursues revisionist goals in the future. 
 
5.2.3 “Maritime strategy” and the “Northern approaches” – Australian tactical 
response to the air-sea defence approach 
The Australian government has never used the term “air-sea battle” overtly, but 
there is evidence in her defence policies that can be associated with the tactic of 
fighting air-sea battles. For instance, both the “maritime strategy” and “defending the 
northern approaches” entail deployment of the air force in cooperation with the navy 
to defend Australia’s security before imminent threats reach Australia’s homeland. 
Indeed, these should be viewed as an “air-sea approach of war tactics” of defence 
that enables the ADF to gain a strategic edge in an asymmetrical warfare by deterring, 
delaying, and deferring major powers’ aggression against Australia’s core security 
interests, though the probability of such warfare is minimal (Babbage 2011). 
Force 2030 dedicated a section to explaining the “maritime strategy”, which, in 
fact, first appeared in the 2000 Defence White Paper, albeit in a different context. 
Specifically, the 2000 version of “maritime strategy” referred to the ADF deploying 
air-sea forces to assist the land forces in defending and defeating an invading 
adversary (Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 47), whereas the 2009 version called 
for defending Australia’s near sea and contributing to Asia-Pacific peace and stability 
on the sea. It was associated with efforts to build confidence in the ADF in 
interoperating with allies and security partners and defending and deterring an 
adversary threatening Australia’s security in the near region, that is, the “sea-air gap 
to our north”, which “is at the strategic centre of our primary operational 
environment” (DOD 2009: 50-51).  
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The 2013 Defence White Paper further elaborated the “maritime strategy” by 
consolidating this evolving maritime defence approach to “achieve and maintain air 
and sea control”. If necessary, the ADF will deter threats by using the navy to 
exercise A2/AD tactics, thus denying adversary’s dominance on the air, on the sea 
and underwater. This is achieved by acquiring the ability to defeat an invading 
adversary and deny attacks against Australia’s seas, military bases, navigation and 
communication routes, and to deploy ADF capabilities to the region whenever 
necessary (DOD 2013: 29). Hence, the “maritime strategy” follows the tactics of 
air-sea battles by attempting to acquire offensive military capabilities to achieve the 
defensive goal of deterring and defeating territorial aggressors.  
In addition to defending Australia’s sea and air, the 2016 Defence White Paper 
included the “Northern Approaches”, namely, the defence of Australia’s near seas, 
exclusive economic zones, and offshore territories (DOD 2016: 68-69; 71-73). As 
such, geopolitical settings framed the defending of the northern approaches to 
preparing military forces to engage in air-sea battles. The focus on her seas and 
offshore islands is evidence that Australia has started to worry about the possibility 
of these areas being attacked by powers that are able to deploy military forces to 
undermine Australia’s security and ability to defend these areas. Defending the 
northern approaches, or the air-sea gap, has been a topic for study since mid-2000s, 
with Australia facing changes in the geostrategic atmosphere stemming from China’s 
rise (Bateman 2007) and the Chinese’s ability to deploy her military to Australia’s 
near approaches, near seas, and archipelagos.  
One of the most alarming incidents for the Australians was Chinese naval drills in 
the Indian Ocean, which alerted many Australians to the possibility of the Chinese’s 
ability to deploy forces to Australia’s near seas or even homeland. In February, 2014, 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships successively crossed the 
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Sunda Strait near Australia’s overseas territories of Christmas Island and the Lombok 
Strait near to Bali Island for drilling. Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircrafts 
were sent to closely monitor the drills, and commentators voiced concerned over the 
strategic signals sent by China, namely, that she has the ability to deploy her naval 
forces to Australia’s close regions (Brissenden 2014; Medcalf 2014; Panda 2014a; 
Wroe 2014). Rory Medcalf, former director of the International Security Programme 
at the Lowy Institute who advised on the drafting of the 2016 Defence White Paper, 
urged for a new strategic debate on the security implications of the Chinese drills, 
given the ground-breaking nature of the Chinese deploying naval forces to exercise 
in the area falling short of Australia’s near maritime approach (Medcalf 2014). Given 
its close proximity to Christmas Island, the drills near Sunda Strait, for instance, 
carried enormous strategic implications. One implication is about the nature of the 
‘China’s threat’’. The event reflects that China has the potential to strike using her 
navy in the future (Brissenden 2014). This makes China an approaching threat on 
Australia’s room to defend Australia in the future. Indirectly, this also arouses 
Australia’s debate of preventing the China threat from limiting Australia’s 
manoeuvre of deploying the ADF to the Northern Approaches. What is less 
frequently mentioned, however, is a collection of photos of the drills on the Chinese 
official news media, the People’s Daily, which were published under the heading 
“PLA Navy conducts confrontation training in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific” (The 
People’s Daily 2014). Whether intentionally chosen or not, such news report did 
nothing but trigger greater regional discontent, including from Australia. 
Another incident was the reclamation of islands by the Chinese in the South 
China Sea, which raised serious concerns in Australia while gradually but indirectly 
strengthened Canberra’s security partnership with Japan and the US. The speech by 
Australian Minister for Defence, Andrews (2015), at the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue 
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outlined clearly that Canberra opposed any unilateral act that is in violation of 
international laws, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation. Australia considered Chinese reclamation work in the South China 
Sea a unilateral change in the status quo that brings the situation into a grey area, 
bleaches international laws in advance, and causes regional members uncertainty in 
the future uses of the reclaimed lands. The main concern, as evident from both 
Andrews’ speech and the joint statement by the Trilateral Security Dialogue Defence 
Ministers (Australian Government Department of Defence Ministers 2015b), was the 
freedom of navigation, which makes up an important part of Australia’s trade. 
Andrews (2015) had called for “a corresponding counter-reaction” if Canberra’s 
business activities were hindered by China’s reclamation. When Australia joins her 
partners to deter threats, they arm to deter adversaries (Australian Government 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2013: 17, 22-23). Canberra made 
clear her disapproval of the situation in the recent 2016 Defence White Paper: 
 
“Australia opposes the use of artificial structures in the South China Sea for 
military purposes. Australia also opposes the assertion of associated territorial 
claims and maritime rights which are not in accordance with international law, 
including the UNCLOS” (DOD 2016: 58). 
 
At the same time, Australia maintained air patrols over the South China Sea to 
ensure the “freedom of navigation” (BBC 2015). These operations aimed at securing 
Australia’s security interests by checking for potential Chinese activities that might 
undermine Australia’s security. The undermining is reflected in, most apparently, the 
loss in freedom of navigation, in a sense tactical manoeuvring. 
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In short, Australia’s overall defence doctrine deals mainly with the rise of Asian 
powers, in particular, China. In essence, when Australia tries to cooperate with China 
in the security aspect at low intensity through actions such as humanitarian assistance 
drills, top official visits, and dialogues, the security doctrine still prepares for 
potential warfare with China. With China’s military power strengthening and the 
perception of Chinese military power growing into an assertive one, Australia’s fear 
and reaction in internally empowering her military becomes understandable. It is not 
about whether the US is present in Asia-Pacific or not. Rather, it is Australia’s own 
perception of China’s power. Internally, Force 2030 best represents Canberra’s 
efforts in allowing Australia to deter and defeat threats, and if possible, pre-empt 
China before the growth of the Chinese’s power to a point that is too costly to be 
dealt with (Maley 2010). The next section deals with what Australia has to acquire 
before ADF has the ability to deter and defeat major power adversaries by fighting an 
air-sea battle to secure Australia’s near region and homeland. The target, of course, 
would currently be China. 
 
5.3 Australia’s execution of the security doctrine – capability plans 
 
This section discusses what kind of military capability the Australian government 
seeks to maximize her security interests. After a brief summary of the military 
capabilities Australia has looked for, Australia’s arming of her land forces and her 
technological capabilities will be introduced. Although Australia’s geography allows 
Canberra to acquire less land weaponry, it is nonetheless important to maintain land 
forces to prepare to defend the country. The main focus of this section is to present 
the kind of capabilities required by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and RAAF. In 
particular, this section focuses on amphibious ships, aircrafts, and submarines, and 
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how Canberra is investing extensively in key capability areas by acquiring better 
weaponry for deterring and defeating territorial adversaries despite its financial 
constraints. 
 
5.3.1 Australia’s military capability choices: Hints from official perspectives 
The RAAF and RAN are responsible for defending Australia by deterring likely 
territorial aggressors. However, regional military modernization poses a continuous 
challenge to Australia’s security, partially eroding capability advantages (DOD 2009: 
38; 2016: 49-51). Furthermore, China’s rising Comprehensive National Power (CNP) 
continues to pressurize Australia into physically arming herself. In other words, most 
fundamentally, it is the threat of rising Chinese power leading to Australia’s rapid 
arming since 2009. Force 2030 advocated for a comprehensive arming plan for the 
ADF to secure Australia’s pursuit of strategic goals and prepare for the inerasable 
possibility of Australia’s participation in major power wars. Australia has been 
searching for a niche force structure capable of fighting an air-sea battle, as fighting 
potential contingency offshore is the best way to secure Australia’s homeland. These 
prompted Australia to carefully decide on “long-term planning, solving technological 
problems, and obtaining weapons to cope with ever-changing security environment” 
(DOD 2009: 15). In addition, the ADF needs to be armed in a way that it is capable 
of interoperating with American forces (DOD 2009: 50; 2013: 31; 2016: 19, 35). 
The DOD named three conditions to be fulfilled when arming the ADF. First is 
readiness, or the ability “to commit to short-notice contingencies that may arise”. 
Next is sustainability, or the ability “to continue to conduct directed tasks and 
operations over time”. The final condition is concurrency, or the ability “to conduct a 
number of operations in separate locations simultaneously” (DOD 2009: 87-88, 
emphases added). Based on these requirements, Australia has acquired an offensive, 
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strategic naval force capable of interoperating with the US naval force. RAN plans to 
replace the current six Collins class submarines with 12 new submarines, in addition 
to acquiring new Air Warfare Destroyers, frigates, and amphibious ships with attack 
missiles and 24 naval helicopters. The RAAF acquired 72 fifth-generation JSFs, 
Early Warning, and Early Warning and Control system-equipped aircrafts. For land 
forces, Australia has strengthened border defence by expanding professional infantry 
forces by two battalions. Finally, Australia has acquired an integrated, 
technologically advantageous electronic warfare system, ranging from 
(anti-)surveillance systems and cyber warfare systems countering escalating regional 
cyber warfare to interoperable systems with American military forces (DOD 2009: 
70-86). 
It is conceivable that such a large-scale, long-term, and extensive arming plan 
would mean spending a handsome amount of money. In fact, when Force 2030 was 
published, both Turnbull, then opposition leader, and his shadow defence minister, 
David Johnston, raised concerns about the related financial pressure (Johnston 2009; 
Turnbull 2009b). Despite this, Force 2030 focused more on worries about the global 
power shift, and suggested to expand the defence budget by three percent real rate in 
the financial year 2017-18, as well as to increase the overall defence budget from 1.8 
percent of GDP to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2030 (DOD 2009: 137-138; 2013: 71). The 
Federal Government also planned to invest A$200 billion in estate development for 
four years from 2009 and in defence support services (DOD 2009: 122-123). A study 
showed that Australia, given her long distance from China, has invested much more 
in arming than some other regional powers (Ayson 2010: 184). Also, some criticized 
Australia’s arming as an attempt to contain China and undermine Chinese influence 
in the region (Guo 2009, cited in Tubilewicz 2010: 154). 
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Reality finally set in as extremely heavy financial pressure forced Australia to 
limit her defence budget to 2 percent of GDP (DOD 2013: 72) and ADF personnel to 
a total of 59,000 (DOD 2013: 71) in the 2013 Defence White Paper. The DOD’s 
budget was further constrained after the release in 2015 of the Defence First 
Principle Review, a report prepared for the DOD to review the ADF’s structural 
inefficiencies related to decision-making, policy outcome, and personnel formation. 
Compiled by a research group chaired by David Peever, the former Rio Tinto 
managing director, the report called for cutting of a total of A$18.2 billion from the 
DOD’s budget after the 2009-10 financial year (confirmed in the 2016 Defence 
White Paper as A$18.8 billion) (DOD 2015b; 2015d: 16; 2016: 177). Despite the 
downsizing in arming, the 2016 Defence White Paper prepared by the Turnbull 
government maintained that arming the ADF is essential for better securing 
Australia’s strategic interests (DOD 2016). Currently, the goal is for the defence 
budget to make up 2.5 percent of GDP in the 2030s, and, given a 5 percent increase 
in average military spending in Asia, to have the DOD budget at A$42.4 billion by 
the financial year 2020-2021 (DOD 2016: 24, 49). Thus, it can be seen that Australia 
is still trying to maintain a high level of investment in security in spite of her 
financial difficulties. 
  
5.3.2 Australia’s land forces and minor capability areas 
Australia invests, to some extent, in arming land forces, especially special forces 
dispatched to join overseas operations, and in her cyberwarfare capabilities (DOD 
2009: 88). For defending the Australian homeland, the ADF land forces have to be 
mobile enough to defend her vast territories, sparse islands, and northern territories, 
in case there are attacks from the sea (Ayson 2010: 187-188). The ADF has acquired 
domestically designed and manufactured armed fighting vehicles since 2016 (DOD 
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2009: 79; 2016: 96). To satisfy ADF’s need for airlift capability, the existing CH-47 
helicopters will be replaced by the new MRH-90 helicopters, which will increase the 
ADF’s ability to deploy land forces overseas (DOD 2009: 76; 2013: 86-87; 2016: 
107). Also, the MRH-90 helicopters, as a multi-purpose, cost-saving and 
effectiveness-enhancing weaponry, allows the ADF to maintain a technological edge 
compared to regional states. 
The 2013 Defence White Paper called for the development of a more 
technologically capable system, including upgrades in intelligence and cyber warfare 
systems to deter regional and international cyber threats and surveillance activities in 
a changing security environment. One example is to upgrade the satellite technology 
in order to satisfy “Defence’s needs for mapping, charting, navigation and targeting 
data” (DOD 2009: 82). Other plans include improving intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities, and enhancing capabilities in collaborating with the 
United States. In addition, cyber warfare and electronic defence capabilities are 
improved, and networked forces established to manage and cooperate with other 
departments in the ADF to deter threats (DOD 2009: 81-84). To defend the outlying 
islands, land-based radars are set up to complement aircrafts in conducting 
surveillance operations (Bateman 2007: 120). Finally, a contract was signed with 
Telstra, a semi-state-owned Australian corporation, to upgrade Australia’s 
telecommunication technology (DOD 2013: 81). 
 
5.3.3 Core of Australia’s military upgrade: Navy and air force 
Amphibious ships, aircrafts, and submarines are the major investments made by 
Australia to maximize her capability and advantage in fighting air-sea battles. 
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Amphibious ships 
Amphibious ships provide the ADF with sealift capabilities for land forces to 
defend Australia’s territorial integrity (DOD 2009: 73). Although the Defence White 
Papers also discussed airlift capability with six C-17 Globemaster heavy air transport 
aircrafts and 12 upgraded C-130 series Hercules aircrafts, amphibious ships are more 
effective in terms of the size of forces lifted (DOD 2009: 80; 2013: 89; 2016: 100, 
107). Force 2030 explained the reasons for acquiring amphibious ships as follows: 
  
“…undertake amphibious manoeuvre, and stabilisation and reconstruction 
operations in our immediate neighbourhood, as well as operations further 
afield in support of our wider interests, as determined by Government at the 
time” (DOD 2009: 61, emphases added).  
 
The original plan to build two Canberra-class amphibious ships of 10,000 to 15,000 
tonnes was to allow the deployment of land forces to areas without port facilities 
(DOD 2009: 73). Facing a more militarily capable China, the displacement of the 
Canberra-class is largely over the revised plan, which sets the size of two amphibious 
ships to “at least 20000 tonnes” when first announcement in 2003. In the end, the 
ships are 27,000 tonnes with a flight deck 202.3m long and 32m wide, and are 
capable of lodging helicopters for landing operations and supporting land forces 
(Royal Australian Navy n.d.). The Canberra-class landing helicopter docks, 
Canberra and Adelaide, are essential to upgrading the ADF’s internal interoperability 
between Special Forces, land forces, navy, as well as striking capabilities in order to 
deploy forces overseas and to outer islands. The two Canberra-class amphibious 
ships could also be deployed to execute humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
operations (DOD 2013: 63). One of these ships is now stationed in Townsville to 
increase the mobility of dispatching forces to the northern approaches (DOD 2013: 
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77). According to the 2016 Defence White Paper, 4 percent of the ten-year division 
of investment will be allocated to amphibious ships in the financial year 2025–26 
(DOD 2016: 85). In short, the Canberra-class amphibious ships reveal Australia’s 
determination to protect her offshore islands and deploy forces by enhancing sealift 
capabilities.  
 
Aircraft: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and more 
The proposal to acquire the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) was an essential 
step in retaining air strike capabilities in Australia’s territories, as well as operating 
overseas in collaboration with security allies and partners. In 2009, Australia planned 
to purchase 100 JSFs to replace the aging F/A-18 Super Hornet series (DOD 2009: 
78). In face of criticisms of wasting money, the 2009 White paper appealed to the 
technological advantage of F-35s over other existing aircrafts. Two F-35s were 
delivered before the documentation of the 2013 Defence White Paper, which pledged 
to strengthen the ADF’s strike capabilities (DOD 2013: 77). In cooperation with air 
control aircrafts, like the airborne Early Warning and Control (EWAC) equipped 
aircraft, EA-18G Growler, F-35s equip Australia to fight on the seas in air-sea battles 
to destroy potential adversaries before they approach Australia’s homeland (DOD 
2013: 78; 2016: 95). 
The next question was on the version of F-35 to be bought. The B-type of F-35, 
Lighting II, is capable of “short take-off, vertical landing, STOVL” from ships, 
which ignited the possibility of transforming Canberra-class amphibious ships into 
small aircraft carriers (Brabin-Smith and Schreer 2014), with the F-35s serving as 
jump jets. While then Defence Minister Johnston admitted to such possibility in an 
interview with the West Australian (Butterly 2014), Abbott was later quoted as saying 
“we [the Australian government] haven’t decided precisely what type it might be” 
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(Abbott 2014d). This divergence triggered further debate on whether the ADF should 
transform amphibious ships into aircraft carriers to further improve its strike 
capability in case of contingency (Brabin-Smith and Schreer 2014; Davies 2014). 
However, transforming the Canberra Class into light aircraft carriers is not 
cost-effective (Brabin-Smith and Schreer 2014; Kerin 2015), and the 2016 Defence 
White Paper confirmed that the purchase of STOVL-equipped F-35Bs was not an 
option at the moment (DOD 2016: 95, 99). 
Another item of concern was the F-35’s survivability in dogfights. The Australian 
government defended its decision by noting that the F-35 should be considered a 
multi-purpose aircraft not designed particularly for dogfights, as the F-16 was 
(Davies 2015; McCarthy 2016). The latest purchase of some 3,000 precision-guided 
bombs for the F-35s for air strike operations added fuel to fire in Australia’s 
offensive capability debate (Gady 2016). As of now, financially constrained, 
Australia will buy 72, instead of 100, F-35s, which will enter into operation from 
2020 (DOD 2016: 95). 
 
Submarines: The most widely debated capability for offence? 
Submarines are at the core of Australia’s arming, but their purchase is not without 
controversy. First, there is debate surrounding Australia’s next-generation submarine 
programme, coded the SEA 1000 project, on the purposes of acquiring 
conventionally-generated (that is, non-nuclear) submarines and their specifications. 
Second, financial support for the SEA 1000 raised wide concerns given the planned 
number of submarines to be built. Third, internal debate on where the submarines 
should be purchased and built is keen. 
The next-generation submarines (officially termed the “Future Submarine 
Programme”, coded SEA 1000) were said to be more capable of defending Australia 
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(DOD2009: 29). Both internal and external factors have contributed to the aspiration 
of the SEA 1000 project. Internally, the six currently operating Collins-class 
submarines are suffering from numerous problems, including “buggy control 
software, hydrodynamic flow problems, cracked propellers, seal troubles, and 
vibration issues” (Mizokami 2014), which has seriously affected the operability of 
those submarines. Externally, rising maritime capabilities by Asia-Pacific states 
necessarily soured Australia’s capability edge in the region. Specifically, China’s 
military rise has increased the cost of Australia’s military operation against security 
threats and adversaries engaging in “hostile submarine operations in our approaches 
and our waters” (DOD 2009: 29, 38, 55). The 2009 Defence White Paper decided to 
simultaneously upgrade the existing Collins to extend their operational life into the 
2030s for seamless handover of submarine capabilities to the next-generation 
submarines. It also launched a study on what the next-generation submarines will be 
(DOD 2009: 70-71). Technological assistance on submarines was also provided to 
enhance next-generation submarines’ operability for A2/AD tactics (DOD 2013: 
14-15, 82-83, 111). 
As the SEA 1000 project proceeded, three controversial issues appeared. The first 
issue was from where should the new submarines be purchased. The second 
concerned the cost of the whole submarine programme. Finally, the third issue was 
the location for building the next generation submarines. These all led to Australia’s 
initiation of a competitive evaluation processes. Former Defence Minister Kevin 
Andrews, in a press release on 20 February 2015, revealed that Australia had 
launched a competitive evaluation process for the next-generation submarines. Out of 
the A$50 billion investment in Australia’s security, A$20 billion was dedicated to 
building and A$30 billion to maintenance, and the German, the French, and the 
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Japanese were invited to compete (Australian Government Department of Defence 
Ministers 2015a; Smyth 2015). 
The first question was closely related to Australia’s external security partnerships, 
in particular, that with Japan, which the Abbott government had been trying to 
strengthen. Then Defence Minister Johnston described Japan’s Sōryū class 
submarine as “the best conventional submarine in the world” that fits Australia’s 
aspiration to be a “regionally dominant” submarine power (Corbett 2014). In reality, 
compared to its competitor, in particular, Germany’s Type 216 model manufactured 
by TKMS group, the Sōryū class has advantages in its displacement with a shorter 
length and experience in operating in the more vulnerable Pacific Ocean. However, 
there were several pragmatic difficulties. On the technological side, it was 
questionable if the Japanese were able and willing to modify Sōryū’s design to fit the 
SEA1000 project’s requirement, which was for the submarines to be equipped with 
electronics capable of interoperating with American troops. Also, it was unclear to 
what extent would Japan be willing to transfer her submarine technology to Australia 
(Clark 2015). On the other hand, the fact that Japan is not exporter of submarines and 
its affiliated technologies in the past has made the Australians worried about the 
reliability of adopting Sōryū’s design, or even directly importing Sōryū class 
submarines. Despite this, Japan was sincere and seemingly willing to transfer their 
technology. A report published in October 2015 revealed, if Japan won the bid for 
Australia’s next-generation submarines, they were willing to transfer 100 percent of 
the Sōryū class technology, as well as allowing the submarines to be manufactured in 
Australia (Gady 2015; McPhedran 2015). 
On the pragmatic side, the cost-effectiveness of adopting Japanese Sōryū class 
design or purchasing completely built Sōryū class submarines was under fire. A news 
report that compared the Japanese Sōryū class, TKMS’s Type 216, and the French 
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Shortfin Barracuda summarized that the former is in a weaker position in terms of 
cost-effectiveness, as it requires a more sizable crew and has a shorter operational 
distance, in addition to Japan’s own arms exportation restrictions (Smyth 2015). 
According to the official budget plan of Japan’s Defence Ministry, the construction 
cost for each Sōryū class submarine for domestic use was 51.3 billion yen(equivalent 
to USD506.9 million at the purchasing power of mid-2016)  in 2014, (Japanese 
Ministry of Defense 2013: 5; LaGrone 2014), or USD 6.08 billion dollars (equivalent 
to 7.89 billion Australian dollars) for 12 submarines. It should be noted that this is 
only the cost for Japan to build the Sōryū class submarines in Japan for Japan’s own 
consumption, and is quite obviously not the price the Japanese were going to charge 
the Australians. As the Australian government pointed out, as a programme for 
building 12 submarines over 20 years, the total cost will be highly fluctuating. While 
the Australia government initially planned to spend A$20 billion, the total budget 
was in fact raised to A$50 billion during the competitive evaluation procedure. A 
report in an Australian magazine, the Monthly, had estimated the total cost to be even 
as high as A$60 billion (Corbett 2014). What made the Australians worry about 
adopting the Sōryū’s class design was the possible high maintenance cost as a result 
of Japan’s lack of experience in exporting submarines and the amount of technology 
the Japanese were willing to transfer. 
Finally, Australia was looking to have the next generation submarines built by 
themselves on Australian soil (Clark 2015). Andrews, on announcing the initiation of 
a competitive evaluation processes, remarked that “significant work will be 
undertaken in Australia during the building phase of the future submarine, including 
combat system integration, design assurance and land based testing” (Australian 
Government Department of Defence Ministers 2015a). While it was initially reported 
that the Japanese were willing to build the first submarine in Japan if necessary 
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(Gady 2015; McPhedran 2015), it was later revealed that all competitors in the 
competitive evaluation process had agreed to build the submarines in Adelaide. 
Eventually, the 2016 Defence White Paper stated that the selected model has to 
be of “regionally superior capability and value-for-money for Australian taxpayers 
while maximising the involvement of Australian defence industry” (DOD 2016: 21). 
Also, the White Paper confirmed that the more capable next-generation submarines 
will be launched by the 2030s and the result of the competitive evaluation process 
will be announced before the end of 2016 (DOD 2016: 91-92). The Federal 
Government, in considering the potential opening of a capability gap, has opted for 
continuous efforts to upgrade the existing Collins as a temporary solution, though 
Collins will be operated for another ten to 15 years (DOD 2016: 92).  
In conclusion, Australia aims to enhance its interoperability with the US by 
arming its military with electronic parts that are compatible with the American 
standard. She maintains strong strategic strike capability, acquiring more capable 
multifunctional weaponry with the capacity to strike strategically through medium- 
or long-range missiles and “smarter” tactical bombs. Australia also plans for 
long-term capabilities acquisition to maximize her advantage in military capability to 
deal with security threats and potential adversaries, be them imminent or 
low-intensity, through air-sea battles. 
 
5.4 Chapter summary 
 
The current chapter argued that Australia tries to maximize her security interests 
internally by upgrading her military capabilities and planning for actions to strive for 
this goal. After the Global Financial Crisis, the Australian government started 
worrying about the strategic implication of China’s rise, including the possibility of 
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China harming Australia’s physical security, given that the Chinese PLA’s capability 
in deploying troops to Australia’s northern approaches. Thus, Australia internally 
prepares for her own security through relocating resources to defence planning and 
acquisition of capabilities. Specifically, by maintaining her technological advantages 
over potential threats and preparing for fighting air-sea battles, which best fits her 
geography, Australia is able to maximize her defence advantage over any aggression 
and direct military clashes that threaten her survival. In spite of an increasingly tight 
budget, Australia continues to heavily arm the ADF over fears of the possibility of 
wars with major powers and potential security threats from China. It is thus feasible 
to conclude that Australia is highly fearful of Chinese military forces. 
The next chapter will be on Australia’s external balancing behaviour. Specifically, 
Australia’s effort in strengthening bilateral and multilateral relations with regional 
powers and optimizing external balancing behaviour to gather more powers on the 
Australian side to maximize security will be discussed. 
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6. EXTERNAL BALANCING AND AUSTRALIA’S CHINA POLICY  
 
One of Australia’s strategic goals is to protect the rules-based order. By 
strengthening her existing security alliance with the US and developing and 
consolidating security partnerships with “trustworthy” regional powers, especially 
those liberal democratic powers, Australia seeks to externally balance against China’s 
military rise. 
This chapter argues that Australia’s external balancing behaviour aims at 
maximizing her security interests. This is achieved by further ensuring that 
Australia’s operating region is favourable for her pursuit of strategic interests and 
defence and making certain that the rise of China will not deprive Australia of the 
chance to realize her strategic goals. In particular, unlike adversarial peer states that 
Australia has to deal with by “out-thinking and out-fighting them” (Dupont 2015: 11), 
the optimization of relations with allies and security partners allows Australia to 
maximize security to deny China’s ambition of dominance. Specifically, by not fully 
committing to any security partnership, Canberra prevents herself from being tied 
down in an agreement to contain China, which could potentially lower Australia’s 
security. In addition, Canberra’s effort in strengthening the ANZUS security treaty 
and emerging security partnerships and multilateral security cooperation platforms 
will be investigated. 
 
6.1 The Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty and Australia’s 
security relation with the United States 
 
The ANZUS, in full the Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty, 
signed between Australia, New Zealand and the United States in 1951, includes an 
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article that binds the signatories to engage in collective defence. While New Zealand 
later abandoned the treaty (Commonwealth of Australia 1997b), it can be said that 
the treaty has been a key element in Australia’s foreign policy, and commands the 
support of the majority of Australians (Oliver 2015). In other words, the abandoning 
of the ANZUS treaty is an unthinkable scenario for Australia’s security. In her pursuit 
of strategic interests in the 1950s and 1960s, Australia provided security support for 
the United States (Gelber 1968: 26-34), an effort which has been ongoing and 
considered a basic assumption of Australia’s active diplomatic presence in 
international politics to pursue her strategic interests (DOD 2009: 43-44; 2013: 26-27; 
2016: 70). 
This section first discusses Australia’s perception of the ANZUS security treaty 
before the American introduction of the “pivot”, that is, strategic rebalancing, to Asia. 
It points out that, while the Australian government has affirmed the strategic weight 
of the bilateral security alliance, scholars and commentators have diverse views on 
the alliance and the bilateral security relations. This is followed by a discussion of 
how, after the American introduction of the “pivot”, Australia attempted to strengthen 
its commitment to the security alliance without triggering China’s sanctions or 
punishment. Specifically, it is observed that, driven by the fear of China’s rising 
military power, Australia had devoted more effort to participating in the American 
“pivot”. However, Australia was not containing China, as this would harm her 
economic interests. 
 
6.1.1 The Australian government’s view on the security relationship with the 
ANZUS security treaty before the pivot 
Australia views her alliance with the US as the basis for championing her 
strategic goals, as she perceives both herself and the US as defenders of the status 
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quo, a rules-based order that Australia strives for (as a strategic goal). As evident 
from an Australian official document: 
  
“Our values underpin our reputation as a responsible member of the 
international community, committed to a rules-based global order… Our 
national security arrangements reflect the basic tenets of whom we are as a 
nation” (Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 2013: 7). 
 
Given the existence of overlapping strategic goals on the international level, 
Australia emphasizes the importance of defence support from the US in relation to 
achieving her strategic goals. Specifically, Australia perceives the security alliance 
with the US as a means to ensure her security. Reciprocally, Australia also remains 
committed to the US by maintaining regional and international peace and stability, a 
move that is also in Australia’s strategic interests. Actions taken by the ADF include 
involvement in anti-terrorist campaigns, protection of vulnerable and unstable Pacific 
islands states, provision of humanitarian assistance in operations and disaster relief; 
and active engagement in anti-proliferation campaigns (DOD 2007: 27; 2009: 94; 
2013: 25-26; 2016: 124). In addition, the bilateral security alliance helps Australia to 
deter and defeat major power adversaries, which Australia would otherwise be 
unable to deal with by herself due to insufficient resources (DOD 2009: 50; 2013: 24; 
2016: 71-72). Thus, the ANZUS security treaty marginally increases Australia’s 
security against peer threats, but contributes largely to Australia deterring China’s 
rising military power and ambition of dominance. To these ends, Australia works 
actively with the US to manage regional security affairs to maximize her strategic 
goal, namely, “to building a strong, prosperous and outward-looking Australia”, 
through participation in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance (Rudd 2008b). Politically, 
Rudd drew from the concept of “responsible stakeholder” to engage China in 
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providing regional security for public goods with respect to the security architecture 
in Asia-Pacific (Rudd 2008b).  
Furthermore, as China’s rise has the potential to threaten global peace and 
stability, Australia looked to the Americans’ military presence under the bilateral 
security alliance as a way to check against China’s military ambitions. The 
aforementioned drilling in the Indian Ocean by the Chinese, as an illustration, has 
aroused Australia’s fear over China’s ability of projecting its military power to 
Australia’s approaches. If this accidentally turned into a warring scenario, Australia 
will require the presence of the US in the region to help her defeat China. Particularly, 
Australians are most worried about the possibility of a nuclear strike, a threat that can 
only be deterred by a more powerful state. Section 5.20 of the 2016 Defence White 
Paper explained Australia’s expectation of the American alliance, especially its 
ability to enhance Australia’s security: 
 
“the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the United States can offer 
effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia. 
The presence of United States military forces plays a vital role in ensuring 
security across the Indo-Pacific and the global strategic and economic weight of 
the United States will be essential to the continued effective functioning of the 
rules-based global order” (DOD 2016: 121). 
 
Specifically, Australia hoped for more intensive military training, drills, and an 
expansion in the size of American military stationing in Darwin, Northern Australia 
(DOD 2009: 94; 2013: 41; 123).  
In addition to deterring Chinese nuclear threats, American military presence 
would also assist Australia in dealing with the Taiwan contingency (DOD 2009: 32; 
2013: 30; Tow 2004). In a hypothetic, emergent scenario where China is determined 
to reunify Taiwan by force and American forces are involved in defending Taiwan, 
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Australia will have to choose between collectively defending Taiwan, as stipulated 
by Article 5 of the ANZUS treaty, and risking her friendship with the US for inaction. 
In face of a possible nuclear war, by error or by determination, it would be best for 
Australia to “prepare for the worst” by closely monitoring China’s rising military 
power. In sum, the bilateral security treaty is crucial to Australia for two reasons: 
Deterring and defending against rising Chinese military power, and assisting 
Australia in championing her strategic goals. 
Another key reason for Australia to hold firmly onto the bilateral security alliance 
is to enhance ADF’s interoperability with American troops to further increase her 
power to deter security threats. Then Minister of Defence Material, Jason Clare, 
revealed in a parliamentary debate on 2 November 2011 that 
  
“[A]bout 50 per cent of Australia's war-fighting assets are sourced from the 
United States, and we will replace or upgrade up to 85 per cent of our 
military equipment over the next 10 to 15 years” (Commonwealth of 
Australia House of Representatives 2011a).  
 
Table 6.1 reports the number of times the word “interoperability” appeared in some 
of Australia’s defence documents since the 1994 Defence White Paper. Here, 
“interoperability” points to the ADF’s ability to operate together with American 
military forces and the context of introducing such concept. First, Australian troops 
usually interoperate with American troops to fight adversaries on the sea and in the 
air in legitimate operations authorized by the UN (Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 
99; 2000: 31-32; DOD 2007: 28-29, 2009: 56; 2016: 35). While there is no evidence 
that such joint actions are associated with China’s rise, working with American 
troops in operations would raise the cost for China to attack Australia in potential 
major power conflicts. Second, Australia is continuously seeking new weapons and 
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personnel capable of operating with the US. As mentioned in the 2009 and the 2016 
Defence White Papers, the next-generation submarines have to be technologically 
capable of interoperating with the American navy (DOD 2009: 131; 2016: 90). The 
decision to purchase the F-35 Lightning II aircraft is another example showing how 
Australia is trying to enhance interoperability with the American forces by using of 
the same type of weaponry (DOD 2009: 78-79). Third, the electronic warfare 
systems, like radar and sonar, acquired by Australia are compatible with those used 
by the American armed forces (DOD 2007: 49; 2009: 131; 2013: 41; 2016: 122). 
Clearly, in potential wars with major powers, where security adversaries and 
imminent threats could invade Australia’s homeland directly, the ability for ADF to 
interoperable with American troops would allow the carrying out of the defence 
tactics of deterring threats and adversaries in “air-sea battles”. 
In summary, Australia has long utilized the ANZUS security treaty to “act to 
meet the common danger” (DOD 2009: 94). Even before the introduction of the US 
“Pivot” in Asia, China’s rise has introduced a new and commonly perceived potential 
security threat which has to be balanced. Australia has been increasing her effort in 
balancing against it through strengthening alliance commitments, at least on the 
paper. 
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6.1.2 The relevance of the ANZUS and China’s rise before the American 
rebalancing 
Australia’s security and the ANZUS: Is commitment mandatory? 
Domestically, Australian scholars and politicians have raised questions 
concerning the appropriateness of using the ANZUS to balance against China’s rise. 
While Australians generally welcome the contribution of the ANZUS to Australia’s 
pursuit of her strategic goals, there were concerns, especially during the mid-2000s, 
about whether Australia’s commitment to the ANZUS is for containing China 
(Rosecrance 2006). FitzGerald (1997) viewed positively the idea to engage Asian 
states to work in compliance with the regional rules-based order, and to maintain 
good security relations with the US to check against Asia’s, especially China’s rise. 
He further suggested that, socio-culturally, official ideological lines should be drawn 
to signify what are non-negotiable Australian values (FitzGerald 1997: 159-164). The 
presence of American troops is a necessary condition to champion these goals. In fact, 
during the 1990s to the mid-2000s, Australia’s security relationship with the US 
consistently lowered the difficulty for Australia to pursue strategic goals, which lent 
support to Howard’s closeness to the US, as the best solution to Australia’s security 
uncertainty was to align with the US. However, care should be taken not to be fully 
committed to collective defence, as getting Australia too close to the US could close 
the door to cooperation with East Asian states (Dalrymple 2003).  
Later on, Australians’ view towards the ANZUS became more diversified. 
Scholars who studied Australian-American relations started to question the 
usefulness of the ANZUS security treaty in ensuring Australia’s security. A study 
suggested that Australia could transform the ANZUS security treaty to keep a closer 
check on Chinese military ambitions (Jennings 2005). As opposition leader, Rudd 
also presented his plan to strengthen security-building procedures and confidence in 
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the US by working together to secure a rules-based international order (Rudd 2007). 
On the other hand, former Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade Secretary Stuart Harris wrote that, given the different degrees in perceiving 
China as a security threat, Australia’s security ties with the US might be reconsidered 
(Harris 2005). In particular, Harris argued for a more balanced relation between the 
US and China, and less association of Australia’s defence with the ANZUS security 
treaty (Harris 2005: 237-238). On jointly operating with US troops, there were voices 
asking the Federal Government to reorient her approach to applying the ANZUS 
treaty to defend Taiwan (Jennings 2005; Tow 2005; White 2005) and Australia’s 
commitment to the war on terror. Ayson (2006: 32-37) especially argued against 
Australia’s strong commitment towards the war on terror, which is both blurring 
defence focus of the ADF both regionally and globally and exposing Australia to the 
threat of terrorism on home soil as a result of her strong support for America’s 
position. To quell worries, both Howard and Downer reiterated Australia’s strategic 
independence from the US (Uren 2012: 115-116). 
There were also concerns about Rudd’s position in the 2009 Defence White Paper, 
in which he hinted at containing China. For example, Dibb (2009) remarked that the 
White Paper called for strengthening of the ANZUS alliance to balance against 
increasing Chinese offensive capabilities on the sea, in the air, and in the cyberspace. 
A report from the Kokoda foundation, a security think tank in Australia, also noted 
that the White Paper listed the improvement of ADF’s capability to interoperate with 
US forces in the Pacific as a strategic goal for Australia, as it would help to maintain 
a favourable strategic environment for Australia’s future development regionally 
(Babbage 2011). Keating, PM from 1991-96, questioned the government’s aim of 
tying Australia to the ANZUS alliance to fight against “a major power adversary”, 
which was understood to be China (Keating 2009). Tubilewicz (2010) also held a 
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similar view, claiming that the White Paper’s focus may demonize China’s economic 
rise as a potential military threat to Australia’s security, presenting a one-sided view 
of Australia’s importance in allying with the US to manage rising threats. To 
summarize, while the Federal Government repeatedly affirmed the need to strengthen 
security relations with the United States, there are some domestic concerns about the 
extent Australia that should be committed to the US in regard to balancing against 
China. 
 
White’s “Concert” and controversies surrounding abandoning the ANZUS 
alliance  
In the long debate of Australia-United States-China relations, works by Hugh 
White, security adviser of the Hawke government and a professor at the Australian 
National University, drew public attention. White proposed the idea of “Concert of 
Asia” to accommodate China’s rise (White 2005; 2010; 2013). Accrediting the 
concert concept to Coral Bell, White’s (2005: 473) imagination of the concert was 
that the great powers join together to manage geopolitical affairs with mutual respect. 
In his seminal article in the Quarterly Essay, and later, in his book The China Choice, 
White argued that Australia has to painfully consider the possibility of abandoning 
the ANZUS alliance. Australia should realize her full potential as a middle power in 
the Asia-Pacific region, to work under a rules-based power sharing mechanism 
among regional great powers, the US and China, for instance (White 2010; 2013). 
Specifically, Australia has to manage regional security and political issues, in which 
China will be able to obtain regional co-leadership while, reciprocally, be responsible 
for providing regional political and security common goods together with the US 
(White 2010: 23-24, 39-40; 2013: 138-151). White asserted the need for Australia to 
become powerful enough independently to balance the security threat from China, 
108 
 
thus reconsidering the security guarantee by the ANZUS security alliance (White 
2010: 46; 2013: 137). Others working on the “Concert of Asia” suggested that 
Australia could be an interlocutor between America and China in championing 
mutual understanding and “agree to disagree” (Rosecrance 2006: 367). The “Concert” 
argument implies that Australia has to review critically her security relations with the 
US, reconsidering the utilization of the bilateral security alliance in balancing against 
China’s rise. 
However, the “Concert of Asia” concept was received pessimistically. Worries 
were mainly related to its feasibility and the belief in Australia’s mainstream view of 
balancing against the Chinese ambition of dominance by exercising her increasingly 
more capable military forces. Wesley (2010) argued that White missed out the 
importance for Australia to balance against China by developing security 
partnerships with regional powers like Japan and South Korea. Additionally, Gelber 
(2010) questioned White’s problematic assessment of China’s power, which led to 
the false conclusion that forming a concert requires the relocation of the ANZUS 
alliance. In response to White’s projection of future power, Garrett made clear a 
long-standing position of the government, namely, there is no need to choose 
between the US and China, and suggested that updating the strategic implications to 
the alliance better suits Australia’s commitment to the region (Garrett 2010a; 2010b). 
A more radical response to White was presented by three analysts writing in the 
Australian, who compared the “Concert” to the proposal made by former British PM 
Chamberlain in Munich – appeasing an unappeasable revisionist Chinese military 
muscle in the region (Danby, Ungerer, and Khalil 2010). In summary, while White 
brought about a question of prime importance – that of the future of the ANZUS 
alliance, in his proposal of the “Concert”, his concept of accommodating a rising 
China by reconstructing Australia’s long-term security foundation and rethinking the 
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essentiality of the ANZUS alliance fell short of some form of great power centrism. 
Specifically, White’s thesis placed Australia into a position less significant politically 
and regionally than the Australian government intended to. 
 
6.1.3 Australia’s responses to American rebalancing towards Asia 
The “Pivot to Asia” strategy, also called “strategic rebalance/rebalancing towards 
Asia”, is a series of policies through which the US attempts to maintain her strategic 
primacy in the Asia-Pacific region as a response to China’s rise and the power shift. 
Former American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, writing in the Foreign Policy 
magazine, said she expected Australia to expand the alliance commitment into a 
global security partnership. Specifically, Australia has to exercise collective defence 
against all forms of attacks in the region, threats to freedom of navigation included 
(Clinton 2011). On 16 November 2011, US President Obama and Australian PM 
Julia Gillard agreed to rotate American troops stationed in the northern Australian 
port of Darwin under the Australia-United States Force Posture Initiatives. The 
initiative later became a plan to station 2,500 American Marine Air Ground Task 
Force personnel and military equipment, including high capability aircrafts, in 
Darwin (DOD 2013: 56-57; 2016: 123; Gillard 2011; Reed 2013). In a speech 
delivered to the Parliament of Australia, Obama encouraged Australia’s participation 
in the “pivot to Australia”, in addition to stationing troops in Darwin and jointly 
operating bases on Australian soil (Commonwealth of Australia House of 
Representatives 2011b; Scappatura 2014). Successful legislation of the Treaty 
between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of 
America concerning Defense Trade Cooperation and the Defence Trade Controls Act 
2012 could be viewed as escalating efforts by Australia to further increase logistics 
support of the US rotation in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 2012b).  
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The Pivot also serves as a possible solution for the increasing threat on Australia 
stemming from the rise in Chinese military power. Presenting his government’s 
stance on the South China Sea dispute, Turnbull reiterated that the ANZUS security 
alliance is applicable to balance against Chinese military capabilities if China seeks 
regional hegemony using her strong economic and rising regional military forces, 
which would seriously harm Australia’s pursuit of strategic interests (Sales 2015). In 
addition, Turnbull also revealed that the ANZUS security alliance could be applied to 
contingencies in Southern Pacific and Southeast Asia (Bisley 2014: 311-312; Oliver 
2015).  
In fact, in the eyes of most Australians, the ANZUS treaty is still the backbone of 
the Australia-US alliance. In arguing for Australia to behave more actively towards 
China’s military rise, Bisley (2014: 308, emphasis added) suggested that Australia 
should nurture China to expand “the understanding of that alliance, both in its 
geographic reach and the scope of its participation while strongly committing itself to 
America’s conception of Asia’s regional order”. Renowned Chinese-sceptic journalist 
Greg Sheridan also supported a tough line in defending the security goals of 
Australia by maintaining the global rules-based, democratic order through working 
closer with American forces in the region (Sheridan 2016). It is clear that both of 
them agreed that Australia should participate in the “Pivot” and show her support by 
providing some degree of military assistance in non-fighting missions, cooperating in 
mutual intelligence and surveillance exchanges, and joining further military drills 
(Bisley 2014: 312; Bishop 2014a; Scappatura 2014: 12-13; Tow 2014: 291). 
At the same time, however, there are still concerns over the potential danger of 
Australia’s containment of China. FitzGerald (2012), for instance, criticized the 
interlocking nature of the Gillard government’s US relations, which consequently 
weakened Canberra’s independent military-security policy-making manoeuvres. The 
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late Malcolm Fraser, Australian PM between 1975 and 1983, was concerned about 
Australia’s heavy commitment to the ANZUS. Raising his concern over the Darwin 
port, Fraser contended that, while externally seeking a right power balance in the 
power shift, Australia does not need to obey every call of the United States. 
Furthermore, Fraser argued that Australia could secure American support in external 
balancing against China even if the ANZUS was banned (Fraser 2015). Annual 
opinion polls conducted by the Lowy institute in 2015 found that, albeit the strong 
support for the ANZUS alliance, Australians generally did not think of China as a 
threat more than an economic partner (Oliver 2015). Another survey conducted by 
Australian National University found that around 35% of respondents felt that the US 
and China are equally important and 62% of them did not perceive China to be a 
military threat (McAllister 2014: 6). Finally, when asked about which side Australia 
should take when the US asked for Canberra’s military support to defend the 
American navy fighting against China in the East China Sea, around 80% of the 
respondents urged military neutrality (University of Technology Sydney 
Australia-China Relations Institute 2015). Thus, it can be concluded that, while 
Australians support low-intensity balancing against China to better secure Australia’s 
territories and citizens, it is not in Australia’s interest to contain China by investing 
too much in the American “Pivot”. 
Analysts also raised the possibility of an attack targeting Australian-American 
joint military facilities in Australian cities other than Darwin. A report revealed that 
such facilities located inland became Soviet target during the Cold War (Scappatura 
2014: 13), thus raising the concern of a Chinese attack, which can be nuclear, on 
such facilities. Regarding such worries, McDougall (2014) concluded that Australia 
is better off opting for “soft” balancing. Specifically, this can be achieved by 
investing limited resources in fulfilling her security commitment to partners and the 
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US, and to maximize Australia’s security by striking a balance between alliance 
commitments and not triggering China’s sharp response. Reports on the stationing of 
the American B-1 bomber, in Darwin further triggered Australians’ concern regarding 
whether Australia should commit too much in return for a little increase in security 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2015; Greene 2016). 
The current section argues for the strengthening of Australia’s commitment to the 
ANZUS alliance to better secure her territories, her people and, her strategic goals of 
maintaining regional peace and stability. Despite the many concerns regarding how 
Australia should invest in alliance commitment presented, these concerns mostly 
come from Australia’s strengthening of defence cooperation with the US for security, 
not vice versa. This means that Australia works to better plan for her security, trying 
to maximize American commitment towards Australia. 
 
6.2 Australia’s emerging regional security partnerships and Australia-China 
relations 
 
China’s military rise and her ability to unilaterally change the status quo call for 
balancing strategies from regional powers. Thus, Australia seeks to strengthen 
existing, and establish new, security partnerships with Asia-Pacific regional powers. 
The 2000 Defence White Paper showed the Federal Government’s determination in 
maintaining future regional peace and stability by building bilateral security 
partnerships (Commonwealth of Australia 2000). During her tenure, Gillard raised 
the importance of India as a security partner to balance against China’s rise 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2012a; DOD 2013: 13-14, 65). This section presents 
some of the regional powers Australia sought to build security partnerships with to 
balance against China’s rising military power. 
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6.2.1 Australia-Japan security partnership and Australia’s “China problem” 
Australia-Japan security cooperation at the dawn of the 21st century 
Australia considers the importance of her security partnership with Japan second 
only to that with the US (Ishihara 2013: 82). The bilateral economic relationship 
between Australia and Japan was developed gradually with increasing bilateral trade 
volume in the 1960s and 70s (Whitlam 1981). However, security cooperation lagged 
behind in the Cold War period thanks to the American provision of security common 
goods in the region. Australia and Japan attempted to strengthen bilateral relations on 
regional platforms in the late 1980s and 1990s, including the APEC and the 
Asia-Europe meetings (Sato 2008: 153-154). The focus on Australia’s security 
relationship with Japan in the 1990s was closely linked with the Australia-America 
relationship. So, to Australia, engaging Japan to be responsible for defending the 
American-led regional order was a strategic goal in the 1990s (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1994: 9-10).  
The 2000 Defence White Paper showed Australia’s eagerness to cooperate with 
Japan on security affairs, as both sides held more security dialogues bilaterally or 
with American presence to maintain regional peace and stability (Commonwealth 
2000: 18-19, 37). In addition, Australia highlighted shared values, including 
humanitarian assistance and security-related operations. In the 2000 Defence White 
Paper, the Howard government argued that the foundation of security cooperation 
includes “securing freedom of navigation, non-proliferation and UN peacekeeping 
operations in Southeast Asia” (Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 37; Ishizuka 2006). 
In fact, caveats aside, working in such operations together under the name of the UN 
could help both sides to further cooperate and develop a better security relationship. 
Future agendas on bilateral security cooperation were confirmed by the Sydney 
Declaration released during the Australia-Japan Conference for the 21st Century 
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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan [MOFA] 2001). In short, until the mid-2000s, 
Australia-Japan security cooperation aimed at strengthening bilateral relations under 
the influence of value convergences and both Australia’s and Japan’s security 
alliance with the US. 
 
The 2007 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and 
Australia-Japan cooperative management of China’s rise 
In 2007, Australia signed the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security 
Cooperation with Japan. The Declaration is a well-planned and well-educated 
document on strategic cooperation. Both sides affirmed that the strategic partnership 
between the two countries is based on democratic values, a commitment to human 
rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual 
respect, trust, and deep friendship (MOFA 2007a). Australia’s National Defence 
Update of the same year emphasized the importance of the Australia-Japan bilateral 
relations in maintaining regional and international peace and stability, as well as 
strengthening the Australia-Japan-US trilateral security cooperation (DOD 2007: 19). 
Further, the Joint Declaration makes Australia’s search for strategic goals easier by 
getting Japan’s commitment and responsibilities to provide her with security goods 
(DOD 2007: 35). Some analysts pointed out that the Declaration could be viewed as 
a sign to “hedge” against China’s increasing power by bilateral diplomatic and 
security coordination (Bisley 2008: 40; Ishihara 2013; Tow 2008b: 20-21). Similar to 
the ANZUS, the Rudd government officially rejected the potential of containing 
China by the signing of the Declaration, nor was Australia joining Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe’s “axis of democracy” to contain China (Bisley 2008: 39; Tow 
2008b: 22). Together with the Declaration, Australia and Japan agreed to expand the 
formal 2+2 Ministerial Meeting for deepening personnel exchanges (MOFA 2007b; 
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Togo 2011: 52). In the June 2007 meeting, both sides agreed to further defence 
cooperation, including Japanese deployment of advanced aircraft, such as the P-3C 
and U-4, to join joint military exercises, and continuation of some decade-long 
maritime cooperation in a more focused way to build A2/AD capability (Ball 2006: 
169-170; MOFA 2007b). Summing up, Australia’s efforts in concluding the Joint 
Declaration aimed at assuring Japan’s commitment to enhancing Australia’s security 
in the Asia-Pacific region and checking China’s military rise by extending bilateral 
relations to include more extensive military exchanges. 
 
Post-2007 Australia’s security cooperation with Japan: search for a balance? 
In the latest 2015 Australia-Japan 2+2 annual ministerial meeting, the Australian 
side argued that the freedom of navigation should be preserved. Australia stood on 
“strong opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status 
quo…” (Bishop and Payne 2015). This includes both the East and South China Seas 
where China is acting unilaterally. In fact, since signing the Joint Declaration in 2007, 
Australia-Japan security cooperation has entailed two add-on phenomena in face of 
China’s rising military power and assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. 
The first phenomenon is the extension of the existing security cooperation. China’s 
rise, according to a former Japanese diplomat, is an increasingly worrying aspect in 
the Japan-Australia security cooperation (Togo 2011). One of the actions taken by the 
Abbott government was to tacitly encourage Japan to abandon Article 9 of the 
Japanese Constitution, or “the peace clause”(Schreer 2016: 43). Abbott pursued 
encouragement, rather than intervention, so as not to harm Australia’s security by 
triggering Japanese suspicion over Australia’s intervention of Japan’s domestic 
politics (Kersten 2016). The motive behind the Abbot government’s encouragement 
was to maximize Australia’s security interests by fully releasing Japan from the 
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constraints limiting her build-up of security forces (Schreer 2016: 40; Sheridan 2007), 
and increasing the potential for Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to cooperate 
with the ADF to assist Australia in pursuing the strategic goal of maintaining a 
regional rules-based order (Kresten 2016: 15). Given the technological advancement 
and size of Japan’s SDF, a more independent and fully-functioning Japanese military 
force would be able to introduce a stronger check against China’s military 
assertiveness. After all, Australia’s efforts to strengthen Japan’s security position can 
be viewed as indirectly strengthening Australia’s security position vis-à-vis Japan.  
Another phenomenon of security cooperation between Australia and Japan is the 
planned exchange of weaponry and arms. The signing of the Japan-Australia 
Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement in 2008 obliged Australia and Japan to 
cooperate to enhance logistical support of supplies and services in humanitarian 
missions, exercises and training, and visits of military forces (MOFA 2008). In 
addition, when Australia was upgrading her fleet of submarines, the Abbott 
government once considered pursuing the so-called “Option J” - directly purchasing 
the Japanese Sōryū class submarines without going through the competitive 
evaluation processes. Although the Japanese submarines have technological edges 
when operating in the Pacific Ocean, such plan was viewed by Australians as too 
aggressive and coming close to Japan in regard to exercising security cooperation, 
which may be viewed as containing China (McPhedran 2015; Ishihara 2013: 87-88). 
Simply put, “Option J” was seen as a sign of close Australia-Japan security 
cooperation and Australia’s hedge against China’s rise, and worse, as containment of 
China, which the Australian government wanted to avoid. While “Option J” could 
never be realized, as a French design won the SEA 1000 competitive evaluation 
process, the fact that Japan was considered for weaponry cooperation by Australia for 
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the first time showed Australia’s eagerness to expand her security cooperation with 
Japan (Wroe 2016).  
Australia’s plan to build a collective defence relationship with Japan reflected the 
sentiment of engaging friends to secure one’s position in the region (Bishop 2014b). 
This is security maximization behaviour whereby Australia tries to gain security by 
working better with Japan to achieve Australia’s security and strategic goals: 
Balancing against Chinese military forces and maintaining global peace and stability 
(Bishop 2015). Australia and Japan share close political values, and their relationship, 
in Abbott’s eyes, is special (Abbott 2014e). Turnbull continued his predecessor’s 
close relationship with Japan by emphasizing the importance of Japan as a strategic 
partner sharing values and political systems, rather than just interest in managing 
China’s rise (Turnbull 2009a; 2015d), indicating a possibility for Australia to 
manipulate the security partnership with Japan to maximize security. Diplomatically, 
Turnbull visited Japan three months after coming into office. The Turnbull 
government’s affirmation of Japan’s active posture in participating in regional 
security affairs through Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial 
Consultations shows that there is room for further cooperation on security affairs 
(Turnbull 2015e; DOD 2016: 132). 
 
6.2.2 Australia’s regional power partnership: India and Indonesia 
Apart from Japan, Australia has also sought to strengthen security ties with two 
sizable regional powers, India and Indonesia, which reflect Canberra’s strategic 
thinking of maximizing security through forming strategic partnerships. 
India 
Australia’s relations with India have been fluctuating, and can be accounted for 
partly by Australia’s alliance with the US (Brewster 2012: 119-120). In 1998, the 
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bilateral relations reached a low point after India’s nuclear test, which Australia 
strongly condemned. However, both countries have a reason to form a closer 
relationship, as they are facing a similar “China problem”. 
Australia’s strategic goal to take advantage of strategic, mostly economic, 
opportunities from India’s rise, and India’s “Act East” strategy under the 
newly-elected PM Narendra Modi have provided the opportunity for both sides to 
come closer to each other. Australia tries to engage India, a democracy in 
Indo-Pacific, to become a useful security partner to balance against, but not contain, 
China (Gordon 2007: 89). In 2009, the Australian government signed the Joint 
Declaration on Security Cooperation with India, in which Australia affirmed: 
 
“that the strategic partnership… is based on a shared desire to promote, 
regional and global security, as well as their common commitment to 
democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law” (Australian 
Government High Commission India 2009; Mayer and Jain 2010: 139).  
 
One of the reasons contributing to the signing of the Declaration is that both sides 
felt the need to balance against China’s rise. Both sides needed each other for a better 
security relationship to balance China’s influence in their respective core strategic 
regions, particularly India (Brewster 2010: 555-556). The 2013 Defence White Paper 
argued that security affairs in the Indian Ocean have to be managed with respect to 
India and “other countries with interests in the region”, warning that Chinese has to 
stop from seeking for regional hegemony (DOD 2013: 65). However, Australia’s 
security relationship with India in balancing China’s rising military capabilities is 
based on India’s dropping of her ambition of dominance in the Indian Ocean, which 
harms Australia’s strategic interests (Brewster 2010: 559-560). 
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Australia-India security cooperation in managing China’s rise has shown an 
upward trend in the last decade. Modi’s “Act East” policy contributed to a more 
favourable atmosphere for Australia to further develop an extensive bilateral security 
relationship, which was called for by Indian commentators (Rajendram 2014). 
Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper highlighted her efforts in strengthening 
security cooperation by managing security affairs in the Indian Ocean and in 
Asia-Pacific (DOD 2016: 134-135). On 18 November 2014, a day after concluding 
the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) negotiations, Australia agreed 
on the Framework for Security Cooperation with India. In the Framework, both sides 
promised to further cooperate on various issues, for example, border protection and 
anti-terrorism measures (Government of India Ministry of External Affairs 2014), 
and raised similar concerns on the strategic implications of the reach of Chinese 
submarines based on their successful docking in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Rajendram 
2014; Government of India Ministry of External Affairs 2014).  
Despite Australia’s condemnation of India’s nuclear test in 1998, the changing 
regional security environment has pressurized Australia to cooperate with India in 
terms of joint nuclear technology cooperation. Australia first lifted her ban on 
exporting uranium to India, which started after India’s 1998 nuclear test, by Article 
5c of the action plan in the Framework. Then, in September 2014, Abbott agreed on 
potential nuclear cooperation during a meeting with Modi (Australian Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT] 2014), which finally came into 
force in Australia in November 2015 with the initiation of the Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement. As its name suggests, India is not allowed to use Australia’s 
uranium for military purposes (Roy 2015). Security cooperation is also ongoing, with 
the first bilateral Australia-India joint naval exercise held in September 2015 (DOD 
2015a). 
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Indonesia 
Australia’s security relationship with Indonesia is even more complicated, yet the 
aim of cooperation is the same: To balance against China’s rise. Located directly to 
the south of Indonesia, Australia has some degree of fear of Indonesia’s military 
ambition on her territories. Lingering memories of konfrontasi between 1963 and 
1966, during which then Indonesian President Sukarno strongly objected to the 
creation of the Malayan state, have made Australians worried about antagonism by, 
and confrontation with, Indonesia. During the Cold War, when konfrontasi happened, 
Australia’s security cooperation with Indonesia was not strong. 
However, in 1995, both sides signed the Australian-Indonesian Security 
Agreement to improve their security relationship through regular dialogues and 
exchanges (Brown, Frost and Sherlock 1996). However, Indonesia’s coercive action 
in East Timor and Australia’s participation in the International Force for East Timor 
(INTERFET), had resulted in the abrogation of the agreement. The East Timor 
incident led to a retrogression in bilateral relations for a while, resulting in earlier 
confidence-building efforts being wasted (Australian Government Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 2013; Commonwealth of Australia 2000: 41-42; DOD 
2007: 42). Presently, Timor-Leste remains a concern in Australia’s defence document, 
reminding Australians of the sour experience and possibility of Australia’s military 
engagement in armed conflicts in these smaller states in the late 1990s (DOD 2009: 
42; Lee 2015: 398-399). It was these experiences in the 20th century that held 
Australia back from quickly developing a security relationship with Indonesia. 
Until recently, Australia tried to work closely with Indonesia to balance against 
China’s rising military power in regard to other nonconventional concerns of human 
trafficking and illegal fishing (Gyngell 2007: 111-112; McRae 2014). Turnbull’s visit 
to Jakarta ahead of the 2015 G20 summit and the meeting with Indonesian President 
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Joko Widodo made clear that Australia will engage the Indonesian economy and 
build a more solid bilateral relationship (Turnbull 2015b). In short, although 
Australia did attempt to develop a security partnership with Indonesia to some degree, 
the path for championing this would be much harder than Australia would have liked 
it to be. 
 
6.3 Regional multilateral security platforms: Australia’s fear alleviating tool 
 
Apart from strengthening bilateral security relations with regional liberal 
democracies, Canberra also tries to strengthen mini-lateral (multilateral cooperation 
with a small number of states, usually three to four) and multilateral security 
relationships with regional powers to balance against China’s increasingly capable 
military forces. This section focuses on two important security institutions that 
Australia has participated heavily in, the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) 
mechanism and the Shangri-La Security Dialogue. 
 
6.3.1 The Trilateral (Quadrilateral) Security Dialogue 
The Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) mechanism and its derivative, 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), have a history of more than a decade. The 
United States, Japan, and Australia came together in 2002 to discuss regional security 
issues after they found the inability of the ASEAN regional forum in dealing with 
security affairs. The dialogue finally formalized as the TSD mechanism in a 
ministerial level meeting in Sydney in 2006, with an aim to “maintain stability and 
security globally with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region” (MOFA 2006). 
The key feature of the TSD mechanism is that all participants are liberal democracies, 
and scholars argued that it is the extension of the “spoke-to-spokes’ system” with a 
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potential to contain China’s rise (Green, et. al. 2015; Medcalf 2008; Tow 2008b). The 
derivative of the TSD, the QSD, was held only once in 2007, when TSD members 
invited India to host a meeting to exchange views on managing the power shift. 
However, the Rudd government unilaterally withdrew from the QSD mechanism in 
2008, because his government did not want to irritate China by raising suspicions of 
Australia hoping to contain China (Panda 2014b; Tow 2008b: 21-24; 2008c: 7). 
Rudd’s fear over Chinese action on the QSD mechanism was partly due to former 
Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s controversial proposal of building an “Axis of 
Democracy” within the TSD mechanism (Panda 2014b; Tow 2008b: 22). In this 
sense, Australia tried to optimize the TSD mechanism to build strategic trust with 
Japan and the US to balance a low-intensity security threat, China.  
The TSD mechanism primarily targets the strategic implications of China’s rise, 
while attempting to narrow down the differences between the parties on how to 
manage China’s rise. Some even further argued that the TSD mechanism was 
designed to strengthen the “weak third leg” of the Australia-United States-Japan 
security relations (Tow 2008a: 35; 2008b: 19-20). In fact, Australia-Japan security 
cooperation is facilitated by championing the goal of concluding an agreement 
between Australia and Japan on establishing representatives on negotiating 
technological exchanges (MOFA 2014). Table 6.2 presents how the TSD joint 
statements described China’s rise. The “N/A” noted in the table does not necessarily 
mean that China was not mentioned; the symbol simply represents the fact that 
“China” or “some states” was not specifically mentioned in those joint statements. 
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Table 6.2 reveals that China was quite frequently mentioned the in joint statements 
along with descriptions like coercive or unilateral actions. For instance, the joint 
statement for the 2013 TSD invited strong response from China, as the US, Japan, 
and Australia were strongly opposed to “any coercive or unilateral actions that could 
change the status quo in the East China Sea” (Ayson 2014; Bishop 2013). It should 
be noted that, while a number of statements were intended for China, they did not 
specifically mention China. This may imply, to some extent, that the TSD parties did 
not want to fully anger China and escalate disputes in an irreversible manner.  
Summing up, the TSD mechanism will continue to be an active tool in Australia’s 
strategy. In particular, the TSD will continue to serve as a means to strengthen 
Australia-Japan security relations (Panda 2014b). However, it remains unclear as to 
whether Australia will join Japan and the United States in becoming more assertive 
in balancing China’s military power.  
 
6.3.2 The Shangri-La Security Dialogue 
First held in 2002, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) is an annual ministerial meeting held at the Shangri-La 
Hotel in Singapore. It functions both as a Track 1 security dialogue between defence 
ministers of member states and a Track 2 meeting between unofficial elites from each 
member state (Bisley and Taylor 2015: 32; The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2015). The 
SLD uses voluntary dialogues, which enhance the possibility of building networks of 
security cooperation, like the establishment of the Sino-American defence hotline. It 
is a non-legally binding means of facilitating consensus-reaching dialogue to yield 
ground-breaking results and participants’ deeper understanding of each other’s 
beliefs (Tow 2008c).  
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Recently, the SLD is increasingly linked to Australia’s management of China’s 
military assertiveness, as the TSD defence minister’s meeting is usually held during 
the SLD meeting. China tried to assure Australia and other regional powers that she 
will not unilaterally change the status quo in several SLD meetings. At the same time, 
Australia has explained her stance toward China in recent territorial disputes, 
including asking all concerned powers to work in compliance with existing 
international laws, like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by ASEAN Regional 
Forum (Bisley and Taylor 2015; Tow 2008c). In the 2015 SLD defence ministers’ 
meeting, joining together with Japan and the US, Australian Defence Minister Kevin 
Andrews criticized Chinese arbitrary reclamation of islands in the South China Sea 
as posing a great threat to the freedom of navigation for Australian ships and aviation 
for Australian planes (Andrews 2015; Australian Government Department of 
Defence Ministers 2015b), and called for opposition to any coercive or unilateral 
actions changing the status quo in the East and South China Seas (Andrews 2015; 
BBC 2016).  
However, as suggested in Tow’s (2008b) report to the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI), cooperative security is not effective in managing China’s rise and 
assertiveness, as evidenced by China’s reclamation in the Fiery Cross reef. China is 
an “opportunistic participant” in the SLD, and sees it as a chance for championing 
Beijing’s strategic goals, possibly at the expense of other participants (Bisley and 
Taylor 2015: 42-45). The SLD, in short, does not work to alleviate Australia’s 
insecure feeling towards a rising Chinese power. However, Australia tries to make 
good use of the SLD to champion security cooperation in order to balance against 
China’s rise, including meeting with the Singaporean Minister for Defence Ng Eng 
Hen (Singapore Ministry for Defence 2015).  
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6.4 Chapter summary 
 
Australia seeks to strengthen her security partnerships with regional powers and 
her alliance commitment to the United States to balance against China’s rise. She 
aims to connect with more partners to fight against China and to better secure her 
position in an anarchic international system. Australia assures China by escalating 
bilateral security ties and increasingly intense military exchanges, like a proposal of 
trilateral military exercise that involves both China and the United States (DOD 
2015c). Meanwhile, Australia overtly declared that the ANZUS alliance will not 
transform into a more adversarial containment strategy for China, as that may induce 
losses to Australia’s economic interests given the extensive trading relations between 
the two countries. 
The next chapter will be a discussion of the economic policies that Australia is 
pursuing with China, with particular focus on how Australia tries to maximize her 
economic gains by doing business with China and arguing for how Australia is 
bandwagoning with China for economic profits. 
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7. AUSTRALIA’S ECONOMIC MAXIMIZATION BEHAVIOUR WITH 
CHINA’S RISE: EMERGING BANDWAGONING FOR PROFIT 
BEHAVIOUR? 
 
An argument of the current thesis is that hedgers bandwagon with the rising 
power to maximize economic gains whenever they can, as this allows states to 
champion economic welfare and well-being. Waltz (1979; 1993: 50) pointed out that 
states have to be economically self-sufficient, and attributed the collapse of the 
Soviet Union to her failure in becoming economically sustainable. However, it is 
observed that hedgers try to cooperate rather than aiming to be economically 
self-sufficient, and nowadays, states strive for prosperity by trading and investing 
with others (Foot 2006; Jackson 2014; Kuik 2008; 2015; 2016; Lee 2012; Medeiros 
2005). At the same time, hedgers avoid their economy becoming too reliant on trade 
and investment from the targeted states. This has resulted in pressure on the hedgers 
to control the economy. To deal with this, Wesley (2011) proposed that hedging 
should be a pushing-pulling pair: 
 
“as China’s economic tractor-beam exerts a growing pull in the economic 
make-up and fortunes of its neighbours, many of them grow increasingly 
ambivalent about this situation… trying to avoid full-spectrum dependence 
on China… [T]he reaction has been the marked tightening of relations 
between America and its allies in the Pacific… [T]he result is an 
uncomfortable dynamic for China: as it grows in power and centrality, so the 
offsetting agreements and understandings grow around it to hedge in China’s 
growing influence” (Wesley 2011: 161). 
 
Thus, while hedgers bandwagon with the targeted state for profit maximization, they 
concurrently try to subjectively maximize economic security by preventing the 
targeting state from dominating their own economy. 
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This chapter presents Australia’s economic relationship with China in the period 
1996-2015, with particular focus on the situation after 2003 – a critical year in the 
Australia-China economic relationship that will be justified in the following. In 
addition, worried about Chinese domination of the country’s mining industry, the 
Rudd government attempted to maximize Australia’s economic security by limiting 
Chinese inward investment in the mining sector. After the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008, Australia had to bandwagon with China through economic cooperation to 
maximize profits, though recently, she has turned to forming economic partnerships 
with others to achieve this target, so as to refrain from becoming too reliant 
economically on bilateral trade with China and providing alternative options in 
investment for Australia to her maximize security. 
 
7.1 General patterns of the Australia-China economic relationship, 1996-2015 
 
Most of Australia’s trading partners are countries emphasized by and large in the 
Asian Century. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 
October 2015, 56.5 percent of Australia’s two-way trade had gone to ASEAN+3 
states (10 states from Southeast Asia with China, Japan, and South Korea) and India 
(DFAT 2015b; 2015f).  
Of these 13 trade relations, the Australia-China economic relationship has 
become closer as a result of expanding bilateral economic goods trade to investment 
and services trade. Wang (2012) pointed out that the bilateral trade volumes 
expanded enormously between 1996 and 2010, as evident from Figure 7.1 and 
Appendix 1, both of which report on the bilateral trade volume between the 
Australian financial years (that is, from 1 July to 30 June of next year) of 1995/96 
and 2014/15. It can be seen that Australia’s trade volume with China has expanded 
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quickly, especially since the 2003/04 financial year. By the 2008/09 financial year, 
Australia ended her long time trade deficit from bilateral trade with China, and 
thereafter, Australia enjoyed widening trade surplus in trade with China. 
China’s huge demand for metal ores, especially iron and copper, and natural 
resources, has resulted in the rapid expansion of Australia’s exports to China since 
the 2003/04 financial year (Wang 2012). The former Chinese Ambassador to 
Australia, Fu Ying, described the Australia-China trading patterns as a bell. 
Specifically, Australia exports mainly primary (for example, raw metal materials, 
iron ore, and natural resources) and tertiary goods (such as Australia’s high-quality 
services, including medical, consulting, and educational services) to China, and in 
return, imports mainly light industrial goods (2006, cited in Wang 2012: 175). This 
has contributed to Australia’s trade surplus after the financial year 2008/09.  
One of Australia’s most important exports to China is iron ore. The amount of 
iron ore exported to China expanded since the early 2000s, skyrocketed in the late 
2000s and in the early 2010s, and dropped in the financial year 2014/15, as China’s 
demand for iron ore dropped. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show Australia’s export to China as 
a share of total exports and Australia’s export of iron ore and its concentrates to 
China as a share of total exports to China, respectively. In short, roughly around 10 
percent of Australia’s total exports have been iron ore to China.  
Table 7.1 Australia’s exports to China as a share of total exports in percentage points 
Source: DFAT (2015d: 32-33) 
Financial 
Year 
Australia’s Exports to 
China (A$M) 
Australia’s Total Exports 
(A$M) 
Portion in total 
(percentage) 
2003-04 10,104 143,178 7.1 
2008-09 37,086 285,701 13.0 
2013-14 107,531 339,062 31.7 
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Table 7.2 Australia’s export of iron ore and its concentrates to China as a share of 
total exports to China 
Source: DFAT (2012: 2, 17; 2015d: 87) 
 
Table 7.3 Australia’s exports of iron ore to China as a share of total iron ore exports 
Source: DFAT (2015a: 102; 2015d: 8, 25, 87) 
 
Note: For Tables 7.1 to 7.3, the differences in values after calculation are 
randomly appeared as a consequence of adjustments on the values of trade by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade according to the values of the Australian 
Dollar and rounding processes. 
 
Financial Year Total Exports (A$M) Portion in total (percentage) 
2001 8,848 15.5 
2009 47,922 45.5 
2011 77,105 55.9 
2013-14 107,531 53.1 
2014-15 90,297 46.6 
Financial 
Year 
Total Value of Iron Ore 
Exports (A$M) 
Portion in total 
(percentage) 
Exports of Iron Ore to 
China (A$M) 
2011 62,703 68.7 43077.0 
2012-13 57,075 73.5 41950.1 
2013-14 74,671 76.4 57048.6 
2014-15 54,465 77.2 42047.0 
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Table 7.3 further presents Australia’s exports of iron ore to China as a share of 
her total iron ore exports. Despite a decrease of roughly A$15,000 million in exports 
from 2013/14 to 2014/15 as a result of the slowdown in Chinese economic growth, 
which brings uncertainty to Australia over future economic profits from doing 
business with China (Ng 2015), the portion remained roughly the same. This is 
evidence that Australia’s economy relies heavily on a rising Chinese economy. Since 
the economic downturn in China was mostly seen in heavy industry and the 
manufacturing sector, the demand for other mining goods also dwindled. It was the 
homogeneity in goods exported to China, namely, mining goods (DFAT 2015c), that 
brought the hardest hit on Australia. For example, between 2013/14 and 2014/15, 
export of coal had dropped from A$9.31 billion to A$7.51 billion, gold from A$8.08 
billion to A$6.96 billion, cooper from A$2.17 billion to A$1.89 billion, and other 
kinds of ores from A$2.01 billion to A$1.80 billion. The only exception was 
aluminium, which increased from A$528 million to A$900 million (DFAT 2015d: 87). 
Interestingly, as seen from Figure 7.1, Australia was still able achieve, albeit at a 
smaller amount, trade surplus versus China between 2013/14 and 2014/15. This was 
partly due to Australia’s expansion in exporting agricultural food, which made up for 
the decrease in exports of mining goods.  
Controversially, although Australia also exports uranium and other radioactive 
materials to China, the quantity is too small for developing nuclear arms or assisting 
the initiation of arms race. For instance, Chinese-owned China Guangdong Nuclear 
Power Holdings invested in two-third of the shares of an Australian nuclear mining 
site in 2009 (Huang and Austin 2011: 127-129). 
China was Australian’s second largest importer of service in 2014 (DFAT 2015c). 
This was especially the case for Education and Tourism Services, which brought 
some A$6 billion to Australia (DFAT 2015c). China was also the largest and 
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second-largest country of origin in terms of inbound students and tourists, 
respectively, in 2014 (DFAT 2015a: 38). In 2014, Chinese inbound students 
numbered 121,318 (DFAT 2015a: 38). As for tourists, Table 7.4 highlights the 
number of short-term visitors who stayed in Australia for less than 30 days in 
selected years. 
 
Table 7.4 Chinese short-term inbound tourists to Australia in selected financial years 
(pre-seasonally adjusted data) 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2015 
 
Trying to maximize profits from inbound Chinese tourists, the Australian 
government released the Tourism 2020 strategic plan, which called for expansion in 
the domestic tourist service sector to attract even more Chinese visitors (Australian 
Government Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism 2011). The progress 
report of Tourism 2020, released in September 2012, listed visitors from Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou as targets (Australian Government Tourism Australia 
2012). These are all proofs for the importance of Australia-China economic relations. 
Financial Year Number (per 1,000) 
1995/96 49.7 
2003/04 216.8 
2008/09 350.2 
2014/15 927.7 
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In the other direction, Chinese investment in Australia has also been expanding, 
though the total amount is still small. For example, in 2014, Chinese investment in 
Australia was valued at around A$64.5 billion, which was only 8.5 percent that of the 
US, and smaller than Hong Kong’s A$77.3 billion (DFAT 2015a: 104). Jointly, 
investment from Hong Kong and mainland China was only 18.7 percent that of the 
US (DFAT 2015a). There are three reasons for the low amount of Chinese investment 
in Australia. First, the Chinese used to invest only narrowly in Australian industries, 
before stepping into other industries recently. As pointed out by DFAT (2015a: 38, 
emphasis added), “Chinese investment in Australia, traditionally concentrated in the 
resources and energy sectors, is now diversifying into infrastructure and agriculture”. 
The difference in development level between the two countries is another 
explanation (Commonwealth of Australia 2012a: 12-14; Laurenceson 2013). Finally, 
Australia does not want Chinese investment to dominate the Australian economy, as 
will be described in the next section. 
 
7.2 Australia’s economic security maximization efforts in the bilateral 
Australia-China economic relationship 
 
While states try to do the most business with others, they do not want to be 
dependent on others. Waltz argued that increasing trade interdependence would result 
in asymmetrical trade dependence on the stronger side, resulting in the weakening of 
power of the other side (Waltz 1979: 143-146). Therefore, states want to secure their 
economy from being dominated by others, so as to avoid asymmetrical economic 
dependence. Powell and Mulligan (2015) argued that relying on the exportation of 
raw materials will harm Australia’s economic position in the long run, as it may drag 
the value of the Australian Dollar down in the global exchange market. Furthermore, 
135 
 
Australians are worried about the Chinese “invading” their mining industry and other 
sectors through investment (Folkes 2015). In response, Australia has imposed stricter 
screening of investment in the property market in 2015 (National Australian Bank 
Group Economics 2015). Although Turnbull tried to reject the radical rhetoric on 
Chinese investment as not being an interventionist and counterproductive approach, 
this did not stop the fear over Chinese inward investment made to Australia (Turnbull 
2015a). This section presents how Australia has tried to maximize bilateral economic 
security. The Rudd government’s rejection of Chinese planned investment in the 
mining industry is first investigated, followed by a review of how Australia used 
financial regulations to prevent Chinese economic domination of sensitive industries, 
like mining. Finally, Australia’s efforts to engage China in multilateral institutions to 
maximize Australia’s economic return by creating regional multilateral economic 
governance bodies and free trade areas is discussed 
 
7.2.1 Iron ore and raw materials and Australia’s economic security 
One of the worries facing Australia, as Rudd (2013) pinpointed in his speech to 
the National Press Club on 11 July 2013, is the over-reliance on exporting iron ore to 
China. This was supported by Ross Garnaut (2015), a prominent Australian 
economist, who authored a report for the DFAT in strategic planning for economic 
cooperation with Northeast Asia in 1989, who argued that “Australia’s resources 
boom was a China boom. From 2007 to 2014, China accounted for more than the 
whole of the global increase in steel production”. In dealing with this, Rudd urged 
Australia to rely on her domestic economic policies to recover the federal economy 
and to manage trade relations with China to reduce the overwhelming reliance on 
exporting iron ore to China (Rudd 2013). But before that could be done, the recent 
slowdown in the growth of the Chinese economy has already raised concerns over 
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her consumption of iron ore, which would affect the future quantity of iron ore 
exported from Australia to China. Two of the most cited reasons for the slowing 
Chinese economic growth are the high level of internal debt at the provincial level 
(Norland 2015), and the low efficiency of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in 
reforming their structures (Xinhua News 2015). Since Chinese SOEs are a major 
contributor to the Chinese GDP (Morrison 2015: 26-27), their effectiveness is 
essential to Chinese economic growth. In sum, given that the “new normal” of 
Chinese economic policy is to focus more on economic growth, Australia’s export to 
China will come under pressure (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015). 
In the meanwhile, Australia has tried to set a favourable price for her iron exports, 
thereby maximizing her economic profits. However, a report by the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (2015: 11-15) revealed that global iron ore prices have been decreasing 
since 2011. China is currently Australia’s largest destination of exported iron ore, but 
Chinese investment in Australia’s mining industry is generating fear for Australians, 
as it weakens Australia’s “carrot and stick” approach of sanctioning the Chinese 
ambition of dominance in the future (Wilson 2015b: 225-227). In addition, the 
Chinese ban on exporting rare earth metals to Japan after the 2010 Senkaku Island 
incident has caused Australians’ fear over Chinese readiness to sanction others for 
political goals (Pomfret 2010). In fact, potential Chinese sanctions on importing 
Australian iron ore can be devastating to the Australian economy, and Australia’s 
inability to widen the destinations of her iron ore exports has strengthened her 
vulnerability in regard to doing business with China. On the other hand, Chinese 
investments in Australian mines have resulted in Australians’ fear of Chinese 
domination of the mining industry. Australians are further fearful of Chinese activity 
in Australia pushing iron ore prices down, harming Australia’s future exports. 
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The Rudd government was willing to reject Chinese investment to prevent 
Chinese domination of Australia’s mining industry through subjecting Chinese 
investment proposals to strict screening by the Foreign Investment Review Board 
(FIRB). In 2005, a proposal by China International Trust and Investment Corporation, 
a Chinese state-owned investment company, to dispatch Chinese labourers to work 
for a project in Australia was declined by the FIRB (Uren 2012: 57-58). Although 
allowing this would speed up the work progress, the FIRB believed that it would 
impact Australian jobs. The Rudd government also rejected a deal by Chinese 
state-owned company, Sinosteel, to purchase the Australian mining firm, Midwest, 
by enacting the Foreign Acquisition and Takeover Act (Uren 2012: 58, 66-67). To 
the Rudd government, the decision had prevented the overwhelming inflow of 
Chinese investment to purchase Australian mines, which would allow them to 
dominate the production of Australia’s exporting iron ore. Australia also delayed the 
approval of a trade deal between Chinalco and Australian mining firm, OZ Minerals, 
which included provisions for the Chinese to purchase an Australian mine at 
Prominent Hill, a sensitive location for its proximity to an ADF facility. Fearful of 
the Chinese using the mining site of OZ Minerals to cover up spying activities, the 
Australian government delayed the deal and did not allow Chinalco to purchase more 
than 50 percent of OZ Minerals’ shares (Uren 2012: 101-103). 
Apart from the efforts mentioned above, one of the most famous examples of 
Australia taking action to prevent Chinese domination in her mining sector is the 
rejection of Chinalco’s proposal to merge with Australia’s largest mining firm, Rio 
Tinto. The deal involved Chinalco purchasing 50.1 percent of the shares of Rio Tinto, 
thus becoming the largest shareholder of the company. At the same time, a British 
mining firm, BHP Billiton, also indicated its willingness to purchase a majority of 
the shares of Rio Tinto. Initially, the Rudd government welcomed the Chinese offer. 
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Later, however, driven by fear of the Chinese trying to drag iron ore prices down, 
and in response to public rhetoric to prevent Chinese domination, the FIRB delayed 
the deal between Chinalco and Rio Tinto by asking Chinalco to submit additional 
documents and prolonging the screening procedure. Turnbull has been arguing 
against the deal, because he worried that allowing a Chinese state-owned firm to 
merge with a major Australian mining firm would drive down the price of Australia’s 
iron ore (Turnbull 2009a). Finally, the Rudd government decided to reject the deal 
after a secret meeting of ministers (Uren 2012: 68-78). Subsequently, the deadline for 
the deal between Chinalco and Rio Tinto passed, and BHP Billiton secured the deal 
with Rio Tinto. 
These four cases all point to one thing. That is, Australians are feared of the 
Chinese purchasing large Australia companies. In fact, a 2014 Australian National 
University poll revealed that, to Australians, China is more of an economic threat 
than a military threat, and more of a threat than a partner (McAllister 2014: 6).  
 
7.2.2 Australia’s financial regulations and economic security  
Facing concerns of Chinese investments taking over Australia, Rudd once 
discussed with officials from the FIRB about posing stricter controls on Chinese 
inward investments, per a WikiLeaks document (2009b). His government’s rejections 
of trade deals between Chinese and Australian firms are examples of how Australia 
has used financial regulation to maximize her economic security.  
Apart from trade deals, Chinese investment in the Australian national debt has 
increased, especially after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. In the 2013/14 
financial year, federal debt as a share of Australia’s GDP was 12.8 percent (Hall 
2015), and, according to a report by the Royal Bank of Canada’s economic analyst 
Michael Turner, up to 20 percent of that debt is held by the Chinese (Shapiro 2015).  
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Another restriction set by Australian government is on the import of Chinese 
labourers, which is motivated by the widening unemployment rate in Australia. The 
unemployment rate has risen in recent years from a ten-year low of 4 percent to 
around 6 percent in mid-2015 (Mitchell 2015), bringing suffering to economic 
welfare of Australia because of the decreasing productivity (International Monetary 
Fund 2015a: 20-24). Here, the fear of Chinese labourers competing with Australians 
for jobs has Australia placing a restriction on their import to restore productivity. 
Other than labour restrictions, Australia has also used her high quality and tightly 
regulated financial system to protect her economy from malicious Chinese inward 
investments (Commonwealth of Australia 2012a: 12-14). DFAT (2015:38) reported 
that recent Chinese investments have focused on infrastructure, real estate, and the 
property market, while a KPMG report listed the top three categories of Chinese 
investment in Australia as commercial real estate (46%), infrastructure (21%), and 
leisure and retail (12%) (Hendrischke, et al. 2015: 10). In face of these figures, the 
Australian government tried to impose stricter financial regulations on bilateral free 
trade agreement negotiations, for example, by requiring all investments from China 
over A$1 billion to be screened by the FIRB (Callick and Kitney 2013). In 2013, 
Rudd even announced to temporarily stop negotiating with China given the huge 
differences in Australia’s financial regulation of Chinese inward investment (Davison 
2014; Laurenceson 2013). The Rudd government’s determination in protecting 
Australia’s financial regulatory rules reflected Australia’s fear of allowing suspicious 
Chinese investment into Australia. Finally, the ChAFTA set the threshold on the 
mandatory screening of Chinese investment from A$252 million to A$1.094 billion 
in non-sensitive sectors. However, due to a high level of fear over Chinese 
domination of sensitive industries, including media, telecommunications, and 
defence-related industries, the Australian government kept screening all Chinese 
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investment in these areas (DFAT 2015e: Annex III).  
Furthermore, some argued that there should be better protection of intellectual 
property rights in the FTA negotiations to better protect Australia’s intellectual 
copyrights. Mauger and Stoianoff (2006) argued that the bottom line of Australia in 
free trade negotiations, drawing from the Australian government’s protection of 
intellectual property rights, is set to not concede on abandoning high-quality 
financial regulations. The increasing reliance on exporting iron ore to China to 
maximize economic gains had not been a reason for further expanding Australia’s 
exports at the expense of lifting Australia’s financial regulations on Chinese inward 
investments. 
During the negotiations of the bilateral free trade agreement, the Australian 
government had tried to introduce a well-established dispute settlement mechanism, 
which, some argued, could help Australia defend her business interests by managing 
disputes between Australian and Chinese firms more effectively (He and Sappideen 
2011; Mauger and Stoianoff 2006). However, setting up a dispute settlement 
mechanism needs careful calculation of the distribution of future benefits brought 
about by the mechanism. This includes establishing clearly-defined rules and 
regulations. He and Sappideen (2011) proposed that a further step should be taken to 
set up a dual-layer dispute settlement mechanism, including a layer specially 
designed for ChAFTA to be adopted by both parties. In the end, the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism was introduced specially for settling disputes 
between Australian and Chinese companies, which could be viewed as Australia’s 
efforts to maximize her economic security. The ISDS mechanism has included most 
of the regulations that the Australian government was looking for. It aimed to act 
against discriminatory treatment in regulations in areas like public health and 
environmental industries (DFAT 2015e).  
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While the bilateral free trade agreement negotiation provides a lot of evidence to 
justify how Australia has maximized her economic security, it has not hindered 
Australia’s bandwagoning with China to maximize economic gains, as will be 
explained in the next section. Australia has tried to utilize financial regulations to 
prevent losses from being economically reliant on trading with China, which 
generated nearly 6 percent of Australia’s GDP in 2014 (Rapoza 2015). 
 
7.3 Australia’s maximization of economic security – regional partnership 
building 
 
As a form of balancing security, the Australian Government has been diversifying 
her economic investments to maximize economic security by preventing losses due 
to over-relying on any party, especially China. One of the actions taken by Australia 
was to engage in the America-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, in addition to other 
regional partnerships, through which the government hoped to avoid the worries of 
Waltz, namely, small powers have to economically depend on a great power, as they 
have insufficient ways to prevent themselves from being “dominated” by the great 
powers economically as a result of interdependence. 
 
7.3.1 The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Australia-China relations 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is an American-led regional multilateral 
trade liberalization mechanism. Led by the US, the TPP has 12 members 
championing the goal of establishing more advanced and more liberalized trading 
rules and investment regulations. Among these rules and regulations, the TPP has 
advanced an ISDS mechanism, rejected protection of medicine licences, and 
prevented China from participating in the negotiation stage (Keany 2015). 
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Concluding the TPP has contributed to expanding Australia’s trade with partner states. 
For example, the TPP is the first trading agreement under which Australia has 
secured tariff-free sugar exports to the US. The more advanced trading regulations 
within the TPP also provide easier access to investment overseas (Robb 2015d). 
While the non-transparent negotiation processes had captured some attention, the 
Australian government has been confident in the American provision of high-quality 
regulatory norms and potential economic profits brought over time. While Australia 
had responded sharply over unfavourable trading rules against existing Australian 
business interests, like stricter protection of medicine licensing, the TPP is still seen 
as a countermeasure against Chinese-led Regional Closer Economic Partnership, 
RCEP, of which Australia is also a member (Wesley 2015). As Australia participates 
in both mechanisms, Canberra has secured profits from both trade negotiations. 
Canberra welcomes the TPP, which stresses the importance of the trade agreement. 
As then Trade Minister Andrew Robb put it (2015e): 
 
“Australia is focused on ensuring the TPP will be a high-quality, 
comprehensive trade agreement, which will deliver strong economic 
outcomes for Australia and Australians. The TPP will forge close links 
between Australia and strong and growing markets in our region, enhance 
competitiveness, benefit Australian consumers and create Australian jobs.” 
 
By this, the Australian government tries to shape regional economies, conforming to 
her long-standing belief in influencing the region by maintaining rules-based order. 
 
 
143 
 
7.3.2 Australia’s regional bilateral economic pacts and economic hedge against 
China 
Rather than just deepening the trading relationship with China, Australia has 
recently sought trading partnerships with regional powers, especially by widening 
trading and service opportunities with Indo-Pacific states, as set forth in the Australia 
in the Asian Century white paper. These efforts serve two functions. First, Australia 
tries to maximize her economic gains by establishing cooperative relations with these 
powers. Second, by widening profits made from these states, Australia hopes to 
dilute the effect of China on her economy. In the following, Australia’s economic 
partnership with Japan and South Korea will be used as examples of how she is 
avoiding overreliance on China economically by widening economic profit from the 
two Northeast Asian countries. 
Australia’s economic relationships with Japan and South Korea are not new, as 
they had been dealt with in Ross Garnaut’s report together with China in as early as 
1989. The Garnaut report, prepared for the DFAT, argued for expansion in economic 
engagement between Australia and these three Northeast Asian states based on profit 
maximization and spreading Australia’s norms to liberalize trading relations with 
these states (Garnaut 1989). Australia’s trading with Japan can further be traced back 
to the 1970s, when Australia made proposals to Japan on reducing and removing 
tariffs on imported Australian goods (Whitlam 1981: 87-90). However, it was not 
until late 2013 and July 2014 – much later than the start of the ChAFTA negotiations 
and slightly earlier than the conclusion of the ChAFTA - that Australia’s trade 
negotiations with Japan and South Korea were respectively concluded (Abbott and 
Robb 2013; Robb 2014a).  
Preferential trade negotiations in forming partnerships respectively with Japan 
and South Korea were similar to the ChAFTA process. Differences include the 
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success in including sugar in the tariff schedule in the FTA with South Korea, which 
was perceived by Australians to be a great win for them, as the failure to put sugar in 
the tariff schedule in the ChAFTA was seen as a defeat of Canberra to defend the 
rights of Australians, surrendering Australia’s stance to an economically powerful 
China (Abbott and Robb 2013; Wilson 2015a). In the Statement on the 
Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement, more surprisingly, not only is beef 
included in the tariff schedule, but the time of effectiveness was also immediate 
(Robb 2014a). This is important, because Japan is notorious for the overprotection of 
her agriculture (for example, 785% tariffs for imported rice). In this sense, the trade 
partnership between Australia and Japan reflected something more than economics. 
Given the sincerity that both sides shared in negotiating with each other, they had 
successfully overcome a difficult question on what should not be negotiated. Also, 
the negotiations with both Japan and Australia were faster than that of the ChAFTA, 
as negotiating with rules-based liberal democracies may be much easier than with 
China. 
With closer security cooperation, Australia launched a feasibility investigation on 
free trade negotiations with India in 2008. The bilateral investment was not low, but 
the key difference in Australia-India economic relations is that Australia’s 
merchandise trade value with India remains relatively low compared to China (DFAT 
2015a). Although the FTA negotiation is not principally linked with Australia’s 
economic dependence on China, expanding trade with India, particularly agricultural 
goods, has been essentially important in Australia’s Asian policy (Australian 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of India Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, Government of India Department of Commerce 2009). 
To Australia, the ambition to sign a FTA with India was an extension of her existing 
regional bilateral free trade network to the “emerging democratic superpower of Asia” 
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(Abbott 2014i). Highlighting “democracy”, Abbott explained the political aspects of 
the FTA by remarking that such a negotiation with India is not solely about the 
economy. Rather, it is a means for Australia to engage politically “like” powers to 
ensure that Australia is ontologically safe, even in the field of economic security. 
Like the ChAFTA, Australia planned to complete her Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA) negotiation with India by as early as the end of 
2015. Similar to the cases of Japan and Korea, political similarity served as the base 
for Australia to negotiate effectively with India despite differences in development 
and views on trade protections between the two countries, leading to Robb (2015c) 
naming ChAFTA the worst of all negotiations, as it was not concluded and signed by 
2015.  
 
7.4 Australia’s economic profit-maximization tactics: The case of bandwagoning 
for profit 
 
Australia has expanded economic cooperation with China in the last decade, 
motivated by the desire to increase economic profits. The current thesis proposes that 
Australia’s recent quick and comprehensive expansion of economic cooperation with 
China, particularly after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, is bandwagoning with 
China for profit maximization. The current thesis also argues that the GFC had 
pressurized Australia to bandwagon with China for future profits. This is because, as 
discussed earlier, Australia has increased her reliance on generating economic profits 
by exporting iron ore to China. In addition, China is one of the few states that has not 
suffered seriously from impacts of the GFC. On the other hand, Australia’s domestic 
financial pressures suddenly increased as a consequence of the GFC, leading to a 
deficit in the federal budget, an increase in the domestic unemployment rate, and 
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challenges in sustaining social welfare provision. These have together contributed to 
Australia’s perception that expanding trade with China is the best way to secure 
Australia’s future profits.  
Along with Australia’s economic cooperation with China is her decrease in 
raising questions on political issues that irritate China, for example, human rights. By 
this token, Australia tries to reprioritize her diplomatic goals by emphasizing on 
expanding economic profits through doing business with China, rather than 
spreading political values to socialize China. In particular, the Abbott government 
was quick in making decisions that secure future economic benefits, for instance, 
quickly concluding bilateral FTA negotiations and joining the China-initiated Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank. However, as reviewed in Section 7.2, concerns of 
economic security (control of domestic economy) are still prioritized over 
maximizing inward investments. It is obvious that Australia’s economic 
bandwagoning is a sincere yet restricted one, as the government bandwagon with 
China for profit only in sections and areas that are profitable to Australia. 
This section first reviews some earlier multilateral initiatives used by Australia to 
build a foundation for her bandwagoning for profit, including the APEC and the G20. 
Next, the bilateral free trade negotiation, as a case of Australia’s bandwagoning for 
profit, and the effect of the Abbott government’s rush to conclude the negotiation 
with Australia’s management on future profits will be discussed. Together with 
previous analysis of Australia’s efforts to maximize economic security, this thesis 
argues that Australia is maximizing her economic profits using her preferred 
institutional settings. This allows Australia to best manage her fear of China’s 
economic domination, in addition to contributing to increasing Australia’s economic 
security as the authority to maximize her material well-being. Finally, Australia’s 
changing stance on whether she should join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
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is explained. As will be explained, rather than the simple, overt motives of 
maximizing her future gains by participating in the institution and spreading her 
influence to regional infrastructures, Australia’s reason for joining the AIIB was to 
please, in a sense accommodate, China to secure future economic rewards. 
 
7.4.1 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Group of Twenty 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the APEC, is the first regional 
multilateral institution for economic cooperation. It was set up for better 
championing economic liberalization among members (Hawke 1989). To Australia, 
the APEC is a ground-breaking regional multilateral organization because it was the 
Australian initiative to maximize economic profits by promoting her own institutions 
to liberalize regional states economically (Dieter 2002: 141; Maull 2002: 25). The 
full implementation of the Individual Action Plan (IAP) in 2005 utilized Australia’s 
efforts to open up the Chinese market, building the basis for the FTA negotiation 
(Findlay and Chen 2000: 47-49). 
The APEC has been transformed into a platform for cooperating with other 
regional and global multilateral economic institutions. For instance, a joint press 
release between Australia and China advocated for better collaboration between the 
APEC and the G20 to better champion regional economic cooperation (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2014). In addition, the APEC is 
also gradually promoting negotiations to establish a regional free trade area to 
supplement the maximization of economic profits under ongoing bilateral free trade 
negotiations (Elek 2012: 67-71). In the 2014 APEC meeting held in Beijing, 
Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop affirmed that an open Asia-Pacific free 
trade agreement negotiation was underway (Bishop 2014c). 
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The Group of Twenty economies summit, G20, has also contributed to Australia’s 
profit maximization behaviour in later bilateral free trade agreement negotiations. 
The G20 is an annual meeting of representatives from 20 economies, mostly large 
economies, globally hosted in a member state (G20 2014b). In the G20 leaders’ 
summit of 2014, held in Brisbane, Australia, members agreed to boost investment 
and infrastructure among members. In addition, members of the G20 resolved to aim 
at 2 percent annual economic growth globally, providing millions of jobs worldwide, 
and reforming global economic governance to achieve a fairer and proper 
representation of economic powers of states (G20 2014a). Chinese President Xi 
Jinping delivered a speech in the Australian Parliament after the G20 leaders’ 
meeting, in which he highlighted the importance of boosting international 
infrastructure projects and collaborative efforts made to increase representativeness 
in global economic governance (Xi 2014). In the 2014 G20 leaders’ summit, 
Australia announced that China would be the host of the 2016 G20 Summit (G20 
2014a). Thus, Australia’s hosting of the 2014 G20 leaders’ summit can be used by 
China as an example of hosting her first G20 Summit (Jorgensen and Strube 2014: 
14). Australia also used the opportunity as host to spread her policy agenda, 
including environmental promotion and infrastructure development, which indirectly 
echoed China’s initiation of the AIIB (Sainsbury, et al. 2015). 
 
7.4.2 The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), also called the 
Australia-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA, not to be confused with the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement), is a product of expanding bilateral trade. The 
origin of ChAFTA can be traced back to former Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to 
Australia in 2003, during which Australia had secured the launching of a preliminary 
149 
 
feasibility research on starting bilateral free trade negotiations (DFAT 2005). The 
FTA negotiation had followed Australia’s efforts in relation to engagement. As 
analysed earlier, Australia had engaged China during the negotiation to accept 
various regulatory initiatives, for instance, screening of inward investment by the 
FIRB and the ISDS mechanism. Australia tried to engage China to follow these 
liberalized, institutional regulations to constrain China’s behaviour to maximize her 
economic profits at the expense of Australia’s (DFAT 2005: 131-133). A report 
prepared for the Australian China Business Council predicted that the FTA could 
boost Australian GDP by an additional 0.7 percent per annum from 2020-2030 
(Davis and Hanslow 2008: vi; 47). The Gillard government emphasized in the 
Australian in the Asian Century White Paper that Australia has to be the winner of 
the Asia Century by achieving her strategic and national goals through diplomacy 
with her Asian partners. In the White Paper, Trade Minister Emerson also argued that 
Australia would conduct “negotiation only on ‘token value to our country’” 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2012a: iii; Janda 2012 cited in He 2013: 694). This 
indicates Australia’s ambition to simultaneously maximize subjective security and 
profits. Davison (2014) concurred, suggesting Australia could not gain economic 
profits simply by conceding on negotiating without promoting Australia’s advanced 
regulatory rules to engage China. As analysed previously, Australia has been insisting 
on not withholding screening of Chinese inward investments by the FIRB and 
introducing the ISDS mechanism to resolve disputes. 
After gaining power in 2013, the Abbott government overturned the second Rudd 
government’s cold response to the ChAFTA negotiation. While the Rudd government 
unilaterally withdrew from the negotiation due to huge differences in regulatory 
settings, Abbott openly outlined a 12-month deadline for concluding the bilateral free 
trade agreement negotiation (Abbott 2013), showing his willingness to make some 
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concessions on regulatory settings in order to meet the negotiation deadline. 
Eventually, the negotiation was concluded on 17 November 2014 during Chinese 
president Xi Jinping’s visit to Australia, with the final text of the agreement signed 
on 17 June 2015 (DFAT 2015e). A commentator had raised concerns regarding the 
motive behind rushing to conclude the negotiation within 12 months. As the price of 
iron ore had started collapsing in 2013 and was predicted continue to go downward 
for a longer period of time, that commentator was afraid that the Federal Government 
was trying to make too many concessions for economic return (Laurenceson 2014b). 
In fact, many shared such concerns that the rush may negatively affect Australia’s 
future profit maximizing behaviour by allowing China to enjoy the benefits of facing 
fewer regulatory rules. 
Despite of such worries, the ChAFTA in fact brought Australia huge sectoral 
benefits, as many tariffs and trade barriers were removed. For example, the 30% 
tariff for importing beef into China was lifted (Davison 2014; DFAT 2015e). This 
had contributed to promoting the agricultural sector in Australia, attracting more 
Australians to take up these jobs (Davison 2014; DFAT 2015e). In particular, dairy 
farmers are given huge benefits upon the conclusion of ChAFTA, as Chinese tariff on 
Australia’s exported dairy products would be gradually removed. During the 
negotiation process, Australia felt pressure from the negotiation as she might not be 
able to compare with her New Zealand counterparts (Gray, 2014). However, as 
Agricultural Minister Joyce pointed out, the exclusion of sugar from the tariff 
exclusion table underprivileged the sector (Barbour 2014).  
The service sector is another clear winner. Australia was granted the right to 
participate in infrastructure works and building healthcare service centres and to 
provide medical services in China (DFAT 2015e). In addition, Australia was granted 
Most Favoured Nation status by China in various sectors, for instance, the 
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environment and forestry sectors (DFAT 2015e). Such boosts to the economy would 
benefit the Australian government by providing more job opportunities to solve the 
high domestic unemployment rate. For example, a report by the Centre for 
International Economics (2015:30) summarized that, in aggregate terms, FTAs 
signed between Australia and her Northeast Asian partners (China, Japan and South 
Korea) could result in “a net increase of 7,925 jobs in 2016 and 5,434 jobs in 2035”. 
In the same report, the rate of expansion of all services in all subsectors was 
predicted to be 13.9 percent after 2035 (Centre for international Economics 2015: 27). 
Although these figures do not look large, the signing of ChAFTA is still viewed as an 
attempt by Australia to maximize economic profits vis-a-vis China. Simply put, the 
benefits brought by the FTA for Australia can be summarized as gaining most 
benefits in the most preferential way for Australia during the negotiation, and 
enabling Australia to be the winner in terms of gaining economic profits (Wilson 
2015a). 
 
7.4.3 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
Recall that the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a Chinese-initiated 
economic multilateral investment body emphasizing, particularly, in boosting Asian 
infrastructure. The US had lobbied for South Korea and Australia not to join the AIIB, 
as she was concerned that China’s increasing influence would impact the global 
economic order (Perlez 2014). However, Australian business leaders lobbied for the 
Federal government to join the AIIB as a founding member to start enjoying the 
economic benefits earlier (Carnell 2014). In the APEC meeting in Beijing in 2014 
and during the G20 leaders’ summit, the question of whether Australia would join 
the AIIB became a hot topic. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop emphasized Australia’s 
concerns over the governance of the AIIB in future negotiation processes (Bishop 
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2014c), but He (2014) suggested that Australia should make good use of the 
opportunity to conclude the bilateral free trade negotiation. In addition, Australia 
could maximize her economic influence by collaborating with China to shape the 
institutional settings of the AIIB, for example, by engaging in the pre-founding 
negotiations and introducing Australia’s plans for future investment projects in Asia. 
This was supported by Laurenceson (2014a), who urged Australia to join the AIIB to 
maximize her economic gains, both in terms of monetary profits and institutional 
setting influence, boost investment region-wide, and enhance the governing 
legitimacy of the AIIB. However, Abbott made it clear that any regional multilateral 
institution should be economically beneficial and not dominated by unilateral force. 
While Australia would like to maximize both economic security and profit, reality 
may force her to prioritize the pursuit of one dimension of strategic interests over 
another (Abbott 2014f). This is the case of Australia’s negotiation with China on the 
terms joining the AIIB, which includes rounds of close-door negotiations behind the 
scenes. As mentioned in Chapter 4, negotiation under table bilaterally is something 
non-transparent and policy-making processes in non-transparent way violates 
Australians’ political beliefs. 
In the end, Australia indicated her intention to join the AIIB after considering the 
institutional settings and progress made bilaterally with China on shaping the 
institutional settings. In addition, Australia joined the AIIB, on paper, as it would best 
help Australia manage the “Asia’s infrastructure gap”, that is, the lack of basic 
infrastructure in many Asian states, which Australia had invested heavily in even 
before joining the AIIB, but was unable to accomplish individually due to the lack of 
money (Kus 2014). In fact, Abbott (2015b) mentioned bridging the regional 
infrastructure as the motive for Australia to join the AIIB, under the condition that 
the institutional settings are liberal. Andrew Robb, Abbott’s Trade Minister, also 
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considered institutional settings, along with the intention of her regional major 
economic partners, including the US, Japan, and South Korea, to join as factors in 
deciding whether Australia would pitch in (Robb 2014b).  
Responses by Abbott and Robb affirmed that Australia would only participate in 
the AIIB after limiting potential Chinese domination in the AIIB decision-making 
processes by maximizing the availability of mechanisms to constrain Chinese 
behaviour. Robb (2015a, 2015b) argued that the institutional settings of the AIIB had 
been good enough to allow Australia to better bargain with China, and expressed 
appreciation of the hard work done by the Chinese to improve institutional settings, 
which successfully attracted the British and other European states to join. As the 
Abbott government’s official representative to negotiate with its Chinese 
counterparts, Robb’s statement can be taken as Australia’s stance, which would be to 
join the AIIB to both enjoy chances for further cooperation with China in the future 
and to better influence Asia’s infrastructure. Buckley (2015) supported the decision, 
noting that the loss of benefits would be too great for Australia if it did not join the 
AIIB. However, if Australia decided to join the AIIB, she could gain by influencing 
the AIIB’s regulatory settings. 
Eventually, Australia signed the Articles of Agreement with other founding 
members in June 2015, taking up 36,912 shares out of 1 million, which is 75 percent 
of the total shares from Asia and total shares boosting infrastructure in Asia (The 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 2015). 
The AIIB has reflected one essential point in hedging, which can be understood 
in two ways. While Australia’s joining of the AIIB would have negative effects on 
the bilateral friendship with the US if the decision was not clearly explained and if 
the US was not consulted, the economic benefits of participating in the AIIB, at least 
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according to the Abbott government, would be great enough to compensate for 
sacrificing the friendship. 
 
7.5 Chapter summary 
 
In the economic relationship between Australia and China, the former can 
simultaneously maximize economic security and profits, as detailed in this chapter. 
As evident from the cases of the ChAFTA and the AIIB, Australia has shown a light 
degree of bandwagoning behaviour with China through her attempt to maximize 
future economic profits by pleasing China in two ways. First, Australia decides to 
forego political and institutional issues in order to prevent harsh Chinese responses. 
Second, Australia risks relations with other regional partners in order to maximize 
economic profits. 
In the foreseeable future, although Chinese economic growth is slowing down, 
her financial regulatory standards are nonetheless improving, as evident from her 
gaining of Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the IMF on 30 November 2015 
(International Monetary Fund 2015b). While China’s declining productivity may 
cause Australia some problems due to the latter’s reliance on exporting iron ore to the 
former, Australia’s light bandwagoning efforts for profit maximization will not be 
stopped (Huang 2015; Morrison 2015; OECD 2015: 29). However, current PM 
Turnbull hinted at Australia shifting away from her heavy reliance on mining export 
by developing “the culture of ideas” and continuing to invest in the innovative sector 
to boost the deteriorating Australian economy (Turnbull 2015c). While the effect of 
this plan is outside the scope of this thesis (Borrello and Keany 2015), it is clear that 
Australia’s aim is to become more self-reliant. 
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8. CONCLUSION: KEY FINDINGS, RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS, AND 
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA’S CHINA STRATEGY 
 
8.1 Summary of findings 
 
This thesis hypothesizes that states hedge against power shift to maximize 
strategic interests, and this hypothesis is tested using Australia’s China policy from 
1996 to 2015. It can be seen that Canberra simultaneously balances against, and 
bandwagons with, China to maximize both her security and economic welfare. 
Specifically, Australia seeks economic gains from China to improve domestic 
welfare while occasionally acting against Chinese domination on her soil and her 
over-reliance on bilateral trade with China. While trying to socialize China into the 
status quo-regional order, Australia still balances China at low intensity. Australia has 
perceived China’s rising military power as a low-intensity threat to her physical 
security, so she balances against it by two means. The first mean is to acquire arms to 
better equip its navy and air force to increase her defensive advantage, while the 
second is to establish security partnerships with other countries to send signals to 
China regarding Canberra’s determination to pay higher costs if China seeks regional 
hegemony. Diplomatically, Australia also maximizes security by enmeshing China 
into regional multilateral institutions with norms and values Australia holds. 
The Howard government started Australia’s hedging against China’s rise. 
Australia’s China policy during the Howard era was to maximize gains through the 
promotion of bilateral economic relations while engaging China to shape Chinese 
behaviours. Trade volumes and size of investment were expanded (Kuik 2015). 
However, the Howard government felt that global terrorism was more threatening to 
Australia’s security than China’s rising military power. Therefore, in his 11 years of 
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the premiership, Australia did not invest heavily in the military to hedge against 
China’s rise. Nonetheless, Australia was still cautious about China’s future military 
power, which drove the Howard government to strengthen security ties with the US 
and Japan. 
The “China problem” was sharpened due to China’s rapid economic and military 
rise and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The Rudd government responded to 
changes in geopolitics in the 2009 Defence White Paper, calling for increased 
investment in armament, for example, by acquiring more surface ships, submarines, 
and combat aircrafts. At the same time, the Rudd government was sceptical of 
China’s inward investments in Australia, seeing them as threats to Australia’s control 
over her own industries and multinational companies. The Gillard government 
continued Rudd’s China policy by rejecting any criticism of Rudd government that 
Australia was trying to contain China. Her Australian in the Asian Century White 
Paper presented a moderate approach to engaging China through Australia’s norms 
and regulatory rules. In short, the Gillard government hedged against China’s rise by 
continuing policies of the Rudd government. 
The Abbott government showed heavier bandwagoning behaviours with China 
economically. Specifically, Australia rushed to join the AIIB and concluded the 
bilateral free trade agreement with China during Abbott’s tenure, which raised 
domestic concerns over kowtowing to China for money. Concurrently, unilateral 
military actions by China in the South China Sea have pushed Australia into pursuing 
balancing efforts. The Abbott government tried to invest more in the defence budget 
to better arm the Australian Defence Forces. Externally, Abbott government tried to 
form and strengthen economic and security partnerships with India and, particularly, 
Japan, whom Abbott planned on buying Sōryū class submarines from. 
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In summary, this thesis concludes that, throughout the years when Howard first 
held power to the ousting of the Abbott government, Australia has been pursuing 
hedging behaviours against China’s rise. Such behaviours are driven both by her fear 
of China’s power and the prospect of economic profit from a rising China 
 
8.2 Theoretical implications on Australia’s strategic dilemma in China policy 
 
The hedging strategy is a mixture of different policies. Hedgers act differently in 
different strategic dimensions. While conventional understanding of the motive for 
hedging is loss minimization, the current thesis argues the true motive for hedging is 
gains maximization. Kenneth Waltz (1979: 126) emphasised that security is the 
highest goal of states, and to increase states’ power is to enhance their security. 
However, this thesis argues that both security and profit are states’ core strategic 
goals. When the situation is peaceful and there is no imminent threat, states can 
simultaneously maximize both security interest and profit. However, when hedgers 
see potential security threat, they will try to maximize security through balancing 
efforts. Concurrently, hedgers maximize economic welfare and well-being by 
bandwagoning with a rising great power for economic profit. Thus, in this sense, 
hedging strategy is a strategic behaviour adopted by many regional powers to pursue 
strategic interests, irrespective of their prioritization of these interests. They try to 
maximize both economic and security interests rather than seeking one by sacrificing 
another. Thus, hedging strategy better secures a state’s strategic interests in an 
anarchic world. Maximizing security and economic interests in an anarchy would 
require investments in different strategic dimensions. Hedgers gain security by 
practicing the self-help principle while simultaneously attempting to advance its 
economic welfare by bandwagoning with a rising state. 
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8.2.1 Hedging strategy: Its endurance and persistence 
After explaining the motive for pursing hedging strategy as interest maximization, 
the thesis continues with how hedging strategy will endure. This question examines 
the prospect for hedging strategy to transform into a pure balancing strategy. 
Matsuda (2012: 114-116) argued that hedging strategy has a high potential to be 
transformed into a pure balancing strategy when hedger’s balancing motives override 
profit considerations. Therefore, when balancing behaviour is observed in a state’s 
hedging strategy, it is inappropriate to conclude that the balancing behaviour is a 
balancing “strategy”, as a balancing strategy shows significant sacrifices of a 
balancer’s economic interests for security interests, a large investment in military 
capabilities, and formation of formal security alliances. As shown in this study, the 
Australian government has carefully hedged against China’s rise without sacrificing 
economic interests for better security. On the other hand, there are scholars who 
argued that hedging strategy can be transformed into more peaceful and cooperative 
way (Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Jackson 2014). The current thesis argues that, if 
hedgers do not perceive the targeted state as an imminent threat, the hedging strategy 
will not change into a pure balancing strategy or bandwagoning for security.  
 
8.2.2 Limitations on studying hedging as maximizing gains 
Due to time and space, there are some limitations to this research. First, the effect 
of domestic politics on Australia’s China policy is not discussed. In a liberal 
democracy, different governments have their own agenda, and the new one does not 
necessarily have to follow the direction of the old one. However, as evident from 
previous analyses, differences in handling domestic policies do not change the fact 
that Australia is fearful of China’s rising military power, and thus, have not affected 
Australia’s hedging strategy as a response to China’s rise. Meanwhile, Australia will 
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continue to maximize economic profits from doing business with China. Australia 
will not sacrifice her economic interests by pursuing a pure balancing posture toward 
a rising China, as China is still not an imminent threat to Australia’s security. 
Another limitation is that Australia’s trilateral relationships with the United States 
and China has not been discussed in full, despite it being frequently studied in the 
field (e.g., Bisley 2014; Wesley 2011; 2015; White 2010). Although the US is an 
important party in Australia’s balancing efforts against China’s rise, a very detailed 
description of the trilateral relations is not necessary for the purpose of this study, as 
a study on how Australia deals with her strategic dilemma is an investigation on how 
Australia has managed to choose between balancing against or bandwagoning with 
China, not how she should choose between the US and China.  
 
8.3 Australia’s China policy after Abbott: Continuations and changes 
 
Finally, this thesis offer a prediction on how Australia’s China policy will evolve 
after incumbent PM Malcolm Turnbull ousted Tony Abbott in September 2015. So 
far, the Turnbull government continues to hedge against a rising China by 
maximizing both economic profits and security. For instance, Treasurer Scott 
Morrison’s rejected a proposed Chinese inward investment in 80 percent of shares of 
Australia’s largest land holding, S. Kidman and Co. Limited (Morrison 2016). The 
2016 Defence White Paper also revealed Australia’s continuous arming efforts, even 
though the Federal budget is tightening. Therefore, the current thesis predicts that 
there will be no significant changes in Australia’s strategic response to China’s rise. 
After all, it is a political consensus that Australia is forced to hedge against China’s 
military rise. Although Australians do not support a pure balancing strategy against 
China, they nonetheless believe that it is necessary to balance against China’s rising 
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military power. In addition, Australians will continue to look for opportunities to 
make their country stable and prosperous, specifically, by reaping economic profits 
from doing business with China and by refraining from raising sensitive political 
issues that make Chinese unhappy. As long as the “China problem” persists, 
Australia will not shift her hedging strategy to either pure balancing strategy or pure 
bandwagoning strategy. As such, it is foreseeable that the July 2016 general election 
will not have a major effect on Australia’s strategic response to China’s rise. 
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APPENDIX  
 
1. AUSTRALIA-CHINA TRADE FIGURES, FINANCIAL YEAR 1995/96 TO 
2014/15 
 
Source: DFAT (2011; 2012; 2014; 2015: 39), Wang (2012) 
Notes: 
1) Volumes are in millions of Australian Dollars 
2) To ensure data accuracy, the numbers above were recorded from DFAT record on 
trade volumes using the finalized data listed in annual reports of the DFAT, which are 
partially based on the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Data for 2014/15 is yet to be 
finalized.  
Financial year  Exports Imports Bilateral Trade volume Australia's net balance 
1995/96 3781 4010 7791 -229 
1996/97 3584 4203 7787 -619 
1997/98 3872 5304 9176 -1432 
1998/99 3948 6106 10054 -2158 
1999/2000 4959 7520 12479 -2561 
2000/01 6846 9881 16727 -3035 
2001/02 7781 11278 19059 -3497 
2002/03 9300 13727 23027 -4427 
2003/04 10104 15126 25230 -5022 
2004/05 12296 16871 29167 -4575 
2005/06 18621 22541 41162 -3920 
2006/07 23705 26598 50303 -2893 
2007/08 27722 30278 58000 -2556 
2008/09 37086 36707 73793 379 
2009/10 47991 37252 85243 10739 
2010/11 64295 40907 105202 23388 
2011/12 77103 43929 121032 33174 
2012/13 79260 46402 125662 32858 
2013/14 101709 49295 151004 52414 
2014/15 98273 54256 152529 44017 
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